Under what conditions are two utterances peformances of the same word? by Morasch, Nathalie
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2011 Nathalie Morasch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ARE TWO UTTERANCES PEFORMANCES 
OF THE SAME WORD? 
      
 
 
 
 
 
BY  
 
NATHALIE MORASCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy  
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
  Doctoral Committee: 
 
 Professor Garry Ebbs, Chair  
Associate Professor Steven Wagner, Co-Chair 
Professor Timothy McCarthy 
Professor Peter Lasersohn 
 
 
 
  ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
     Starting from the fact that people sometimes use the “same” words to talk about a given 
topic, I want to clarify what word-sameness comes to in those uses.  I will adopt an epistemic 
framework, in which words are primarily instruments that render the inter-subjective transfer 
of knowledge possible. 
     In the course of my dissertation I refine Kaplan’s notion of words to propose an account 
that occupies the middle ground between (social) anti-individualism and the kind of 
individualism that individuates a speaker’s words without input from the speaker’s linguistic 
community.  I make the case that speakers keep track of the various performances of a given 
word w via a mental register.  According to my proposal, the conceptions the speaker comes 
to associate with her mental register over time may play a role in whether we ought to identify 
her idiolectal word w with the public word w’.  I will argue that in the end we must leave it up 
to the speaker’s own (informed) judgment whether she interprets her word w as repeating a 
particular public word w’.   
     According to Kaplan the individual speaker’s word w is referentially bound to the public 
word w’ through her intentions to repeat w’.  I stress that the intention to repeat her own words 
w trumps the intention to repeat the word w’ produced by some other speaker.  I attempt to 
solve Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle and problems of self-knowledge by arguing that the speaker 
cannot be wrong about how she keeps track of her own words.  
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ARE TWO UTTERANCES PERFORMANCES1 OF THE 
SAME WORD?  PROPOSAL:  PHYSICAL RESEMBLANCE 
1.0  Introduction 
The transmission of knowledge across speakers and intra-subjective reasoning rely on our 
ability to express one and the same thought from one occasion to the next.  With “same thought” 
I mean something of the following:  You tell me:  “Syrus is a dog.”  Days later I reason:  “If 
Syrus is a dog2, then Syrus needs daily exercise.”  I recall your utterance:  “Syrus is a dog.”  So I 
conclude:  “Syrus needs daily exercise.”  The validity of my modus ponens reasoning depends on 
the respective elements of my utterances expressing the same thing.3  For example, the 
consequent expressed by the last part of my first utterance, and the conclusion expressed by my 
last utterance must say the same thing.  Moreover, your original utterance and my report of it 
must say the same thing.  I can’t rely on information4 offered by other people if I don’t, at the 
very least, understand what their utterances state.5   
                                                
1 The term “performance” is taken from a forthcoming paper from Lepore and Hawthorne entitled “On 
Words.” 
2 A young and healthy dog, that is.   
3 See also Fine (2009):  p. 1. 
4 I am using a very narrow notion of “information” here; with “information” I mean the content of an 
utterance.   
5 I am assuming here that we can theoretically target sentence meaning independently of the pragmatic 
meaning of an utterance.  I will not be dealing with problems of contextual enrichment or implicature.  
Some utterances merely provide a “semantic skeleton”, which needs to be fleshed out via contextual 
enrichment such as to make the respective utterance propositional (Recanati (2004): chapter 1).  Consider 
the following utterance by John, a student getting ready to host a party:  “Every beer is in the fridge”.  
John clearly doesn’t mean to say that every beer in the universe is in the fridge.  There are multiple 
candidate propositions:   
P1   Every beer we will serve later is in the fridge. 
P2  Every beer we bought at the corner store is in the fridge.   
P3 Every beer for the party is in the fridge. 
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Starting from the fact that people sometimes use the “same” words to talk about a given topic 
(i.e. the individual Syrus or dogs in general), I want to clarify what word-sameness comes to in 
those uses.  I will explore what notion of words is pre-supposed by our linguistic communicative 
exchanges.  In this epistemic framework, words are primarily instruments or tools that render the 
inter-subjective transfer of knowledge – about the co-occupied environment (conceived broadly) 
– possible.6   
In my above reasoning about the individual Syrus, I rely on knowledge acquired via 
testimony.  I cannot employ a statement S of yours in an argument, unless I, at the very least, 
understand S – which presupposes that I understand the words you are using in the respective 
utterance.7,8   
                                                                                                                                                       
P4 Every beer in the kitchen is in the fridge. 
The problem with multiple candidates is that even if John had uttered: “Every beer is in the fridge” with 
any particular proposition in mind (which he need not), the audience can still understand the utterance 
without entertaining that same proposition (Buchanan & Ostertag (2005)). 
Grice considers the following utterance:  “Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is 
grammatical” Grice (1961).  The speaker may have intended to convey any of the following propositions: 
P1 Jones is/was a poor student. 
P2 Jones doesn’t have the intellectual virtues required for graduate work. 
P3 Jones should not be admitted to the graduate program. 
P4 I am not in the position to say anything stronger.   
P5 Jones is not prepared for graduate work.   
Again, the audience may have understood the original utterance without having entertained any particular 
proposition of the list above. 
I will therefore concentrate on utterances with as little contextually variant meaning as possible.  Even my 
conclusion:  “Syrus needs daily exercise” is contextually variant.  With the proper name ‘Syrus’ I 
designate a specific dog of that name, not some dog or other named ‘Syrus’.  When I specify ‘daily 
exercise’ I don’t have in mind a stroll around the block, I have in mind 3-5 miles of brisk walking.   
6 According to Evans “communication is essentially a mode of transmission of knowledge” (Evans 
(1982):  p. 310).  This, he explains “should debar us from certifying anything as successful 
communication which is intrinsically incapable of conveying knowledge” (ibid.:  p. 320).   
Other works in which this framework is endorsed:  Heck (1995); Goldberg (2007a); Ebbs (2009).  
7 We must also assume that I understand the compositional structure of my utterances and yours, that is, I 
understand what each contributes to the meaning of the utterance as a whole.   
8 I will leave other epistemic conditions for the reliable transfer of knowledge via testimony aside and 
focus merely on the linguistic aspects. 
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I will take for granted that each speaker knows the “semantic content” of their own words, 
that is, I understand what my (present) expressions state9 and am entitled to state biconditionals 
of the following kind: 
(a) x satisfies my word ‘dog’ if and only if x is a dog10,11 
I could then attempt to express the “meaning” of your words in terms of my own.  This allows us 
to theoretically circumvent the provision of a general account of meaning, or semantic content.  
For example, the meaning of your word ‘dog’ I can state thus: 
 (b) x satisfies my word ‘dog’ if and only if x satisfies your word ‘dog’12,13 
If your word ‘dog’ and my word ‘dog are one and the same14, then (b) is true.15  Finally, I can 
express what your word ‘dog’ means: 
(c) x satisfies your word ‘dog’ if and only if x is a dog16 
Suppose we have a longer conversation about the origins of the dog and how the domestication 
of the latter is inherently connected to our own evolutionary anthropology.  You will utter 
                                                
9 Burge (1988).   
10 Tarski (1994) was the first to propose a definition of truth in terms of satisfaction conditions.  
11 Even though I here propose to define sentence meaning in terms of satisfaction conditions (which is 
controversial), nothing in my account depends on such a disquotational approach.  If, one prefers to talk 
about sentence meanings using propositions, this is compatible with my account.   
12 If you used the word ‘dog’ in such a way that it is satisfied by all and only fish, I could not extend a 
judgment of sameness of satisfaction to your word ‘dog’ as described above. I would have to say instead: 
“x satisfies my word ‘dog’ if and only if x satisfies your word ‘fish’.”   
13 Ebbs explains how such intra-subjective word-individuations are learned, yet typically non-
deliberative; they constitute nonetheless judgments because we will reject such communicative 
assumptions such as (b), if we come to think of them as wrong (Ebbs (2009):  p. 5).   
14 As I will discuss in this chapter, phonetic and graphic identity are not sufficient conditions for two 
speakers to be using the same word.  If you only know the word ‘bank’ denoting a financial institution 
and all I am familiar with is the word ‘bank that denotes the slope along the river, then I cannot state the 
satisfaction conditions for your word ‘bank’ thus: 
 x satisfies my word ‘bank’ if and only if x satisfies your word ‘bank’.   
15 Usually when two speakers belong to the same linguistic community, they are able to state satisfaction 
conditions of each other’s words (as described above).  Parts of my dissertation deal with isolated 
exceptions to this normality.   
16 See also Ebbs (2009):  chapter 4.    
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several tokens17 “dog1”, “dog2”, “dog3” … “dogn” and I will produce a multitude of tokens 
“dog1’”, “dog2’”, “dog3’” … “dogm” of my own.  In order for us to have a successfully 
communicate18, I need to be able to do more than merely “link” an individual word token to one 
of your word tokens.  I must be able to keep track of my own tokens as instantiating a unified 
word-type and also identify your individual tokens as the same word-type ‘dog’.  So, in (a) 
through (c) we are actually referring to words as types.   
Let’s take a closer look at (a), which is not as trivially true as it seems at first.  If the two 
underlined tokens constitute performances19 of the same word, then I stated something true.20  
We may realize that the two word tokens are spelled the same, but that doesn’t suffice for them 
to constitute tokens of the same word type.  Consider the following bi-conditional: 
(d) x satisfies my word ‘robin’ if and only if x is a robin21 
If in (d) the first underlined word token is an instance of the British English word ‘robin’ and the 
second underlined word token is an instance of the American English word ‘robin’, then the bi-
conditional is false.  It is intuitive to assume that we simply don’t make such mistakes with 
regard to classifying our own word tokens.  The European Robin and the American Robin are 
distinct species of birds.   
                                                
17 Peirce used the terms ‘type and ‘token’ to indicate a distinction between two senses of the word ‘word’.  
Although there is only one definite article, ‘the’, in English, there are apt to be about twenty instances of 
it on a single page (Peirce, Charles Sanders (1931-58)). 
18 That is, have the kind of conversation where the transfer of knowledge is possible.   
19 When I talk about Aristotle the shipping magnate and utter: “Aristotle…”, then I thereby performed the 
name ‘Aristotle’.  If, at a different occasion I talk about Aristotle the philosopher and utter:  “Aristotle…”, 
then I thereby performed the name ‘Aristotle’.  Those names sound and look very similar, but they do not 
constitute performances of the same word.  If I utter:  “‘Aristotle’ contains nine letters”, then I also 
performed the name ‘Aristotle’ – I mentioned it.  Perhaps use and mention are different modes of 
presentation.   
20 The biconditional can hold true, without the used word being the same as the mentioned word.  For 
example, I could say: “x satisfies my word ‘urchin’ if and only if x is a hedgehog” and thereby utter a true 
biconditional.  Whenever the words in question are synonyms of one another, the biconditional is true.   
21 Example taken from Ebbs (2009):  pp.114-115; see also Putnam (2001):  p. 22. 
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Words are types instantiated in utterances as tokens.  Ebbs explains how most theories of 
meaning subscribe to a two-step word individuation process: 
(U) Two word tokens t and t’ are of the same word type if and only if  
(i) t and t’ are each tokens of the same orthographic or phonetic type, and 
(ii) facts about the explanatory-use22 of t and t’ determine that they each have 
semantic values and that their semantic values are the same.23 
It is agreed that tokens of the word ‘bank’ denoting a financial institution and ‘bank’ denoting 
the slope of a river are not instances of the same word-type, even though they share the same 
orthographic or phonetic type.  It is thus tempting to conclude that there must be some additional 
facts that divide the tokens in question into separate types.  It is these facts that Ebbs tries to 
capture with the expression ‘explanatory-use’:  the kinds of facts that supposedly determine the 
meaning or satisfaction conditions of a given token (i.e. the cognitive content of the speaker, 
causal-historical facts, the social environment of the speaker or the physical environment of the 
speaker). 24  
In the present chapter, I will show that there is no intrinsic relationship between word tokens 
that would allow us to define an orthographic or phonetic type – beyond a perceived relation.  As 
a result, the individuation process collapses into step (ii).25  
1.1  Proposal:  all and only tokens of a given word type share a common “form” 
We communicate our thoughts through physical word tokens, or marks.26  Marks are physical 
objects such as inscriptions in ink, the composite sound coming out of the mouth of a speaker, 
                                                
22 This terminology is introduced by Ebbs (2009).   
23 Ebbs (2009):  p.112; Ebbs rejects the token and explanatory-use model of words (U).   
24 Ebbs (2009):  p.6.  
25 We could attempt to reword (i) into something of the following:  t and t’ are each perceived as tokens of 
the same orthographic or phonetic type by the appropriate judges.  Of course, much will depend on who is 
entitled to make such evaluations.  The multiplicity of ways in which various tokens of a given type can 
be realized in are still going to constitute serious challenges for (U).   
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hand signals, raised dots, ripples in the sand – just to name a few.  Some of those marks, i.e. a 
blob of ink that I accidentally shook out of my fountain pen, don’t represent anything; others are 
replicas27 of pictures or meaningful strings of characters such as words or numerals – and 
eventually utterances.  Can we specify what all and only marks of the word ‘dog’ have in 
common?  Do they perhpas all share the same distinct shape, form or pattern?   
A word can be realized in a variety of symbolic systems:  The word ‘dog’, for instance, can be 
physically conveyed through a visual (i.e. a grapheme, hand signal, short-hand symbol, or Gödel 
Number), auditory (i.e. a phoneme or sequence of Morse Code) or tactile sign (i.e. a symbol in 
Braille).28  The grapheme and phoneme for the word ‘dog’ don’t have anything in common, 
capable of recognizing them as a unified pair distinct from tokens of the word ‘cat’, except that 
they are tokens of the word type ‘dog’ and not ‘cat’.  Not only do we not see a common form 
among all and only word tokens of the word type ‘dog’, we couldn’t even come up with some 
shared equivalence relation.29  Defining the word types in terms of a resemblance relation among 
the tokens of the type comes full-circle; the only distinctive resemblance between the utterance 
‘dog’ and the written inscription ‘dog’ is their membership in the same word type.30  In fact, they 
                                                                                                                                                       
26 ‘Mark’ is a technical term adopted from Goodman (1976) and also found in Ebbs (2009).  Goodman 
may in turn have adopted it from Peirce, who writes:  “For a “possible” Sign I have no better designation 
than a Tone, though I am considering replacing it by “Mark”. […] An Actual Sign I call a Token; a 
Necessitant Sign a Type” (Peirce (1908, 1998):  p. 480).  Goodman’s technical term ‘mark’ seems to be 
better translated as Peirce’s ‘token’ than Peirce’s ‘mark’.   
27 ‘Replica’ is a technical term adopted from Goodman ((1976):  chapter 4), who in turn may have 
adopted it from Peirce:  “Every legisign [i.e. word] signifies through an instance of its application, which 
may be termed a Replica of it.  […]  Each single instance of [the single word “the”] is a Replica” (Peirce 
(1903,1998):  p. 291.  Goodman’s nominalist notion of replica is, however, missing in Peirce.  You can 
find Goodman’s notion of marks developed further by Ebbs ((2009):  chapter 4).  
28 As far as I know we don’t have a symbolic system that relies on our gustatory or olfactory senses. 
29 With the exception of perhaps mental word tokens? 
30 For those who wonder whether we couldn’t say that two marks are replicas of the same word type only 
if they have the same denotation, recall that the ink spill mark looking like this:  ‘dog’ doesn’t denote 
dogs.  Only once we determined that a mark indeed is a word (or other linguistic entity) do we know that 
it has a semantic value.   
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appear so radically distinct, that we couldn’t even rely on some sort of family resemblance 
relation among marks of a given linguistic type across distinct symbolic systems.   
Maybe there is some abstract form that categorizes all the marks into word types, but we 
don’t see that form in all the tokens.  How an abstract form or pattern is supposed to single out 
its tokens by itself is puzzling, at best?31,32  If what “glues” the tokens into a type is the abstract 
pattern instantiated in all of them, but we don’t notice that instantiation, then we have an 
explanatory problem.  It is not sufficient for the word type ‘dog’ to merely exist.  This type is 
supposed to facilitate our intra-subjective reasoning and the inter-subjective exchanges of 
information.  Therefore, unless we can somehow come to know of it and reliably recognize its 
instantiations, the abstract form cannot explain those processes.   
 
1.2  Proposal: all and only tokens of a given word type resemble each other within a symbolic 
system 
Couldn’t we at least group the tokens of the word ‘dog’ within each symbolic system in terms 
of resemblance, such that the following strings: 
  i)  dog 
  ii)  DOG 
  iii)  Dog 
are all similar to each other relative to the Latin Writing Script?  Given that we probably haven’t 
yet exhausted all the possible symbolic systems, we won’t be able to create a complete list of the 
                                                
31 Ebbs (2006): p. 115. 
32 It is also puzzling how we could, in principle, have knowledge of abstract objects, due to their acausal 
nature (Wetzel (2000):  p.368).  At the same time we take for granted that we have knowledge of 
mathematical entities (such as numbers and circles).  Therefore, unless we can explain the relevant 
ontological difference between abstract mathematical objects and abstract linguistic objects, we cannot 
reject the latter to do any theoretic work on the basis of epistemic concerns, without rejecting the former.     
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representative categories.  We could begin by compiling all the existing ones (Braille, American 
Sign Language, International Sign Language, Writing System in Latin Alphabet, Spoken 
Language…).  Resemblance would then “merely” have to group the tokens within each symbolic 
system.   
Since everything resembles everything in some respect or other, we have to distinguish 
degrees of resemblance.  Let’s specify a set of features (i.e. shape, color, size, orientation, etc.) 
on the basis of which to categorize marks. Within a selection of marks, the two that display the 
most overlap in features are also the most similar to one another.33   
Consider the following string of marks: 
9    9  9  6 
The second, third and fourth marks are all replicas of the first with one feature changed: size, 
then color and finally orientation.  In a context neutral setting, those marks are all equally similar 
to one another and thus any grouping of the above marks bear claim to forming a class.  For 
example, equal shape and coloration – subset 1: 
9    9  6 
Or equal shape and size – subset 2: 
9  9  6 
Or equal shape and orientation – subset 3: 
                                                
33 Goodman also considers this suggestion and rejects it (see Goodman (1970):  p.26).   
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9    9  9 
If we had asked actual users of those marks – people who use those marks as characters – most 
of them would have picked subset 3 as the one that selects a relevant type.  Some features we 
more habitually pay attention to than others.  Individuating numerals is something we often have 
to master in order to communicate numbers to one another.  If we are on a tight budget, it matters 
whether a given piece of meat costs $6 or $9 per pound.  As it turns out the change in color and 
size are irrelevant modifications (as long as the result is legible) – given the context of 
individuating marks as replicas of characters, or numerals more specifically.   
Whether a subset groups together marks of an interesting type, depends on whether we have a 
use for the type in our ordinary activities.34  One may object that this doesn’t mean that only 
those types that matter to human activities should be of importance in general. However, if all 
subsets of the original series form a type, then we fail to mark a useful distinction.  At least in 
this example, the disinterested observer:  nature, doesn’t group the tokens into types for us.   
A person, a dog and a dust particle are all extended in space.  Which two members of this set 
are more alike than the third?  You may think that of course, the dog and the human are more 
like each other as contrasted with a dust particle.  The dog and the person are both capable of 
perception; they are both mammals, which implies they have a heart, can breathe in oxygen 
through air, the females give birth to live off-spring which are fed with breast-milk…  There are, 
however, important characteristics shared by a person and a dust-particle (which dogs lack):  the 
                                                
34 Sometimes we classify individual (people) into types, which has significant socio-political 
consequences.  Consider the following monologue from the movie A Single Man directed by Tom Ford:  
“There are all sorts of minorities.  Blonds, for example [pauses] people with freckles.  The minority is 
only thought of as one when it constitutes some kind of threat to the majority – a real threat or an 
imagined one.  […] Minorities are just people, people like us […]”.   
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person and the dust particle are alike because they are tailless, furless, not four-legged, unable to 
bark, unable to track via sense of scent, lacking curiosity for excrements…35 In terms of 
taxonomies relevant to human activities a person is clearly more like a dog than a dust particle.  
In order for resemblance to be a relation capable of drawing contrasts, we must pick some, but 
not all, shared properties as salient.  Salience is in the eye of the beholder – an individual or 
group of individuals.  It is not an intrinsic feature of the objects under consideration.36  Which 
similarities are of importance to our community relies on the kinds of activities we engage in.  
Picking up on the salient groupings of tokens is learned through participation in those activities.  
When we say that marks m1 and m2 are similar to one another, we mean that m1 and m2 are 
similar to each other with regard to respect R – the presence of certain properties we care about 
(for one reason or other).  This reduces the similarity relation to the presence (or absence) of the 
property or properties we regard as salient to the type – thereby rendering similarity itself 
superfluous.37   
1.3 Proposal: all and only types of a given word type resemble each other in some salient 
respect within a symbolic system  
Recalling our example of numeral individuation you may think:  that was easy!  So marks 
replicating the numeral ‘9’ all share the same orientation and (geometric) shape.  But what do 
you mean with ‘shape’?  You go on to propose a geometric construction for the ideal-numeral-
                                                
35 I failed to come up with features that are present in the person and in the dust particle, but not in the 
dog.  Sometimes individual marks are unified by the lack of a trait.   
Consider the series:    
⎜  ⎜  ⎡   
The first and the second are more similar, because they lack the horizontal line extending from the top.   
36 “But how could a pattern or form settle which respects are relevant?  The idea of an abstract form or 
pattern that somehow by itself singles out its tokens is puzzling, at best” (see Ebbs (2009) p. 115).   
37 Goodman (1970):  p. 27.   
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nine-shape:  let’s first draw a circle and divide it by drawing the North-South38 diameter through 
it.  Next we “discard” the West39 segment thereby created (that is, the left arch and the diameter 
get erased).  For our last step we draw a circle with half the radius of the original circle attached 
to the top end-point of our arch such as to touch two (the maximum amount of) points along it.40  
After that, no rotations allowed!  This construction describes the shape that all marks replicating 
the numeral nine have in common.   
Of course actual physical replicas of the numeral ‘9’ deviate from the “ideal” geometric shape 
constructed above.  To begin with, geometrical lines have no width, or thickness, while all actual 
physical replicas that we recognize as the numeral nine must have width, or we couldn’t possibly 
perceive them.  How could an ideal numeral-nine construction relate to actual numeral nines in 
physical space?  Clearly it is not the case that we have in mind or are somehow guided by 
something like the above construction rule when we write a replica of the numeral nine.  Even if 
we were actually guided by such a homogenous construction rule, we would all have to interpret 
the rule homogenously. Just looking at how people actually draw the numeral nine, we realize 
that either we aren’t guided by the same rule, or we interpret it differently.  Some people start 
their numeral nine on the top (beginning to draw the small circle first), others on the bottom.  
Then again, some draw a small circle and attach a straight line.  That means we are forced once 
more to look at the end-products – the marks – and categorize them in accordance with some 
resemblance relationship.   
                                                
38 North-South would be the diameter parallel to the y-axis.    
39 West would have to be defined relative to the x-axis.     
40 I am only proposing this as one of several possible ideal mathematical numeral nine-constructions.   
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As mentioned before, it is puzzling how an abstract form could somehow by itself specify 
which “deviant” physical marks constitute appropriate copies of it – relevant to our purposes.41,42   
1.4   Proposal: relative to a particular context, all and only types of a given word type resemble 
each other in some salient respect within a symbolic system      
Let’s take a closer look at actual character tokens – do tokens of a given character share any 
(limited amount of) properties?  Consider the series: 
a d A 
Figure 1.143 
In terms of intrinsic features, the first two marks are more similar to one another. Nevertheless, it 
is the first and the second mark that are considered replicas of the same character type. This 
means (intrinsic) similarity between marks is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
them to replicate the same character.   
Let’s observe the following strings next: 
 
                                                
41 Ebbs (2009):  pp. 114-120.  
42 Invoking abstract entities to account for the grouping of marks as characters makes us vulnerable to 
long-standing – but controversial – epistemic objections: 
[T]he truth values of our mathematical assertions depend on facts invoking platonic entities that 
reside in a realm outside of space-time.  There are no causal connections between the entities in 
the platonic realm and ourselves;  how then can we have any knowledge of what is going on in 
that realm?  And perhaps more fundamentally, what could make a particular word like ‘two’, or 
particular belief state of our brains, stand for or be about a particular one of the absolute infinity 
of objects in that realm? 
If we cannot explain our knowledge of geometric shapes, then we cannot explain our knowledge of 
characters in terms of geometric shapes.  This leaves us at a loss elucidating why all replicas of the 
numeral nine share the same shape and how this shared shape facilitates communication and reasoning.  
Field (1980):  p.1. 
43 This example is taken from Goodman (1976):  p. 138; the order of the letters has been changed.   
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ISABELLE 
language 
I0 + 20 = 30 
Figure 1.2 
The first mark of the above three strings of marks are identical (except for their location in space 
and their environment).  In the first string, the first mark is a replica of the capital letter ‘I’.  In 
the second string that same mark is a replica of a different letter, the small letter ‘l’.  In the last 
sequence the same mark doesn’t stand for a letter at all, but is a replica of a numeral.  The 
identification of the mark as a replica of a particular character depends on the marks that follow 
it (and what characters those marks replicate) and its location in the sequence it is a part of.  The 
three marks in question are ambiguous.  Although indistinguishable in terms of intrinsic features, 
they all replicate different character types.  Notice how the marks in question could all pass as 
“standard”44 replicas of distinct characters.  Even physical identity (that is, constituting an exact 
copy) is not a sufficient condition for character-hood.  If we had encountered the first marks of 
the three strings of figure 1.2 above in isolation, we would have been at a loss of how to 
individuate them in terms of characters.  Imagine a person draws ‘I’ on a piece of paper.  Only 
the producer of that mark would know what character she intended to replicate, or whether she 
perhaps just drew a line with no character in mind (unless she sincerely shares that information 
                                                
44 A standard replica is one with a high degree of recognizability by competent users of the character in 
question.  We cannot define ‘standard’ as very similar to the ideal pattern or form, since we have yet to 
find a working definition of ‘similar to’ and we don’t know how an abstract pattern could be similar to a 
physical token.   
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with us).  According to Kaplan we cannot individuate marks as replicas of characters without 
taking into account the intentions of the producer.45 
 
 
Figure 1.346 
In figure 1.3 the first and the last mark were written by different authors – authors A and B 
respectively.  Both marks are replicas of the numeral ‘4’.  If the middle digit was written by B, 
then it is clearly a ‘9’.  If the same mark was produced by A, then it could also be a ‘4’, albeit a 
somewhat botched ‘4’.  The individuation of the mark as a replica of a given numeral sometimes 
depends on the style of handwriting.  Figure 1.3 shows furthermore that some marks may deviate 
from the standard way of writing a character.  The middle mark may be a standard replica of the 
numeral ‘9’, but it is not a standard replica of the numeral ‘4’ (regardless of authorship).   
 
 
Figure 1.447 
In figure 1.4, the last letter of the first word and the second letter of the second word constitute 
identical marks.  Nevertheless, each mark is a replica of a different letter type.  Letter 
individuation is dependent on the progression of the string of letters (‘bad’ and ‘man’ are words 
                                                
45 Kaplan (1990); see my chapter three on further discussion of Kaplan’s notion of words. 
46 This example and the accompanying figure are taken from Sas (2006). 
47 This example is taken from Goodman (1976):  p. 138.   
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of our vocabulary, while ‘baa’ and ‘mdn’ are not meaningful letter sequences in English48), as 
well as the style of handwriting or choice of font.  Which of the following two styles:  
i) a 
ii) a   
is the small letter ‘a’ written more like?  In contrast to the first example, the mark in question is 
not a standard replica of the letter ‘a’ or ‘d’.  The confusion arises partly, because (even 
assuming a certain style or font) the mark falls in-between what would count as a “standard” 
replica of an ‘a’ or ‘d’.  It is the context that settles (partly) whether the borderline instance is a 
replica of the letter ‘a’ or ‘d’.   
1.5  Added hurdle: accounting for replicas constituting mistakes     
Not only do we have to account for one and the same mark replicating different characters, 
depending on context, we also have to allow for the possibility that a mark is considered in-
between the standard replica of two different characters.  In addition, some tokens are 
misspelled, mispronounced or otherwise mis-“shaped” versions of the linguistic type.  If I 
accidentally hit the ‘D’ key, instead of hitting the ‘A’ key when typing the word ‘man’, such as 
to produce: ‘mdn’, then the second letter of that word doesn’t replicate a highly deviant ‘a’; 
instead, I misspelled the word ‘man’.  It is only by considering ‘mdn’ a token of the word ‘man’ 
that we can account for its mistaken spelling – otherwise it constitutes just a meaningless string 
of letters.   
                                                
48 Of course it is possible that the second mark in figure 1.4 is simply a misspelled version of ‘man’.  
Perhaps the writer got distracted and was thinking of a loved one whose name starts with a ‘D’.  The 
mistake may even go unnoticed.  But if you showed her the result, she would say:  ‘Oh no, I spelled 
‘man’ with a ‘d’ in the middle!’.  She wouldn’t say:  ‘This is how I write my ‘a’ letters’.  I think those 
retrospective judgments are of philosophical importance.  I will discuss this in a later chapter.   
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Foreigners often pronounce words with the wrong inflection.  I used to consistently pronounce 
‘reciprocal’ with an accent on the ‘o’, instead of the ‘i’.  The correct pronunciation simply 
wouldn’t stick.  This “insignificant” deviation from the norm would confuse my interlocutors 
(unless they were close friends already used to my quirky pronunciations) to such a degree that 
they were unable to recognize my phonetic production as a replica of ‘reciprocal’.  I think it 
accords with our pre-theoretic intuitions that I still managed to use the English word ‘reciprocal’, 
even though competent speakers didn’t recognize it as such.  Kaplan agrees: 
I would claim that a mispronunciation of a word is an utterance (a Pronunciation, if you will) of 
that word.  […]  It’s just that the subject can’t come anywhere close to giving the word a standard 
pronunciation.49 
There is a surprising lack of homogeneity in (acceptable) word-pronunciation even within an 
individual’s idiolect.  In some contexts, perhaps while reading out loud or speaking to somebody 
who is less familiar with the English language, I may carefully enunciate all six syllables of the 
word ‘extraordinary’.  At other times, when speaking very quickly or perhaps when slightly 
tired, I will shorten it to merely four syllables.50  Some English words have more than one 
correct spelling such as:  ‘medieval’, which has two alternative spellings:  ‘mediaeval’ and 
‘medieval’.51  As long as we could reduce each pronunciation or spelling to a very limited list of 
options – that is, one or a few more strings of phonemes or letters – these variations shouldn’t 
constitute a problem.  However, this means we theoretically depend on phoneme or letter types.  
We have yet to offer an account of letter types; phoneme types are even harder to account for.52  
As if matters were not already complex enough, what is considered correct spelling may change 
depending on the medium.  In a mobile phone text-message, the pronoun ‘you’, for instance, is 
                                                
49 Kaplan (1990):  p.105. 
50 Wetzel (2006).   
51 This example is taken from Janssen & Visser (2004). 
52 Wetzel (2009):  pp.65-68. 
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often written:  ‘u’ – although this would be considered a mistake in most other written media.  
Similar variations can be found with respect to phoneme types which are sensitive to class- and 
regional-dialects and need not even be constant throughout an idiolect.53 
1.6  Final Proposal:  relative to a particular context, all and only types of a given word type 
resemble each other in some salient respect within a symbolic system as recognized by a 
computer program          
Although intrinsic resemblance between two marks is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for those marks to replicate the same character type, surely resemblance – even if it is 
the kind we habitually pay attention to (resemblance in a particular respect) – must guide us 
somehow in the individuation process.  If each replica of a given letter were radically different 
from its next, how could we ever individuate words?  Communication would be unimaginable.  
The individuation of marks as replicas of certain types depends on the general purpose of the 
activity in which the mark was produced, as well as more narrowly construed contextual factors 
within linguistic reproduction: such as “style” of characters and the individuation of the 
surrounding characters and the placement of the mark within a meaningful string of symbols.  
Certainly the naïve snapshot approach failed:  even when it comes to the identification of marks 
as replicas of characters, the snapshot that captures the intrinsic features of the mark is not 
sufficient (nor necessary) information.  We furthermore need extrinsic information that sets the 
mark within a meaningful context of a given practice.  Not all tokens of a given character type 
share the same shape, but they display family resemblances.  Can we render those family 
                                                
53 Wetzel (2006). 
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resemblance features transparent with the help of mathematical formulas and thereby program 
computers to do the individuating work for us? 
Computer science is individually tackling those issues with programs such as:  spell-checker, 
predictive text generation, optical character recognition and speech recognition – just to name a 
few.54  Although optical character recognition for a typewritten text is achieved with very high 
success rates, there is presently no computer-automated method that recognizes handwritten 
characters with acceptably low error rates55 (unless the dictionary is very restricted, as for 
instance, when individuating marks entered on the amount line of personal checks).  Computer 
scientists are challenged by (i) regional differences in conventions of how to write or draw letters 
using the same alphabet or graphemes and (ii) variations across individuals (see figure 1.3).  In 
order to overcome regional and author-specific variations some methods identify the author first 
by relying on features such as:  (average) mark width, (average) mark height (distinguishing 
between marks replicating small or capital letters), relation between width to height, average 
distance between individual marks within a string of marks, distance between individual strings 
of marks, average writing slant and angle…56  Significantly higher recognition rates are achieved 
by employing author recognition techniques.57         
Spell-checker programs (as used in Microsoft Word) are able to identify word tokens as 
misspelled word types and suggest a correction.  Such programs compare word tokens against a 
dictionary of correctly spelled words.  For example if I mistype ‘word’ as ‘wor’, my spell-
checker will offer the following options: ‘work’, ‘word’, ‘worn’, worm’, ‘wore’, ‘war’, ‘woe’, 
                                                
54 See Kukich (1992); Golding, Golding & Roth (1999); Sas (2006). 
55 “First, the richness of the linguistic structures that must be represented results in extremely high-
dimensional features spaces for the problems.  Second, any given target concept depends on only a small 
subset of the features, leaving a huge balance of features that are irrelevant to that particular concept 
[emphasis added]” (Golding & Roth (1999)). 
56 Ibid.   
57 Ibid.   
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‘worry’.  Those options are ranked in terms of (i) how commonly the word type occurs in the 
language generally, or on the basis of frequency of use in documents on the respective personal 
computer or in the particular text, as well as by (ii) the degree of (letter) deviation between the 
misspelled sequence and the proposed one and (iii) the distance of the corrected letter(s) in the 
proposed word on the keyboard from the ones that were erroneously typed.  There are two major 
problems with this approach:  (a) if the misspelled string matches the correct spelling of a 
different word, the spell-checker won’t be able to identify the mistake58 and (b) in many cases 
the program is not able to link the string to only one word, it merely matches it to a small 
selection of distinct words (sometimes not even words of the same grammatical type).    
In order to avoid the aforementioned problems more sophisticated models that allow for 
context-sensitive spelling correction are being developed.59,60  The context features tested are 
word tokens near the target word (that is, the word type with correct letter type order), as well as 
patterns of parts of speech around the target word.  In addition to a dictionary, the computer is 
provided with confusion sets containing homophones {whether, weather}, {hear, here}, {there, 
their}…, and typographical errors {form, from}, {desert, dessert}, {maybe, may be}.61  
Examples of useful features for the first confusion set {whether, weather} include: 
 (1)  ‘cloudy’ within ±10 words 
 (2) ____ ‘to’ followed by a verb 
If (1) is encountered, then it is highly likely that ‘weather’ was intended.  If (2) occurs, then 
‘whether’ is probably the target word.  Of course, we will have to deal with tricky cases such as:  
‘I don’t know whether cloudy weather is to be expected’.  Major improvements are being 
                                                
58 Such errors account for anywhere from 25 to over 50% of observed spelling errors (Kukich (1992)). 
59 Golding & Roth (1999). 
60 Microsoft Word 2007, like several other text-writing programs, already makes use of such a context 
sensitive spelling program. 
61 Golding & Roth (1999). 
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achieved in word individuation for spell-check purposes.  The question is ultimately whether we 
can identify a limited number of features that can, for each context and for all confusion sets, 
select the target word.  The more features and confusion sets we add in order to increase 
completeness (the distinction of all words in all “actual” confusion sets) the more 
computationally challenging becomes the task.  Since increasing the amount of features to test 
for, also adds irrelevant features for the distinction of the words of a given confusion set in a 
particular sentence62, I wonder whether completeness will eventually interfere with soundness 
(the identification of the target word).  Notice, however, that we already perform some of the 
classification work for the computer, by hitting specific keys on the keyboard (or by selecting 
from the symbol menu). Whenever I want to produce a token of the letter ‘d’ I have to press the 
‘D’ key.  The production of character tokens through a computer is standardized. 
Will we be able to combine programs that correct spelling mistakes (such as spell-checker or 
predictive word-generating) with optical character recognition for handwritten text, or speech 
recognition such as to avoid having to input marks produced by humans and thus first make 
those marks recognizable to the computer?   
Computer generated characters of a particular font use Bézier curves to model smooth curves 
that can be scaled indefinitely.  It should be theoretically possible to generate infinitely different 
deviations of the “geometric” numeral nine construction described above with the help of Bézier 
curves – altering the circles into various curved lines.  This would account for all “ideal” 
numeral nine shapes.63   
 
                                                
62 See footnote 48.   
63 This constitutes what Wetzel calls a disjunctive shape theory (Weztel (2009):  p.64-65).  We may find 
something that all the numeral nine token construction Bézier functions have in common.   
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              Construction of a quadratic Bézier Curve 64       Construction of a cubic Bézier curve65 
 
Human handwritten characters are never perfectly smooth (many points will deviate from the 
trajectory of the curved or straight lines attempted), sometimes they are partially incomplete (see 
first and second mark in figure 1.3; see third letter of the first word in figure 1.4), or contain 
unintended extensions (see second letter of the second word in figure 1.4).  These are probably 
all deviations that can be eliminated through statistical functions.  Computers can be 
programmed to find the center of a human pupil, which are only approximately circular.66  This 
means overcoming (primarily) the following problems:  (a) pupils never have a perfectly smooth 
circumference, (b) some pupils have “dents” interrupting the circle and (c) sometimes part of the 
pupil is hidden by the lower eyelid and the eye-lashes67 – all problems we also encounter when 
individuating characters.  If such “correction” operations can be performed on an approximate 
circle, it should in principle be possible to do the same for marks approximating ideal geometric 
character shapes.  Next, the computer would check which of the Bézier defined shapes the mark 
matches best statistically.   
This is only a sketch of how we may program computers to recognize handwritten marks as 
character types.  However, we cannot claim that the set of all the tokens of the letter ‘d’ have 
nothing in common that distinguishes them from tokens of other letter types, while at the same 
                                                
64 See URL:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bézier_curve 
65 See URL:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bézier_curve 
66 Moore & Haslwanter (1996). 
67 This is relatively rare, but happens when people have droopy eyelids, or the picture of the pupil is taken 
when it is dilated.   
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time computers can be programmed to reliably68 decipher hand-written text.  It remains to be 
seen whether the completeness of the program will interfere with the soundness of its results.   
1.7  Insurmountable hurdle: some tokens remain unrecognizable      
There are two basic problems that no computer will be able to overcome.  If a new font 
(significantly distinct from the presently existing fonts) were to be invented69, the computer 
program may or may not catch it, depending on whether its statistical “correction” calculation 
can match it to one of the existing fonts or letter shapes.  Furthermore, an entirely new symbolic 
system could be invented.  Pupils in school may decide to communicate information to each 
other via a new code based on closing and opening of the eyelids.  Perhaps this code catches on 
and finds good use in hospitals with paralyzed patients.70  If this code specified a sequence of eye 
blinks as equivalent to the word ‘dog’, then this would need to be recognized. Again, there is no 
way to account for this development at present. Whether with or without the help of a computer, 
we cannot identify what word type a mark produced in a future symbolic system replicates.  That 
mark may already exist today (people do blink their eyes), but we simply couldn’t know that this 
mark will come to mean ‘dog’.  However, if we want to reduce a word type to a set of physical 
marks (relative to symbolic system and context), then this set should contain all past, present and 
future marks.  Otherwise, the word type ‘dog’ would change constantly with the production of 
new marks.71  
                                                
68 ‘Reliably’ here means that the program must do as well as humans or better.   
69 Wetzel suggests the invention of a new font as a problem for “disjunctive shape” theories (Wetzel 
(2009):  p.65).   
70 I believe that the present technique only allows patients to say ‘yes’ and ‘no’. 
71 Ebbs (2009):  pp. 118-119.   
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A computer furthermore lacks access to speaker intentions.72  A person may produce the 
following mark on an otherwise unmarked piece of paper:   
I 
The manufacturer of that mark, may have intended to write ‘Idea’, but didn’t get to complete that 
word.  This would mean that the above mark replicates the capital ‘I’.  No computer program, no 
matter how sophisticated, may tell us whether that person intended to write the capital letter ‘I’, 
the small letter ‘l’, the numeral ‘1’ or whether that mark replicates no character at all – it’s just a 
line of specific width and length.  However, we wouldn’t do much better than the computer 
(unless that person informed us of her intentions).  
1.8 Conclusion           
As demonstrated in this chapter we weren’t able to reduce homonymic word types to sets of 
physical word tokens (marks).  Even if my imagined computer program worked, it would have to 
be based on mathematical formulas, which at the very least manipulates symbols, that is, 
character types, not tokens!73  We may have character individuation reduced to manipulation of a 
few types:  a quantifier, negation, conjunction, zero and one – thereby elucidating linguistic 
types, even if we didn’t reduce them to physical marks.  Goodman foresaw our failure:  “The 
                                                
72 Unless computers science were to find out that the intention to produce a certain character is causally 
linked a measurable brain-state.   
73 Wetzel argues:  “Formalism is, roughly, the philosophy of mathematics that holds that math is not 
“about” anything, least of all numbers, sets, and spaces; it is the mere manipulation of symbols […].  […] 
The problem is that these “concrete signs” cannot be construed as physical tokens if Hilbert [one of its 
main proponents] is to derive the mathematics he wants” (Wetzel (2009):  p.56).  
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letter-classes of our alphabet […] are established by tradition and habit; […] defining them would be as 
hard as defining such ordinary terms as ‘desk’ and ‘table’.”74  
We weren’t able to define the homonymity relation beyond a perceived one. 75  Of course 
perceiving that tokens t and t’ are of the same physical word type does not make it so. In order to 
rigorously define homogeneity, we would need an account for phoneme and letter types – which 
we do not have. 
Given the complexity of factors to be taken into account for correctly individuating words, the 
ease and success rate with which we do so is surprising!  In most cases we know (without 
reflection) what character or word a given mark replicates – even when the mark was produced 
by other language users.  Even though sometimes only the producer of a given mark recognizes 
what character or strings thereof the mark replicates.   
Starting from the fact that people sometimes use the “same” words to talk about a given topic, 
I want to clarify what word-sameness comes to in those uses.  My first attempt towards 
explicating the notion of words operative in our communication of knowledge began by asserting 
that words are types instantiated in utterances as tokens.  Ebbs explains how most theories of 
meaning subscribe to a two-step word individuation process: 
(U) Two word tokens t and t’ are of the same word type if and only if  
(i) t and t’ are each tokens of the same orthographic or phonetic type, and 
(ii) facts about the explanatory-use of t and t’ determine that they each have semantic 
values and that their semantic values are the same.76 
Our failure to account for step (i) means that we will have to individuate words entirely through 
step (ii) or switch to a different framework altogether.   
                                                
74 See Goodman (1976):  p.138.   
75 It is quite possible that cognitive science may discover what brain state we are in as perceivers when we 
pick up on homonymity.  Even if that were possible, it still wouldn’t make the relation one that obtains 
between words.   
76 See Ebbs (2009):  p.112; Ebbs rejects the token and explanatory-use model of words (U).   
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ARE TWO UTTERANCES PERFORMANCES OF THE 
SAME WORD?  PROPOSAL:  RESEMBLANCE OF COGNITIVE CONCEPTIONS 
2.0 Introduction           
In order to individuate words for the purpose of drawing valid inferences and reliably 
including information based on other speaker’s testimonies, we must be able to individuate our 
own words and those of others across time and varying contexts.  Words are types instantiated in 
utterances as tokens.  Ebbs explains how most theories of meaning subscribe to a two-step word 
individuation process: 
(U) Two word tokens t and t’ are of the same word type if and only if  
(iii) t and t’ are each tokens of the same orthographic or phonetic type, and 
(iv) facts about the explanatory-use77 of t and t’ determine that they each have 
semantic values and that their semantic values are the same.78 
Assuming that our goal is to individuate words in a way relevant to knowledge transmission (i.e. 
through testimony), we came to realize in the previous chapter that it is not some resemblance 
relation between physical tokens or marks that groups the tokens into word-types.79  In this 
chapter I will show that the resulting collapse of (i) and (ii) begets insurmountable challenges for 
semantic individualism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
77 Facts about explanatory-use are the necessary and sufficient conditions that supposedly determine the 
meaning or satisfaction conditions of a given token (Ebbs (2009):  p.9). 
78 Ebbs (2009):  p.112; Ebbs rejects the token and ex-use model of words (U).   
79 There are notions of word that are independent of semantic value – those relevant to copy editing, for 
instance.  Those notions, however, do not fulfill my explanatory goals.   
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2.1 Individualism defined  
For the scope of this chapter I define ‘individualism’ as the thesis that any word-token t is 
individuated independently of correlations with the speaker’s linguistic community.80, 81 The kind 
of individualism I have in mind conceives of the semantic value of a word token t in terms of the 
cognitive content the individual speaker associates with what individual or group of objects t 
denotes (in conjunction with external physical facts about the speaker’s environment)82.           
The comparison of individual conceptions is inherently problematic.  We clearly don’t have 
access to the totality of conceptions other speakers associate with their tokens ‘dog’.  I am not 
even sure whether I have first-person access to all of my own dog-related conceptions.  I 
certainly cannot come up with a definition that captures all the essential features I believe to 
constitute dog-hood.  It seems that we must think of these cluster of beliefs related to a given 
word as idealized aggregates of beliefs: 
[T]heories of meaning for terms such as “clutch” and “water” in particular agents’ language [are] 
idealized constructions, i.e. as ideally complete specifications of their “concepts,” which 
hypothesize on the basis of ideally complete evidence […] all the beliefs that an agent associates 
with each such term in his language.  Of course, we cannot make such idealized specifications 
                                                
80 Individualism, so understood, must be distinguished from the stronger thesis of internalism:  any word-
token t is individuated independently of the world external to the individual who produced t.  For 
individualists it is permissible to take into account information about the individual’s physical 
environment (except for brain states of other individuals).  Sometimes individualism is understood to 
make a stronger claim, namely, that content (or what utterances express) is determined only by factors 
internal to individual agents.  Bilgrami labels this stronger version of individualism ‘internalism’ and 
views himself as a proponent of individualism, but not internalism (Bilgrami (1992):  p.65). 
81 This kind of individualism is primarily defined in contrast to social externalism, which Burge defines 
as follows:  “The main idea of [… anti-individualism] is that the natures and correct individuation of 
many of an individual person’s intentional, or representational, mental states [,words] and events 
commonly depend in a constitutive way on relations that the individual bears to a wider social 
environment”  Burge (2007):  p. 151.    
82 Bilgrami’s externalist constraints enter into the individuation process as follows:  externally determined 
concepts of an agent are fixed by consulting the respective indexically formulated utterances in 
conjunction with relevant beliefs within her complex network of beliefs (Bilgrami (1992):  p.5).   
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explicitly because we usually cannot list all the beliefs an agent associates with these terms of his 
language.83 
It is somewhat nebulous what these idealized constructions amount to.  Of course, a speaker can 
draw on memories of experiences involving other speakers (especially for complex terms such as 
‘discrimination’).  It is the lack of linguistic deference to other speakers that renders the 
conceptions individualistic.  For example, we could not include intentions such as:  I am 
repeating my neighbors word ‘German Shorthaired Pointer’.84  Assuming that we have some way 
of determining individual conceptions, let’s proceed.   
Given the primary role contents of belief are to play in psychological explanations, accounting 
for individual variations in understanding is a primary motivation for the individualist account: 
[A]n individual’s representational content depends (partly) on a web of inferential connections 
with other representational contents.  The idea is that the constitutive conditions for 
understanding a concept cannot outrun the network of inferences that the individual can draw.85,86 
In order to make sense of the inferential patterns of the speaker individualism attempts to derive 
word-type identity from individual conceptions.87,88,89  
Weigand stresses that understanding is a process of coming to an understanding90 – she is 
thereby suggesting that understanding is not a binary phenomenon, but one that admits of 
                                                
83 Bilgrami (1992):  p. 12. 
84 Perhaps I heard that she is intending to adopt a dog of that breed and am conveying this to some other 
neighbor using that same expression – even though I am not quite certain what constitutes a member of 
that particular breed ( I merely know that they are hunting dogs). 
85 Burge (2007):  p. 176.   
86 Begby (forthcoming) describes the motivation thus:  “the range of thoughts that a person can entertain 
by reference to the concepts at that person’s cognitive disposal”.   
87 A speaker who associates one set of beliefs with Paderewski, the politician, and another set of beliefs 
with Paderewski, the pianist, may very well believe that ‘has musical talent’ can be predicated of one 
Paderewski, but not the other (even though there is actually only one Paderewski).  Such an individual is 
not able to see that ‘Paderewski has musical talent and it is not the case that Paderewski has musical 
talent’ constitutes a logical contradiction.  See chapter five for further discussion.   
88 “One has failed to capture the inferential patterns which give rise to an agent’s behavior.  And this 
[malaise] is diagnosed as flowing from a general source:  an agent’s conceptions are being ignored in the 
attribution of externalist content” Bilgrami (1992):  p.19.   
89 See chapters five and six for further discussion.   
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gradations91.  Differences in understanding, she argues, result from the interlocutors inhabiting 
different cognitive backgrounds.92  Utterer and interpreter inhabit different physical, social and 
mental worlds, such that common ground is almost never really common.93  Comprehension is 
the creation of meaning resulting from a gradational overlapping of meaning, individual 
cognitive contents that is.94  Pagin proposes in a similar vein: 
A communicative event (between speakers that have propositional attitudes) is successful just if 
the content of the hearer’s thought is sufficiently similar [to] the content of the speaker’s thought.  
Sufficient similarity as here intended is an equivalen[ce] relation[…].95 
According to individualism no two people are likely to have the same aggregate of conceptions 
associated with the tokens of a given word-type, thus making it difficult to explain how we could 
share the same word-type intra-subjectively.96  Consequently, a similarity relationship between 
these aggregate conceptions will have to confirm the appropriate groupings of tokens produced 
by different speakers into word-types.  Your word-token ‘dog’ and my word-token ‘dog’ 
constitute tokens of the same word-type because we both share relevantly similar conceptions 
with the respective token we produced.  I will argue in this chapter that there are too many other 
tokens with which some speakers associate equally similar conceptions (i.e. ‘hound’, ‘dingo’ and 
‘gray wolf’)97.  We would need a method to filter out these tokens without relying on community 
norms that provide us with adequate similarity standards grouping physical forms into the 
relevant types.  My arguments of the previous chapter deprive individualists of a way to exclude 
                                                                                                                                                       
90 Weigand (1999). 
91 The frequency of incomplete understanding plays an important role in Burge’s anti-individualism 
(Burge (1979, 2007). 
92 Weigand (2000). 
93 Verschueren (1999).  
94 Ferbezar and Stabej (2008).   
95 Pagin (2006):  p. . 
96 Bilgrami (1992:  p. 10), himself a proponent of this view, admits this to be true of the individualist 
notion of concepts.   
97 For those wondering why the conceptions associated with ‘dog’ could be similar with ‘gray wolf’, let’s 
not forget that people can be under-, as well as, mis-informed about a topic.   
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these competing candidate tokens on the basis of their physical features.   Our failure to account 
for word-forms begets insurmountable challenges for individualist conceptions of words.   
2.2 Intra-subjective word individuation 
Does the relationship between the (totality of) conceptions a speaker associates with what her 
tokens t and t’ denote determine whether t and t’ constitute performances of the same word?  We 
would have to show that whenever the respective conceptions overlap in the appropriate manner, 
t and t’ constitute performances of the same word (and vice versa).    
Imagine a physics student uttering u1:   
“x satisfies ‘space’ if and only if x is space.” 
These are the kinds of things we can also hear her say: “Space is Euclidean, that is, two parallel 
lines can be extended indefinitely and will never intersect.”  Some time goes by and she now 
sincerely affirms:  “Strictly speaking, space is non-Euclidean …”  At some later time that student 
utters u2: 
“x satisfies ‘space’ if and only if x is space.”   
We would say that the student learned98 something that radically altered her conception of space, 
but the subject kept track of the same topic throughout her learning process:  “Participants [of a 
discussion]”, according to Burge, “commonly regard their object-level thoughts (thoughts about, 
say, chairs) as undergoing correction in the course of the inquiry.”99  
Given that the conceptions associated with what ‘space’ denotes in u1, radically diverge from 
those associated with what ‘space’ denotes in u2, it would seem that according to anti-
                                                
98 Explaining how we can learn from others is one of the central motivation for anti-individualism.  See 
Ebbs (2002).   
99 Burge (1986, 2007):  p.261.   
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individualism the respective tokens would have to constitute performances of different word 
(types).  Consequently, her utterances u1 and u2 are not stating the same thought100 – which is 
counterintuitive.   
At other times, speakers can be under- or mis-informed about a given topic.  Putnam 
confesses not being able to distinguish an elm from a beech tree.101  He may utter u3: 
“x satisfies ‘elm’ if and only if x is an elm.” 
as well as u4: 
“x satisfies ‘beech’ if and only if x is a beech.” 
Since Putnam’s conceptions associated with what his tokens ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ denote 
respectively are identical, it follows (from individualist assumptions) that u3 and u4 express the 
same (thought) – whereas Putnam would say that his utterances u3 and u4 express different 
satisfaction conditions.  It is tempting to argue that, since the tokens in question do not 
instantiate the same shape or form, the question of word-sameness doesn’t even arise.  This 
assumption would significantly simplify the task, since we would only have to test tokens of the 
same form for word-sameness.  I argued in the previous chapter that we were unable to group 
tokens in terms of resemblance relations between physical tokens or marks.  As a result, this 
simplification is not available to us.  
Individualism leads to counterintuitive results when it comes to grouping tokens intra-
subjectively.  What I have not yet considered is expanding the theory with an intentional-clause:  
if a speaker S intends to replicate a token t (which S previously produced) and thus produces 
                                                
100 With ‘thought’ I mean the content of what an utterance expresses.   
101 Putnam (1975):  pp. 226-227. 
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token t’, then t and t’ are of the same word type.102  It seems to me that those intentions would 
have to be part of the resources available to an individualist, since they are (so to speak) “inside 
the individual’s head.”  Consider my uttering u5: 
 “Syrus is a dog.” 
And while pointing at the same individual, I utter u6: 
“Syrus is a dog.”   
We don’t want to rely on the somewhat “flimsy” assumption that as long as the last token of the 
utterance u5 and the last token of the utterance u6 were produced within a relatively short 
timeframe, the corresponding conceptions associated with what each token denotes are likely to 
be similar.  Even if between uttering u5 and u6, I learn some substantial new facts about dogs (i.e. 
that dogs are domesticated animals) we would want u5 and u6 to express the same belief.  We can 
account for this identity by arguing that I intended to replicate the last token of the first utterance 
with the last token of the second utterance. 
In my example, Putnam did not intend for ‘elm’ to replicate ‘beech’ (or vice versa), thus 
utterances u4 and u3 express different (thoughts).  Individuals are supposed to have privileged 
(“full”) knowledge of their own intentional states.103  If a speaker’s utterances express her 
thoughts, then she must be able to group her tokens into word types.  Without assuming this 
ability, we cannot explain how individuals are able to draw valid inferences from their own 
utterances.  I only grant individualists to draw on intentions with regard to intra-subjective 
sameness of word types.  The same cannot be done for inter-subjective sameness of word types, 
                                                
102 Kaplan applies this intentional proposal also to inter-subjective tokens, which I will discuss in the 
chapter three.      
103 I will explore this issue in chapters five and six. 
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since this would introduce semantic deference to other speakers – a violation of individualist 
principles! 
My notion of thoughts is intricately linked with how I conceive of words.  The latter are 
instruments that render the inter-subjective transfer of knowledge possible.  Thoughts are what 
utterances express.  They are what speakers attempt to communicate through the use of words.  
2.3 Inter-subjective word-individuation 
Do individual conceptions play an important role in inter-subjective word individuation?  In 
the previous section we concluded that individual conceptions don’t determine whether two 
tokens t and t’ are tokens of the same word type.  Perhaps resemblance of individual conceptions 
can explain under what conditions we understand utterances of other speakers.   
Sometimes individual conceptions are understood in terms of paradigms.104  Suppose James’s 
paradigm “dog” is a German Shepherd (a guard dog), while Sarah’s paradigm “dog” is a Chinese 
Crested (a toy dog).105  Let’s go so far as to say that the cognitive concept that James associates 
with his word ‘dog’ is importantly different from the cognitive concept Sarah associates with her 
word ‘dog’ – there is little overlap between James’s conception dog and Sarah’s conception dog.  
The Chinese Crested is hairless, weighs about 8 pounds on average and doesn’t bark.  The 
German Shepherd, in contrast, weighs about 85 pounds on average and, as most of us know, is 
covered with brown, yellow, black or white fur and likes to bark (hence the frequent use as a 
                                                
104 Rosch, Eleanor (1975); Bilgrami, Akeel (1992): p. 25 – just to give some examples.   
105 The other day at the dog park I made an interesting observation of how the paradigms that we associate 
with a kind can influence how we (sometimes falsely) individuate that kind.  A family with two kids of 
ages about three and five walked in with their Great Dane.  The kids were unfazed by the rough treatment 
of their Dane, even when they accidentally got pushed over.  But when some smaller dogs came to 
participate in the chasing games, they ran away screaming.  Their father had to explain:  “It’s okay, those 
are dogs too”.  It seems that the children couldn’t fathom that animals so much smaller than their own dog 
could be dogs also.   
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guard-dog).  Under what conditions are Sarah and James talking about the same topic when they 
use their respective words ‘dogS’ and ‘dogJ’?  The problem for the proponent of individualism 
seems to be that they cannot explain how Sarah and James ever could be using the same word, if 
indeed the individual conceptions associated with their respective utterances are significantly 
different.106 
Of course there are examples where speakers clearly talk past one another.  Putnam invites us 
to imagine somebody, let’s call him Oscar, uttering:  “This is a tiger!”107 – while pointing at a 
snowball.  Jane, a friend of Oscar’s, would describe tigers as follows:  “a tiger is a yellow and 
black striped feline…”  Putnam declares that there wouldn’t be much use in Jane’s talking to 
Oscar about tigers (using her word ‘tiger’).  In this case, individualism produces the intuitive 
result!  The conceptions Jane associates with what ‘tiger’ denotes are radically different from 
those Oscar associates with what his ‘tiger’ tokens denote.  We need some theory that 
distinguishes cases like this tiger thought-example from the case above concerning the words 
‘dogJ’ and ‘dogS’.  I don’t think ranking conceptions in terms of degrees of discrepancy will turn 
out to be of much explanatory value – given the possibility of words denoting conceptually 
similar things (such as the American Robin and European Robin).   
Let’s recall Putnam, who confesses not being able to distinguish an elm from a beech tree.108  
Let’s assume that since this coincidence suits his theory of language, he makes a point of never 
consulting an arborist or encyclopedia to fill in this knowledge-gap.  That is, the conception 
                                                
106 Loar objects to paradigms as picking out referents for similar reasons:  “A non-social causal theory 
requires non-socially-mediated causal-reference relations.  I doubt that we have conceptions of such 
relations […] consider the simple fact that there is no such thing as the natural kind to which paradigms of 
a predicate like “dog” belong:  they are dogs, members of the family Canidae, mammals.  A person’s term 
“dog” does not acquire a natural kind as its reference merely by pointing to paradigms” Loar (1985):  pp. 
128-129.   
107 We are assuming that this snowball doesn’t even have the “shape” of a tiger.   
108 Putnam (1975):  pp. 226-227. 
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Putnam associates with his tokens replicating ‘elm’ across time remain unchanged.  I earlier 
imagined Putnam uttering u3: 
“x satisfies ‘elm’ if and only if x is an elm.” 
as well as u4: 
“x satisfies ‘beech’ if and only if x is a beech.” 
We solved this problem by arguing that Putnam didn’t intend to replicate the last token of the 
first utterance u5 with the last token of the second utterance u6.  This solution only gets us so far, 
since an analogous problem can occur with inter-subjective word individuations.  As clarified 
earlier, intentions to repeat another speaker’s token introduce deference conditions that are not 
available to individualists without violating their own theory.   
Suppose Quine knew exactly how to determine whether a given tree is a beech or an elm.  
When he utters u7: 
“x satisfies ‘elm’ if and only if x is an elm.” 
as well as u8: 
“x satisfies ‘beech’ if and only if x is a beech.” 
those utterances u7 and u8 lay equal claim to expressing the same (thought) as Putnam’s utterance 
u4 within the individualist framework.  This conclusion is counterintuitive.   
Putnam’s conceptions associated with ‘elm’ are equally similar to those Quine associates with 
tokens of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ respectively; yet it is with Quine’s token ‘elm’ that we want to group 
Putnam’s ‘elm’ – into a unified word-type.  Again, what we would like to say is that Putnam’s 
token ‘elm’ is of the same orthographic or phonetic type as Quine’s token ‘elm’ (and not of the 
same orthographic or phonetic type as Quine’s ‘beech’) – but we don’t have the necessary 
resources to do so.  Even though such a shared “form” would not suffice to explain why u3 and 
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u7 express the same thought it would at least narrow down the relevant set of tokens against 
which to compare Putnam’s tokens to considerably.   
If all we have to go by are the physical characteristics of the respective individual tokens, 
substantial similarity may be completely lacking.  Suppose Putnam knows how to spell the word 
‘elm’ (in Latin Script), but is clueless about how to pronounce it (which of course is not actually 
true).  Quine, on the other hand, only ever utters the word ‘elm’, but has no idea of how to put it 
in writing (which is of course also counterfactual).  We could take this one step further and ask a 
competent “hearer”, reader, speaker and writer of the English language to spell Quine’s utterance 
and try to “match” it with Putnam’s orthographic production.  Clearly, this can go wrong on 
either end.  The “translator” may be unable to understand Quine’s utterance, or read Putnam’s 
handwriting.  At this point it truly seems that we have run into an impasse, because we won’t 
receive any useful information from the comparison of the physical features of the tokens under 
consideration.109   
It is so tempting to argue that the question of whether Quine’s word ‘beech’ and Putnam’s 
word ‘elm’ are one and the same word (in the sense of word-sameness that allows for the transfer 
of knowledge) doesn’t even arise, since they don’t even instantiate the same word form.  As 
argued previously, this line of reasoning is not available to the individualist.   
This time intentions – as they did for intra-subjective token individuations – can’t come to the 
rescue, since this would render individual conceptions entirely superfluous from an explanatory 
point of view.  Assume speaker S1 produces a linguistic token t and speaker S2 produces t’ with 
the intention to repeat t.  It is possible that in some circumstances S2 merely intends to repeat the 
word-form.  For instance, when children are first introduced to cursive handwriting, they are 
                                                
109 See Chapter 1 for further discussion.   
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slowly trained to adhere to the similarity standards of their respective community relevant to 
reproducing a written copy.  The focus is at first on how the letters and words look, not what they 
mean.  However, in conversations where the interlocutors are using the respective tokens in order 
to discussing a single topic, S2 wouldn’t merely commit to repeating the word-form, but also to 
what that word expresses (in her linguistic community).  Imagine Putnam were to ask Quine:  
“You keep mentioning elms and beeches.  I am not sure how to distinguish them from each 
other.  Can you tell me more about those trees?”110  
In conclusion, resemblance among the relevant individual conceptions doesn’t group inter-
subjective tokens into word types and will thus not explain under what conditions we are able to 
understand each other’s utterances. 
The individualist will grant my observation and embrace that within their framework neither 
u7 nor u8 has any chance of expressing Putnam’s utterance u3, since u7 and u8 are too fine-grained 
in their respective contents.111,112 It is perhaps better to moderate my observation:  given the 
epistemic explanatory goal that I set forth, the individualist approach fails to adequately group 
the tokens into types.   
In addition, individualists believe in a social conversion of individual conceptions regarding a 
given topic of conversation (i.e. dogs).   
There is a common underlying explanation of both deference and the exceptions to deference 
which makes no appeal to Burge-like considerations [such as socially shared public concepts and 
words].  More obvious commonsense sociological explanations, i.e. more pragmatic and 
historical explanations of deference, can be introduced instead of Burge’s explanations, such as:  
if we wish to be understood and understood without strain, we will by and large […] use words as 
others do; if we have been brought up in the same social environment and our words and beliefs 
                                                
110 This doesn’t mean that speakers couldn’t fail in their attempt to repeat tokens produced by other 
speakers.  I will discuss this problem in chapters three and four.   
111 Bilgrami’s asserts that “at the meaning-theoretic level, […] concepts are very fine-grained and they are 
hardly ever shared by people” Bilgrami (1992):  p. 11.  
112 Thanks to Ebbs for pointing this out to me.   
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have been formed in it, our meanings will tend to converge and especially so if we want to bring 
others up in it. 
   These alternative explanations belong to commonsense sociology and have no relevance to 
philosophy in the way Burge insists on.113 
Only once we already have grouped the tokens into word-types intra- and inter-subjectively can 
we make sense of individualist conceptions converging.  A social conversion must also be driven 
by effects within individuals – even if those individuals don’t entirely understand what they are 
motivated by.  What Bilgrami seems to have in mind here is something along the following lines:  
early on we get trained to call dogs ‘dog’, or red things ‘red’ – otherwise other agents won’t 
respond to our utterances in the manner we need or expect them to.  Again, this seems to pre-
suppose that we can split the intention to repeat the word-form from the intention to use the word 
as it is used by other speakers – thereby introducing an anti-individualist ingredient of deference. 
How would Putnam’s conceptual apparatus be singling out tokens of Quine’s word ‘elm’ and 
the behavior associated with those tokens as evidence from which to derive conceptions 
associated with the topic labeled ‘elm’ (within Putnam’s cognitive system)?   
Why not thus single out the behavior associated with other tokens?  On what basis can the 
individualist even group (almost) all and (almost) only tokens of Quine’s word ‘elm’?  The 
suggestion of a social conversion only makes sense, once we already assume adequate groupings 
of tokens into word-types.   
Bilgrami’s intuitions about the role of belief content in psychological explanations lead him to 
reject the intuition that Putnam and Quine are using the same word in both conversations.  He 
argues that at 
the meaning-theoretic level, the concepts are very fine-grained and they are hardly ever shared by 
people.   
   But this does not matter since it is not these “concepts,” so thought of, which go into the 
contents that explain action.  Action-explanation always takes place at a much more local level 
                                                
113 Bilgrami (1992):  pp.79-80.   
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than the meaning-theoretic level.  Here, the entire aggregate of beliefs that an agent associates 
with “water” are not all relevant.  One distils out of the aggregate of resources provided by the 
meaning-theory only those beliefs that are relevant to the action-explanation at the local level.  
Thus, if you and I are both drinking some substance from the kitchen tap because we want to 
quench our thirst with the cheapest available drink, we may in this locality both be attributed the 
same content:  “… that water will quench thirst.”  […]  The specification of your local water-
concept in the attribution of content which explains your behavior does not contain your chemical 
beliefs.  […] Hence, although our idiolects are never likely to be the same for any single concept, 
in many localities we may nevertheless share many contents.  There will obviously be other 
localities in which we will not share contents because in those localities we will find it necessary 
to use your chemical beliefs from the overall pool in order to explain your action.114 
I interpret Bilgrami to be saying – in the terminology I used so far – that he admits individual 
conceptions that different speakers associate with their words to be similar in some contexts (or 
localities), but not with regard to others.  That is, from the “pool of resources” of meaning-
theoretic concepts, the superfluous fine-grained beliefs are “distilled out” such as to leave us 
with the action-explanation content for each speaker’s words or statements at that locality.  If 
those contents are identical, supposedly communication succeeds in facilitating the coordination 
of behavior.   
On what grounds do we identify Putnam and Quine’s beliefs at the local level?  Ebbs similarly 
objects: 
[Bilgrami’s] idea that beliefs attributed locally are “selected” from beliefs attributed at the 
meaning-theoretic level pre-supposes that some of the beliefs attributed at the meaning-theoretic 
level are also attributed locally.  But his own theory undermines this presupposition.115 
On the one hand Bilgrami writes how his interest in meaning-theoretic concepts is entirely 
secondary – it is “merely a gesture acknowledging that a selection has to be a selection from 
somewhere.”  His real interest is in local contents.  He continues:  “the “locality thesis” dissolves 
the very idea of content composed of context-invariant concepts [thereby rendering his] account of 
intentionality […] genuinely radical.”116   
                                                
114 Bilgrami (1992):  p. 11. 
115 Ebbs (1998):  p. 619. 
116 Bilgrami (1992):  p. 12. 
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How can context invariant meanings ground the selection of local contents, while at the same 
time the existence of context invariant meanings is denied?  Without grouping tokens into 
orthographic and phonetic word-types, individualists cannot account for any continuity in a 
given topic within or across contexts.   
2.4 Resemblance is context sensitive, but semantic content is context insensitive117 
Even if we could separate steps (i) and (ii), that is, offer a robust account of orthographic and 
phonetic word types, insurmountable challenges would remain.  Individual cognitive conceptions 
may “overlap” with regard to some conversations, but not all, while speakers interpret 
themselves as using the same words (associated with those cognitive conceptions) throughout 
those conversations.   
What makes comparing cognitive conceptions associated with various tokens difficult is that 
relative to one context (and purpose) the conceptions under consideration may be similar, while 
they are significantly distinct relative to some other context.   
Our human activities are so varied that which features are salient is not constant from context 
to context.  Goodman remarks:  “[I]n the case of ordinary actions, the principle of classification varies 
with our purposes and interests.”118   
I repeatedly catch myself thinking about some random group of things that a subset of that 
group is de facto (independently of my or anybody’s point of view) a type because the members 
of that subset are de facto more similar to each other than to members outside that subset.  It 
                                                
117 Semantic content of proper names and kind terms, that is! 
118 Goodman (1970):  p.22. 
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takes a good amount of distancing myself from habitual categorizations, to see alternative 
groupings of types.   
Consider the following three objects: 
a. an aspirin tablet 
b. an ibuprofen tablet  
c. a pack of macadamia nuts 
On a first look it seems that the aspirin and the ibuprofen tablet clearly form one class:  they are 
examples of over-the-counter pain medications.  In fact, sometimes people use ‘aspirin’ as a 
general term for relatively mild over-the-counter drugs that reduce pain, in which case it denotes 
either of the following:  ibuprofen, acetaminophen or aspirin tablets (and maybe others).  Dog-
owners, in contrast, will, if it comes to something their dog may have consumed, put the 
ibuprofen tablet and macadamia nuts into one category.  While moderate amounts of aspirin are 
harmless to dogs119, even one ibuprofen tablet may cause a dog’s death.  If consumed by a dog 
macadamia nuts can lead to kidney failure, in the same way that ibuprofen does.  Whether a. and 
b., or b. and c. form a relevant category – based on a relevant resemblance relation – depends on 
the context of the conversation.  Are you looking for a headache remedy or the cause to your 
pet’s vomiting?   
What could constitute the apt standard for semantic or conceptual resemblance?  We use 
words as means to communicate our thoughts to others successfully.  Sometimes it is suggested 
that conversations are successful when they run “smoothly”, that is, when it is in virtue of the 
                                                
119 Although adult aspirin tablets ought not to be given to very small dogs (less than 15 pounds).  Then 
again, we wouldn’t consider the same dosage to humans weighing less than that either.     
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words that they are exchanging that the interlocutors successfully co-ordinate their 
behavior.120,121 
In the following section I will imagine two conversations.  One turns out to be successful 
according to that standard, the other not.  Sarah believes ‘aspirinS’ refers to aspirin tablets.  
James, on the other hand, believes ‘aspirinJ’ to be a generic term for over the counter pain 
medications (including ibuprofen, aspirin and acitaminophen tablets).   
Conversation 1: 
Sarah:   “Do you have some aspirin?” 
James:  “Yes, I have some aspirin in my pocket”   
James hands Sarah an ibuprofen.  Sarah swallows the tablet and her headache 
disappears.122,123   
                                                
120 Quine proposes a behavioristic approach to translation.  Since stimulus meaning cannot be assumed 
the same across speakers for a given observation sentence, Quine abandons inter-subjective likeness of 
stimulus meaning for less technical success conditions:  “[T]here is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond 
what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable circumstances.  […] Success in communication is 
judged by smoothness of conversation, by frequent predictability of verbal and non-verbal reactions, and 
by coherence and plausibility of native testimony” Quine (1992):  pp. 38-43.   
Paul suggests that communication succeeds if senses are similar enough to allow speaker and hearer to 
co-ordinate their future actions.  Paul (1999) pp. 161-162. 
121 I am deliberately sketching this notion of communicative success.  If it fails to work while being 
painted in broad brush-strokes, why would it fare better once we are picky about the details?   
122 Pagin considers a similar case based on Putnam’s Twin Earth thought-example.   
[S]uppose we have two different concepts of water, water1 [H2O] and water2 [XYZ]. […] Jill 
associates the concept water1 with the mass term ‘water’, whereas Jack takes it to express water2.  
Jack says to Jill: 
(1) I have a glass of water in my hand. 
By the identity standard [word-sameness], communication has failed.  […] The question is 
whether this matters to the success of the actual communicative event.  There is, I submit, a pretty 
strong intuition to the effect that it doesn’t.   
See Pagin (2006). 
123 Heck presents us with a similar example.  He envisages an North American and a British speaker to 
talk about pies, each using their own word ‘pie’.  As it turns out in England a proper pie is required to 
have a pastry top, whereas in the United States it is optional.  Heck observes that we would consider this 
to be a successful communicative act, regardless of the distinct dialects in use – that is, word-sameness is 
not necessary for communicative success (Heck, Richard (2006)  p. 87).   
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Sarah and James successfully coordinated their behavior and their respective words ‘aspirinS’ and 
‘aspirinJ’ played an important role – they were the “primary” carriers of the information 
exchanged.  Given the overall context and purpose of the conversation, the overlap between 
Sarah’s conceptions regarding what ‘aspirinS’ denotes and James’s conceptions regarding what 
his word ‘aspirinJ’ denotes was substantial. 
Conversation 2 (occurring a little later in the day): 
Sarah: “Could I have another of those aspirin?  Dakota, my dog, is suffering 
terribly from arthritic flair-ups today.” 
James:   “Here, this is my last aspirin tablet.” 
When James passes on the bottle of ibuprofen, Sarah catches a glimpse of the label and 
reads ‘Ibuprofen’.   
She scolds:  “James, ibuprofen is not aspirin.  You can’t give ibuprofen to a dog!”  
James: “I’m sorry Sarah.  I didn’t know that.”   
In conversation 2, the distinct conceptions Sarah and James associate with their respective word 
‘aspirinS’ and ‘aspirinJ’ lead to failed co-ordination of behavior.  If Sarah hadn’t caught a 
glimpse of the label, she may have administered human pain medication to her dog and thereby 
possibly killed it.   
Conversation 1 brought about successful co-ordination of behavior, while conversation 2 
didn’t.  According to the above-mentioned criteria of conceptual resemblance, we would have to 
argue that Sarah and James shared the same word in conversation 1, but not so in their later 
exchange.  We cannot say that Sarah and James shared the word in question in conversation 1, 
but failed to do so in conversation 2.  Sarah would judge that her respective tokens were tokens 
of the same word type.  James would say the same about his tokens that are meant to be 
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repetitions of his word ‘aspirinJ’.  We cannot take the ability to reliably group intra-subjective 
tokens into word types away from individuals or we introduce all sorts of self-knowledge 
problems (which individualism is supposed to be able to avoid).124  Individualists cannot allow 
for speakers to be wrong about individuating their own words.  If a speaker were to be wrong 
about how she relates her own words to each other, then the constitutive conditions for 
understanding the corresponding concepts would outrun the network of inferences that she can 
draw – hence threatening the individualist’s psychological explanatory goals.   
If we accept that Sarah and James are respectively using tokens of the same word types 
‘aspirinS’ and ‘aspirinJ’ in conversations 1 and 2 (in accordance with their own judgments), then 
‘aspirinS’ and ‘aspirinJ’ cannot constitute replicas of the same word-type with regard to 
conversation 1, but replicate distinct word-types with regard to conversation 2.  
The individualist ought to propose that Sarah and James have to be generally successful in 
their conversations when using their words ‘aspirinS’ and ‘aspirinJ’.  Of course, the mis-
communication may happen to never actually become apparent.  We therefore must consider a 
wide-range of potential conversations between Sarah and James.  In some cases the conversation 
may not go “smoothly” at all if Sarah is using the word ‘aspirinS’ to talk to medical experts.  
Imagine a group of pediatricians discussing the amount of aspirin safe to administer to an 
undernourished two year-old infant.  Although Sarah knows how to effectively use the word 
‘aspirinS’ in day-to-day exchanges, she lacks the necessary knowledge to participate in an 
exchange among experts.  The possibility that either interlocutor may be under- or mis-informed 
about a given topic can in and of itself cause a “bumpy” conversation (or interfere with the co-
ordination of behavior), but shouldn’t therefore be an indication that communication failed in the 
                                                
124 Bilgrami (1992):  pp.18-19.   
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sense that the relevant tokens were not tokens of the same word type.  Demanding general 
success in co-ordination of behavior across a variety of situations introduces far too stringent 
demands on word-sameness.  In that case, speakers would barely ever replicate each other’s 
tokens (as tokens of the same word type relevant to the communication of knowledge).   
The anti-individualist would argue that so far Sarah and James’s example was under-
described.  In order to know whether they are using the same word ‘aspirin’, we need to know 
whether they are using the same public word.  There is a generic word ‘aspirin’ that matches 
James’s use of ‘aspirinJ’ and there is a brand’-name ‘Aspirin’ that matches Sarah’s use of 
‘aspirinS’125.  The generic ‘aspirin’ and the brand name ‘Aspirin’ constitute distinct words, in the 
sense that they cannot be interchanged in a conversation without changing the topic (they cannot 
be truth-functionally interchanged in statements to the content of which they contribute non-
vacuously126).  According to the anti-individualist then, Sarah and James are (probably) using 
distinct words, if there is a parallel generic and specific use of the word-“form” ‘aspirin’ in their 
linguistic community.  The individualist and anti-individualist analysis thus far agree.   
In a linguistic community, however, where no generic term ‘aspirinG’ exists (and thus we 
cannot translate James’s word ‘aspirinJ’ as ‘aspirinG’), the outcome could be quite different.  
James may simply be mistaken about whether ibuprofen is aspirin.  Imagine the generic word 
‘aspirinG’ didn’t exist and somebody claimed of an ibuprofen tablet “this is aspirin”.  We would 
                                                
125 At least this is true in Germany.  In the United States the brand name in question is ‘Bayer Aspirin’.   
126 Some may want to argue that the word ‘aspirin’ is ambiguous.  I am analyzing words as tools in our 
inter-subjective transfer of thoughts (about the external world).  The content of the thought changes 
depending on whether I am thinking of Aspirin the brand, or more generally of over-the counter pain 
medication.  I will thus have to argue that ambiguity pertains to word-forms.  The word-form ‘aspirin’ is 
ambiguous between two words ‘aspirinG’ and ‘AspirinB’.   
My view is in line with Kaplan’s:  “[On] my conception, there are two phonographic words “base” 
(meaning ‘low’ and bottom), not, as the orthographic conceptions would have it, a single word with two 
meanings” Kaplan (1990):  p.100. 
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simply say that the person has the false belief that ibuprofen is aspirin.127  So, whether the 
linguistic exchange is successful (in the sense relevant to whether they understood each others 
assertions), ultimately depends on how we individuate James and Sarah’s words – not the other 
way around.  If James hands Sarah an ibuprofen tablet (which is not what Sarah asked for), the 
conversation itself may still be successful (in both imagined linguistic exchanges).  James 
sincerely conveys to Sarah that he believes that what he handed her was aspirin (Aspirin) – but 
his belief is false.  It was his mistaken conceptions associated with ‘aspirin’ that almost 
endangered the life of Sarah’s dog128, not his use of a different word (a word Sarah is unfamiliar 
with).   
Public language accounts provide us with a reference point against which to measure 
individual token productions as “matching” standard productions (i.e. spoken and written 
productions).  Do other speakers recognize my mark ‘dog’ as a replica of their word ‘dog’?   
2.5 Conclusion 
With the collapse of steps (i) and (ii), individualism must explain why two word tokens t and 
t’ are of the same word type in terms of resemblance features between the conceptions associated 
with what t and t’ denote respectively.  I have demonstrated that the individualist framework 
                                                
127 In extreme cases if the person is completely unwilling to be corrected in her use of the word in 
question, we may have to say that she is not using a word that we can find in our own vocabulary.   
128 We find similar objections that demonstrate that individual conceptions are not sufficient for word-
individuation.  See also Burge (1979); Putnam (1975), Kripke (1972) (although Kripke’s criticisms are 
targeted at descriptivism in general).   
Burge’s arthritis patient perhaps shows that they aren’t necessary.  It depends on whether we consider the 
patient and the doctor’s conceptions regarding their respective words ‘arthritis’ as different or roughly 
similar.  If we allow this kind of discrepancy between individual conceptions to still relate to the same 
word, we will run into problems distinguishing conceptions that relate to words denoting similar kinds of 
things (i.e. elm versus and beech trees).   
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cannot accomplish this goal – if we are interested in words as communicative tools through 
which we convey knowledge to each other.     
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CHAPTER 3 
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ARE TWO UTTERANCES PERFORMANCES OF THE 
SAME WORD?  PROPOSAL: APPROPRIATE INTENTIONS 
 
Niemand würde viel in Gesellschaft sprechen, wenn er sich bewusst wäre, wie oft er die anderen 
missversteht. 
-- Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, Die Wahlverwandtschaften 
 
 
No one would talk much in society if they were aware how often they misunderstand others. 
-- Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, Elective Affinities 
3.0  Introduction 
Kaplan’s “Words,” lays out the groundwork for a new theory.  It lures us away from the 
resemblance-based model and offers an alternative framework based on intentionality. Most 
objections against Kaplan’s proposal show it to be in need of refinement, but are not targeted at 
its basic assumptions.  My analysis is primarily focusing on how Kaplan answers the question:  
under what conditions are two utterances performances of the same word?  His answer is simple:  
if a speaker produces token t’ with the (appropriate) intention to repeat token t, then t and t’ 
belong to the same repetition word-tree – they both constitute performances of the same word.129  
Since we can clearly imagine cases where a speaker fails in her attempt to repeat t, Kaplan owes 
us an account of what constitutes an appropriate intention such that within his framework we 
can make sense of these repetition failures.   
                                                
129 Kaplan (1990) rejects the type token distinction altogether and would object to the above formulation.   
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3.1 Kaplan’s new notion of words 
With resemblance relations eliminated from the theoretical repertoire, Kaplan replaces those 
failed criteria of word-identity with individual speaker intentions.  Resemblance is degraded to 
solely providing us with clues as to which intentions a speaker may have had – given that we 
cannot access other speaker’s intentions directly.   
The identification of a word uttered or inscribed with one heard or read is not a matter of 
resemblance between the two physical embodiments (the two utterances, the two inscriptions, or 
the one utterance and one inscription).  Rather it is a matter of intrapersonal continuity, a matter 
of intention:  Was it repetition?  We depend heavily on resemblance between utterances and 
inscriptions (using resemblance here not to mean matching of physical characteristics but of their 
appearance as we look and listen) in order to divine these critical intentions.  If it sounds like 
“duck”, it probably is “duck”.  […]  It is [intention] that decides the matter.130   
Tokens t and t’ are of the same word type, if one was produced with the intention to repeat the 
other.  Sometimes intermediate tokens (finite in number) t1” through tn” link t and t’ in the 
described manner.  For example, t is produced as a repetition of t1”, while t1’ is produced as a 
repetition of t’.  All tokens t, t’ and t1” belong to the same performance continuum T – that is, 
they all constitute performances of the same word (in the thick sense of word-sameness).  Kaplan 
calls the resulting complex ‘repetition trees’.  Any subsequent tokens t2”…tn” produced with the 
same intention to constitute repetitions of the tokens t, t’ or t1” in turn become nodes of 
repetition tree T.   
Common currency names (and other common currency words) are not abstract constructions, 
they are natural objects.  Not physical objects, though most will have physical embodiment at 
many places and times.  And not mental objects, though most will have mental embodiment (an 
oxymoron?) at many places and times.   
   One might think of them as trees.  Stemming out from their creation, with physical and mental 
segments […].131 
                                                
130 Kaplan (1990):  p. 104.   
131 Ibid.:  pp. 116-117.   
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Kaplan thus ascribes a constitutive role to the (appropriate) speaker intentions.  Those word 
“trees” are shared across speakers. 
The type-token model is abandoned in favor of a naturalistic notion of words:  the stage-
continuant model.   
I propose a quite different model according to which utterances and inscriptions are stages of 
words, which are continuants made up of these interpersonal stages along with some more 
mysterious intrapersonal stages.   
[…]  The identity of a common currency word lies in its continuity, both interpersonal and 
intrapersonal.132   
In the last chapter I wondered how we know that Putnam’s word ‘elmP’ is the same word as 
Quine’s word ‘elmQ’.  Putnam was assumed to be significantly under-informed about elms (not 
being able to tell a beech from an elm tree) while Quine was ascribed arborist-like knowledge of 
elms.  According to Kaplan’s theory, Putnam’s inscription ‘elm’ [t1] and Quine’s (verbal) 
utterance ‘elm’ [t2] are stages of the same continuant (or repetition “tree”).  It is Putnam’s 
intention to repeat Quine’s utterance t2 that makes Putnam’s token t1 belong to the same 
repetition tree as Quine’s token t2.  Quine’s token t2 in turn reaches all the way back through a 
repetition chain to the original token that gave birth to our word ‘elm’.   
Kaplan offers us a strange hybrid version of words:  they are natural objects but can be 
embodied at several places at the same time – a characteristic usually reserved for abstract kinds.  
Wetzel raises an objection against Goodman’s attempt to eliminate abstract semantic objects for 
a nominalist theory, which equally applies to Kaplan’s proposal.133  She challenges the 
nominalist to explain (without reference to types) why the following statement is true: 
 (i)   ‘Paris’ consists of five letters. 
                                                
132 Kaplan (1990):  p.98.   
133 Wetzel, Linda (1999); Weztel, Linda (2009):  chapter 5.   
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Not all nodes of the ‘Paris’ repetition tree contain five letters.134  Apparently some outdated 
performances looked (or sounded) like this:  ‘Parrys’ or ‘Pareiss’135 and some are misspelled:  
‘Pari’, ‘Pariss’, ‘Pairis’…  Kaplan would have to argue for either of the following: 
 A1 A correct repetition of ‘Paris’ consists of five letters. 
But then what does it mean to be a correct repetition?  Doesn’t that suggest that we are copying 
something – a standard form?  Kaplan doesn’t accept this “myth”.   
A2 A repetition of ‘Paris’, which is generally recognized as a correctly spelled 
repetition consists of five letters.   
But who is to judge?  Clearly, not all mistaken repetitions of ‘Paris’ constitute a slip of the pen.  
Some people simply don’t know how to correctly spell ‘Paris’ and would constitute bad judges.  
Since Kaplan is a public language proponent, he could allow individuals to defer to the relevant 
experts with regard to the correct spelling of ‘Paris’. 
A3 A repetition of ‘Paris’, which is recognized as a correctly spelled repetition by the 
relevant experts consists of five letters. 
Sometimes a person’s handwriting is simply illegible.  That person’s inscription of ‘Paris’ will 
not be recognizable as one replicating ‘Paris’.  Let’s suppose we already have a correctly spelled 
inscription ‘Paris’ as a starting point.  If the producer of the repetition token views herself as 
having correctly copied the sample standard token, then the copy will consist of five letters.  The 
sample standard tokens may be found in reputable dictionaries or were otherwise produced by 
relevant experts.136  To some this may not be as robust of an analysis of (i) as they were hoping.  
Given our explanatory goal, individuating words for the purpose of drawing valid inferences and 
                                                
134 I am setting aside here that we also don’t have an account for letter types.   
135 Wetzel (2009):  p. 95. 
136 Those tokens cannot constitute slips of the pen.   
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reliably including information based on other speaker’s testimonies – we don’t need a more 
robust account of correctly spelled tokens.   
A consequence of Kaplan’s ontology is that words don’t exist outside the repetition trees.  
Although in the course of our existence we can say a whole lot, this means that there will only be 
finitely many words.  “There being only finitely many [performed] sentences”, according to 
Wetzel, “entails, among other things, that although A and B might be sentences, their 
conjunction, (disjunction, equivalence, negation) need not be.”137 
This violates some key assumptions in logic.  If sentences A and B are individually provable 
in system S with axioms a1, a2, a3… , then so should their conjunction.  Something that doesn’t 
exist is not provable.  If the conjunction of A and B is never performed (in the past, present or 
future, that is, never part of a repetition tree), then the conjunction of A and B is not provable in 
S, although A and B are individually.   
Quine recognizes the problem and offers the following solution: 
A more humdrum reason for supposing that the propositions outrun the eternal sentences could be 
that for many propositions the appropriate eternal sentences, though utterable enough, just happen 
never to get uttered (or written [or otherwise performed]).  […]   
   Prima facie the answer is that a sentence is not an event of utterance but a linguistic form that 
may be uttered often, once, or never; 
We have shown in the first chapter that we cannot reduce word or character types to physical 
events.  Quine goes on: 
But we must not accept this answer without considering more precisely what these linguistic 
forms are.  If a sentence were taken as the class of its utterances, then all unuttered sentences 
would reduce to one, viz., the null class; they might as well not exist so far as propositions are 
concerned, for all distinction lapses among them.  […]  We can take each linguistic form as the 
sequence, in a mathematical sense, of its successive characters or phonemes.  A sequence a1, 
a2,…, an can be explained as the class of the n pairs <a1, 1>, <a2, 2>…, <an, n>.  […]  We can 
                                                
137 Wetzel, Linda (2000):  p. 367; Weztel intends this to be an objection against Goodman’s nominalism, 
not Kaplan’s notion of words.   
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still take each component character ai as a class of utterance events, there being here no risk of 
non-utterance.138 
By adopting an ontology that includes sets or classes of signs or characters Quine renounces a 
strict “Goodmanesque” nominalism.139,140   
Kaplan stresses that the notion of ‘word’ he introduces is one of natural objects, so I don’t 
think Quine’s solution is available to Kaplan.  Perhaps Kaplan would argue that he is only 
interested in actual proofs and actual inferences – that he is not interested in such formal 
relations.   
A legitimate move in the German language game is to “glue” together several nouns such as 
to produce a new noun.  For example:  The German word ‘Blumen’ (plural of ‘flour’) and the 
word ‘Topf’ (‘pot’) and ‘Erde’ (‘soil’) can be added together to a new meaningful string of 
letters:  ‘Blumentopferde’.141  In principle, there could be such a combination of nouns ‘a’ and 
‘b’ that if ‘ab’ were uttered ‘ab’ would be instantly meaningful to a competent German speaker.  
Let’s say this noun ‘ab’ never actually is performed.  Therefore, Kaplan would have to deny that 
‘ab’ is a word of the German language.  The problem with this objection is that we could never 
actually provide a counterexample.  As soon as it is uttered or only thought of, it ceases to be an 
unperformed word.   
                                                
138 Quine (1960):  p.  194-195.   
139 In an earlier paper written with Goodman, Quine renounces all abstract entities (including classes) he 
admits:  “we cannot say in general, given any two inscriptions, there is an inscription long enough to be 
the concatenation of the two” (Goodman & Quine (1947)).  This means that Quine doesn’t think abstract 
objects in general problematic, but only renounces propositions, predicates etc.  Even though signs also 
have an acausal nature, we certainly seem more confident in our interaction with signs, then in our 
identification of propositions.   
140 Wetzel and Ebbs endorse Quine’s solution.  Wetzel, Linda (1993); Ebbs (2009):  pp. 119-120. 
141 ‘Donaudampfschifffahrtsgesellschaftskapitänshutsfederfarbe’ is one German noun.  It roughly means:  
the color of the feather of the hat of the captain of the Donau shipping company.  With sufficient 
creativity this noun can be extended (almost) indefinitely.   
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Kaplan could argue that these German words could be treated on a par with compound words.  
A speaker is thus linked to the repetition tree of ‘Blumentopferde’ if she is linked to each 
component basic word:  ‘Blume’, ‘Topf’ and ‘Erde’.142  Especially, since Kaplan doesn’t require 
correct pronunciation or spelling, I doubt that without dashes and space marks, it will be clear 
how to break down compound words into their component parts.  The word ‘Blumentopferde’ 
also contains the plural of ‘horse’:  ‘Pferde’.  The compound word thus may also be read as 
denoting a type of horse (although, admittedly in this case ‘Blumento’ is not a meaningful 
component and neither is ‘Blumento-Pferde’ a meaningful word).  I may be very good at 
repeating the components ‘Blumen’, ‘Topf’ and ‘Erde’, but when I see the word 
‘Blumentopferde’ and repeat ‘Blumento[pause]pferde’ I clearly failed to repeat the compound 
word adequately.  I take it to denote a specific type of horses, rather than soil for flowers.   
3.2 Are Kaplan’s performance standards143 too lenient? 
Cappelen accuses Kaplan’s of not introducing appropriately stringent performance standards: 
A proponent of the sufficiency thesis holds that in order to produce a token of a certain word it is 
sufficient for the producer of the token to be in some intentional state at the production time.  
According to Kaplan, the intentional state is that of standing in the repeating relation to a 
previous interpersonal stage of a common currency word.144  
He goes on to invite us to imagine something of the following:  a person attempts to write the 
letter ‘l’, but he ends up merely with a squiggle looking something like this: 
                                                
142 Thanks to Ebbs for bringing this option to my attention.   
143 The term ‘performance standard’ is taken from a forthcoming paper from Lepore, Ernest and 
Hawthorne, John entitled “On Words,”.   
144 Cappelen (1999):  p. 94.  
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Figure 3.1145 
Kaplan acknowledges “the difference in phonographology, the difference in sound or shape or 
spelling, can be just about as great as you would like it to be.”146   
Let’s not forget that according to Kaplan, we attempt to reproduce our own standardized 
replicas of a given word or character.  As a result, it is up to the individual to impose standards 
on her replicas.  I find it hard to believe that anybody would in good faith claim the above 
squiggle to be a replica of the character ‘l’ (unless we extend our symbolic system such that the 
above mark is to count as a replica of the mark ‘l’).147  Then again, Georges Braque, while 
developing cubism, must have said to himself while looking at a painting with the eyes, nose, 
hair-line and mouth scattered somewhat randomly throughout the canvass “yes, this is a face!”   
 
                                                
145 Cappelen (1999). 
146 Kaplan (1990):  p. 101.    
147 We put our novice language producers through rigorous training.  Recall the endless repetitions of the 
letter ‘A   ’ every student has to draw and carefully press in-between the (pre-printed) triple lines until the 
teacher is satisfied with the output.  This mimicking process beings much earlier when toddlers play 
around with names.  Sofia:  ‘Nadli?’ – the adult:  “No Sofia, it’s N-A-T-A-L-I !”  Still, on order for the 
adult to even suggest an improved pronunciation of her name, she must recognize the attempt as one 
performing her name.     
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Georges Braque “Woman with Guitar” (1913) 
Even in the painting entitled “Woman with Guitar” we recognize, after some observation, a face.  
If we were looking at the original painting with a friend who simply couldn’t recognize the face, 
we would talk them through the process of discovery.  “Look here are the eyes, and this is the 
mouth …”  Hopefully, we can thus bring our friend to see the face in the picture. 
Perhaps the producer of the squiggle could explain to us how he wants us to look at the mark 
as a performance of the letter ‘l’.  He can’t just stipulate:  “It is a replica of the letter ‘l’ because I 
intend it to be!”  It also isn’t acceptable for him to tell us that during the process of production he 
had been bumped accidentally.  Recall my mispronunciation of the word ‘reciprocal’, where I 
placed the accent on the letter ‘o’, rather than the letter ‘i’.  Although at first my interlocutors 
couldn’t recognize my utterance as a replica of the word ‘reciprocal’, friends of mine who acted 
as “translators” were able to make them hear my replica as one of ‘reciprocal’.  With some 
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guidance, my interlocutors were able to hear my ‘reciprocal’ as a performance of the familiar 
‘reciprocal’.148   
A replica of a character or word must be intentionally produced in good faith.  Additionally, 
the outcome has to meet the standards of the performer.  I assume that if these conditions are 
met, the audience can be brought to recognize the mark as a replica of a character or word – even 
if it takes a little explanation by the performer or more charitable observers.  Kaplan demands 
that the mark has to be produced with an appropriate intention.  Perhaps part of what makes an 
intention appropriate is that the speaker wants to communicate successfully with her audience, 
which brings about that her performances are (in principle) recognizable to others.149  This is 
why resemblance, or more precisely the perception of resemblance, still plays an enabling role in 
practice – albeit not an explanatory role in theory.   
While Cappellen’s last attack on Kaplan intended to demonstrate that intentions are not 
sufficient to repeat, his next objection attempts to show that intentions are not necessary in the 
creation of the word- or character-replica.  He envisions finding a piece of paper displaying the 
following marks: 
CAN YOU SPARE A QUARTER? 
Cappellen invites us to imagine that this mark was produced as a result of an accidental spilling 
of ink.  Perhaps a cat was playing with a fountain pen and the above mark was the end result.  
                                                
148 It is surprising how good we are at individuating “deviant” words.  What the following passage states 
is incorrect – the alluded study was not conducted in Cambridge – but our ability to understand each word 
is surprising nevertheless: 
Aoccdrnig to a rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a 
wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist and lsat ltteer be at the rghit pclae. The rset can 
be a toatl mses and you can sitll raed it wouthit porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae the huamn mnid deos 
not raed ervey lteter by istlef, but the wrod as a wlohe. 
From:  http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/people/matt.davis/Cmabrigde/ 
Most people report that they can read the above passages without much difficulty.   
149 See also Ebbs (2009): pp. 124-125.   
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Next, in this thought-example, Cappellen holds this very piece of paper up to random passers-by 
in order to collect change.  He does so without ever letting a word slip out of his mouth or 
physically altering the found piece of paper.   
I suppose Cappellen wants us to reason as follows:  He communicates his (hypothetical) 
desire (or need) for some change via that piece of paper.  At that point the piece of paper clearly 
states the question ‘Can you spare a quarter?’  Cappellen did not produce the string of marks in 
question, so he did not produce the meaningful string of words.  Therefore, it seems the question 
must have already existed on the piece of paper when Cappellen found it.   
An analogy with art-pieces constituting found objects should be illuminating.  In the movie 
“Ghost World” the main character Enid finds a historical poster-advertisement from a fast-food 
chain depicting a grotesquely caricatured black man.  Enid (without claim of having designed or 
produced the poster) displays it as her art-piece in an exhibition.  She doesn’t physically alter the 
poster; she merely alters its location and contextual setting.  Enid’s intention is to provoke 
disgust in the observer as a response to the overt display of racism on the poster and thereby 
cause the audience to reflect on our blindness to present expressions of racism – which are less 
overt and thus more resilient.  Placing the poster in a meaningful context and picking-up on its 
importance is Enid’s contribution to the piece of art.  Sometimes advertisement posters can be 
considered works of art, but this one lacked any artistic value.  When did the mere poster become 
a piece of art?  Enid did something to it to cause the transformation, without physically altering 
the poster.  It is her invitation of reflection via the poster – placing it in a new context – that 
changes its status.  The same goes for the marks on the piece of paper.  Cappellen produced the 
question, without physically altering the marks on the piece of paper, by placing it in the 
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appropriate communicative context.  Just because Cappellen (in the thought example) didn’t 
produce the physical marks doesn’t mean that he didn’t produce the meaningful string of words.   
If the analogy with art-pieces composed of found objects doesn’t speak to you, allow me to 
present my own linguistic thought example that reveals how Cappellen’s assumptions lead to 
ridiculous conclusions.  Suppose I am missing a comma in a sentence that I was just in the 
process of writing, when my pen runs out of ink.  I then walk downstairs into the kitchen to 
select a single kernel of rice from the Basmati-bag.  Carefully, I place the rice-corn where a 
comma is needed (at the correct location and with the right orientation) and glue it onto the page.  
We would certainly recognize the rice-corn as a comma (albeit an unusual one).  The rice-corn 
existed as a physical object, a mark, prior to my using it as a replica of a comma.  It is absurd to 
claim that it already was a replica of a comma prior to my using it as such.  In that case I would 
be storing a whole bag full of commas in the kitchen!150,151 
Cappellen may simply reject my supposition that a rice corn could (under the right 
circumstances) replicate a comma.  It looks like a comma, without “properly” replicating a 
comma – or so he might argue.  He would maintain that my audience is interested in what I 
wrote (rather than in my ability to produce character-tokens) and thus is willing to fill-in the 
missing elements of my written string of words – the comma.152  I don’t deny that we use 
                                                
150 See also Ebbs’s objections (Ebbs (2009):  p. 124);  Alward calls for a more charitable interpretation of 
Kaplan than Cappellen is willing to extend (Alward (2005):  p. 177).    
151 Independently of Cappellen’s objections to Kaplan’s notion of words, Putnam rejects the idea that any 
“physical object can, in itself, refer to one thing rather than to another”.  He insists:  “nothing physical has 
‘intentionality’, save as that intentionality is derivative from some employment of that physical thing by a 
mind” (Putnam (1981) p. 2).   
152 “What these cases show is that charity in interpretation often extends to the classification of ink marks, 
sounds etc.  In some cases we overlook the fact that the speaker didn’t produce a token of the word she 
tried to produce.  We know which words she tried to produce and since we are interested in what she has 
to say (rather than in her ability to produce word tokens), we give the speech act the interpretation we 
would have given it had the speaker managed to produce a token of the word we know she tried to 
produce” (Cappellen (1999):  p. 95). 
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contextual clues to figure out what word or string of words the speaker intended to produce.  But 
I disagree with the comma having been missing altogether and instead having been added by the 
observer.  The rice corn was merely harder to recognize than a standard comma!  The idea that 
words have to be produced with standard materials (i.e. with ink on paper) is not tenable, once 
we consider the already accepted alternatives:  words carved in wood, traced in sand, formed out 
of modeling clay and so on.  We don’t want to argue that a rice-corn intrinsically constitutes a 
comma and we don’t want to strip it of its potential semantic content either.  Our constitutive 
intentions turn the rice-kernel into a comma! 
3.3  Considering standard anti-individualist thought-examples  
According to social anti-individualism, speakers can be partly wrong or under-informed about 
what one of their words denote.153  Sometimes the speaker has only minimal information about 
what a word denotes.  I use a variety of unlabelled spice mills for coriander, mustard seeds, 
pepper and cumin.  My husband is able to identify the pepper, but he starts guessing on the 
content of the other mills.  So, if a recipe asks for coriander, he will consult me:  “which of the 
jars contains coriander?”  In this case he at least knows that the word ‘coriander’ refers to a 
spice.  He even knows that it comes from the same plant as the fresh herb cilantro.  When it 
comes to picking out a coriander sample from similar seeds, however, he struggles.  He is partly 
under-informed about what ‘coriander’ denotes.  Assuming that the author of the recipe knows 
what she is talking about, it is her word ‘coriander’ that he attempts to repeat to me.154,155  This 
                                                
153 “Participant commony regard their object-level thoughts (thoughts about, say, chairs) as undergoing 
correction in the course of the inquiry”  Burge (1986, 2007):  p. 261.   
154 That is, he is assuming that she didn’t make up a new word ‘cilantroNEW’ that denotes some ingredient 
other than cilantro.  He assumes that the author of the respective recipe is using her word ‘cilantro’ to 
denote cilantro.   
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case is best viewed as one where my husband is under-informed about a given topic156 and lends 
support to Kaplan’s notion of words.  
In one of the standard anti-individualist157 thought-examples, Burge conceives of a patient 
who has been diagnosed with arthritis in both knees.  Let me call this patient ‘Alice’.  She is 
overall competent in the English language.  At one of her follow-up visits she conveys to her 
doctor:  “I believe that arthritis has spread from my knee to my thigh.”  In the appropriate 
circumstances she would utter sentences containing the term ‘arthritis’ (non-vacuously):   
  ‘I have arthritis in my knees’. 
‘Certain aches are characteristic of arthritis’.   
  ‘It is better to have arthritis than cancer of the liver’.   
  ‘There are various kinds of arthritis’. 
‘Arthritis often afflicts the elderly’.  
The latter three utterances are true, if Alice’s word ‘arthritis’ denotes arthritis.  Prior to 
examining the patient, the doctor informs Alice that arthritis is a condition which couldn’t afflict 
any other parts of the body, but the joints.  Alice is surprised as well as relieved and goes on to 
ask about what could be wrong with her thigh.158,159  How should we interpret Alice’s word 
                                                                                                                                                       
155 Putnam presents us with a similar thought-example (Putnam (1975):  pp. 226-227).   
156 Burge elucidates:  “A primary impetus for my discovering the thought experiments was recognizing 
how many words or concepts I went around using which I found, on pressing myself, that I did not fully 
understand.  I came to realize that this was not just a personal weakness.  It was part of the human 
condition, at least in complex societies” (Burge (2007):  p. 175).   
157 Burge defines anti-individualism thus:  “The main idea of [… anti-individualism] is that the natures 
and correct individuation of many of an individual person’s intentional, or representational, mental states 
and events commonly depend in a constitutive way on relations that the individual bears to a wider social 
environment.  […] The differences in the social environment bear on the meanings of words and the ways 
words are connected through social chains to their subject matters” (Burge (2007):  p. 151). 
158 Burge makes it part of the description of his thought experiment that the patient “thinks falsely that 
[she] has arthritis in the thigh”.  Burge, using the patient’s term ‘arthritis’, begs the question as to whether 
the patient has thoughts about arthritis.  I presented a paraphrased version of Burge’s thought experiment, 
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‘arthritis’?  It seems most “natural” to describe the exchange between Alice and her doctor as 
one where Alice learned from her doctor that arthritis cannot afflict muscle material.160  If 
Alice’s word ‘arthritis’ denotes arthritis, we are in a position to say that her utterance “arthritis 
has spread from my knees to my thighs” expresses her belief that arthritis has spread from her 
knees to her thighs – which is false.  Alice revised her mistaken conceptions about arthritis based 
on what her doctor told her.  This presupposes that Alice and her doctor share the same word 
‘arthritis’, although she is severely mistaken about what that word refers to.  She also grasps the 
concept arthritis although she isn’t able to grasp it fully – her conceptions that she associates 
with what ‘arthritis’ refers to considerably diverge from the concept arthritis.   
Notice, that if you think that we shouldn’t interpret Alice’s utterance “Arthritis has spread 
from my knee to my thigh” as an utterance about arthritis, then we also cannot interpret her 
“true” utterances161 as beliefs about arthritis.  I think this would simply not coincide with how we 
generally interpret other speakers’ words in practice.   
Alice learned that she doesn’t have arthritis in her thighs since this condition doesn’t occur in 
parts of the body other than the joints.  In fact, this is how Alice would interpret her own 
epistemic experience.  Alice would not view herself as having learned a new word, but instead as 
having acquired a new belief.   
     Burge explains: 
In the course of the dialectic, we stand corrected:  we recognize ourselves as convicted of 
mistakes, not merely infelicitous strategies for communication.  We come to know something that 
characterizes empirical entities […] Usually, all participants begin the discussion without being 
able to give a precisely correct normative characterization [norms of identification regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the description of which doesn’t assume that the patient’s utterances in question are about arthritis (Burge 
(1979, 2007)). 
159 I once witnessed a patient asking her physical therapist whether the pain in her quad is caused by 
arthritis.  This reinforced my belief that Burge’s thought experiment isn’t far fetched. 
160 Ebbs (2002). 
161 ‘True utterances’:  The utterances that are true if they are spoken by a competent ‘arthritis’-user.   
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empirical entities]; all or most would make minor errors in attempting to do so.  But this does not 
entail that any lack object-level thoughts expressible, by the rest of us, with the term whose 
meaning is in question.  If it did, most people would have few if any object-level thoughts so 
expressible – an absurdity [emphasis added].  Participants commonly regard their object-level 
thoughts (thought about, say, chairs) as undergoing correction in the course of the inquiry.  They 
stand corrected on substantive matters.162 
It should not be overlooked that Alice would in retrospect (post-correction) interpret herself as 
having used the same word throughout the conversation and as having repeated the doctor’s 
word ‘arthritis’ – that is, she would interpret herself as having employed the same word 
‘arthritis’ as the doctor.163  Perhaps Alice is merely viewing herself to be repeating the mark 
‘arthritis’ but is not bound to use it to denote arthritis.  Burge anticipates this objection164 and 
reminds us how Alice is open to corrections by the doctor regarding the reference of ‘arthritis’165 
and wants to learn more about arthritis from him (in addition to being cured from whatever 
condition is causing the pain in her thigh).  Burge stresses how Alice would regard herself as 
having had a false object-level thought.  That is, a thought that pertains to the condition arthritis, 
not merely the word ‘arthritis’: 
The subject may maintain that [her] reasoning did not fix upon words.  [She] may be brought up 
short by metalinguistic formulations of [her] just-completed ruminations, and may insist that 
[she] was not in labels.  In such cases, especially if the reasoning is not concerned with linguistic 
issues in any informal or antecedently plausible sense, attribution of an object-level thought 
content is supported by the relevant evidence, and metalinguistic attribution is not.166   
                                                
162 Burge (1986, 2007): pp. 260-261.   
163 When we begin to identify a phenomenon it is not only the laymen, but also the experts who associate 
mistaken and incomplete conceptions with it.  If conceptions individuate words, then given how little 
even experts know about arthritis – it would follow that nobody can talk about that condition – whatever 
it turns out to be – using our present word ‘arthritis’.  
164 Burge (1979, 2007):  p. 122.   
165 Burge clarifies:  “We may imagine a cast, ragged network of interdependence, established by patterns 
of deference which lead back to people who would elicit the assent of others.  […] To put it crudely, a 
person counts as among the most competent if he or she would be persuasive to other competent speakers 
in the use and explication of the language.  The point about persuasion is fundamental” see Burge (1986, 
2007):  p. 259.   
166 Burge (1979, 2007):  p. 127.   
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If Alice were merely repeating a mark, she wouldn’t need to yield her beliefs regarding what her 
word ‘arthritis’ denotes to the doctor’s statements such as:  “arthritis only afflicts the joints.”  
Therefore, it is much more plausible that Alice is using our word ‘arthritis’, which lends support 
to Kaplan’s notion of words.   
3.4  Does Kaplan solve word-performance ambiguity? 
Putnam observes that if we were to encounter somebody, let’s call him ‘Oscar’, pointing at a 
snowball uttering:  “This is a tiger!”167 – there wouldn’t be much use in talking to Oscar about 
tigers using our words ‘tiger’ or ‘tigers’.168, 169  Why not?  Does this mean there are limits to the 
degree to which a speaker may be under- or misinformed about a given topic?  If so, can Kaplan 
accommodate such limits with his theory?  
I have earlier shown Cappellen’s criticisms to be unfounded.  Nevertheless, I agree with 
Cappellen that the speaker intending to repeat a word doesn’t thereby guarantee her success.  
Unlike Cappellen, I am not concerned with radically deviant marks in terms of physical features.  
Instead, I am interested in cases where the speaker is fully capable to produce standard marks, 
such as “angina”, but the speaker still fails in her attempt to repeat the respective public word.  
How can these phenomena be explained?  What interferes with the linguistic commitment to a 
given public word?  I raise doubts as to whether the intention to repeat a token t originally 
                                                
167 We are assuming that this snowball doesn’t even have the shape of a tiger.   
168 Putnam (1975):  p. 248. 
169 Some of you may think that Putnam’s example is too far fetched.  People simply don’t really talk like 
that.  During one of the primaries I came across an interesting response by one of the republican 
candidates, Governor Mitt Romney, to the following question: “Knowing everything you know right now, 
was it a mistake for us to invade Iraq?”  He said: 
Well, the question is, kind of, a non sequitur, if you will. What I mean by that – or a null set – 
that is that if you're saying let's turn back the clock and Saddam Hussein had…[emphasis added]. 
This is from a republican presidential candidate debate aired on television June 5th 2007: 
http://myclob.pbwiki.com/Was+it+a+mistake+for+us+to+invade+Iraq 
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produced by another individual, which results in the production of t’, suffices for tokens t and t’ 
to represent performances of the same word (that is for t and t’ to be nodes on the same repetition 
tree) – as argued by Kaplan.  
His proposal seems to work particularly well in contexts where one speaker enters the 
conversation with a “blank slate”, or where one speaker is under- or misinformed about a topic 
and wants to learn from the more knowledgeable interlocutors.170  It is remarkable how in many 
instances we appear to pick up a word instantly yet without knowing anything at all about its 
referent.171   
[I]n a tiny fraction of cases the [epistemic] connection is absent – semantics (or metasemantics) 
does not require it – and in these cases we have direct reference, and expressibility, but no 
apprehension.172   
A name may later take on the required epistemic connection when the referent appears upon the 
scene and is recognized as the named object.173 
What Kaplan describes seems to be particularly true for “what-is-x-questions”.  The inquirer is 
only put en rapport with the referent after her question has been answered.  
Capoeira is a Brazilian martial art that is always accompanied by songs.  One of them  
begins ‘Não é dinheiro, não é ouro…’.  Although I don’t speak Portuguese, except for a few 
words, I can ask “what does ‘dinheiro’ mean?”174  This would be easy to explain if the lyrics had 
been written on a board and I had pointed at the word in question and asked “what does this 
word mean?”  But I didn’t.  I produced my own token of the Portuguese word ‘dinheiro’.  I 
repeated more than just some word-“form” that sounds like the Portuguese ‘dinheiro’.  I want to 
                                                
170 Ebbs (2002). 
171 We can do this even for words of a language we are not competent in.  This is why I do not agree with 
Alward (2005) that Kaplan’s proposal could be improved by requiring that the speaker must be overall 
competent in the language that the word w belongs to – in order to be in a position to repeat w.  This is not 
wherein the mistake lies.   
172 Kaplan (1989). 
173 Kaplan (1989):  footnote 98.   
174 I happen to know how to pronounce that word correctly, since I have heard the song many times.  
Even if I had mispronounced it, I would still have repeated that word. 
  
 
 
 65 
know what the Portuguese ‘dinheiro’ means.  I don’t want to know about some word ‘dinheiro’ 
or other, I am asking about that word – the one used in the song in question.  Suppose the song 
were in French, where the word denoting money can also mean silver.  ‘Ce n’est pas de l’argent, 
ce n’est pas de l’or…’.  This time, it’s a language I can speak.  So I ask:  ‘Qu’est-ce que c’est du 
argent’ (overlooking that it would be rather strange for a competent French speaker not to know 
what ‘argent’ means)175.  Several aspects of this example seem to favor my being able to use the 
name ‘argent’ versus merely being in a position to mention it:176 
a) My question is grammatically complete.  So I must be using some word (albeit not 
necessarily the public word ‘argent’).   
b) Other speakers would and ought to interpret me as asking a question about argent.  
c) In the song the word ‘argent’ denotes money, so the proper answer to my question would 
be that money is a means of exchange that can take on a variety of forms (expressed in 
French of course). 
I will later go on to use the French word ‘argent’ on many occasions successfully in 
conversations with other competent French speakers.  I intra-subjectively individuate the various 
‘argent’-marks as utterances of one and the same word ‘argentN’.  I view myself as having 
repeated the same word ‘argent’ (in the thick sense) – since I first produced the corresponding 
mark.  This speaks in favor of Kaplan’s notion of words that regards the individual conceptions a 
                                                
175 From the grammatical construction of the song excerpt I can tell that ‘argent’ is a mass noun, enabling 
me to ask a grammatical question without knowing at all what ‘argent’ denotes.  
176 Most ordinary speakers don’t pay much attention to the use-mention distinction, so how can we be 
sure that I am using the word ‘argent’, rather than mentioning it?  Most ordinary speakers don’t indicate 
syntactically whether the word is being mentioned, rather than used.  In this case, it just happens that 
‘argent’ is a mass-term while words are the kinds of things we can count.  If I were asking about the word 
‘argent’, then I should be using the count-noun construction:  ‘Qu’est-ce que c’est le (mot) ‘argent’’.  I am 
not even sure how we would answer such a question.   
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speaker associates with her own words as irrelevant in interpreting her words (with the omission 
of the exception clause that I will discuss later).177,178,179,180  
In the above example I had no substantial beliefs associated with ‘argent’, but I was 
nevertheless able to mention and use it – or so it seems.  Sometimes, though, the indexical 
intention – repeating that word (the third word of the original song, or the seventh word in the 
French translation) of that particular song – can be overridden.  
I now want to call into doubt whether we really pick up the word with its pre-packaged 
semantic content as Kaplan has us believe.  The following example speaks against immediate 
word-acquisition.  If my analysis is correct, then Kaplan owes us an explanation with regard to 
                                                
177 Maybe you care to also inform me that there is another word ‘argent’ in French that denotes silver.  
Accounting for ambiguity is somewhat difficult for Kaplan, since he regards words such as ‘bank’ 
denoting financial institutions and ‘bank’ denoting the land mass adjacent to a river as distinct words (not 
as one and the same word with distinct uses or meanings). For Kaplan ambiguity can only be a relation 
between marks (or perhaps a non-resemblance notion of word forms).   
178 Evans makes a similar observation:  “An example which might favourably dispose one towards the 
[causal] theory [of names] is this.  A group of people are having a conversation in a pub, about a certain 
Louis of whom S has never heard before.  S become interested and asks:  ‘What did Louis do then?’ There 
seems to be no question but that S denotes a particular man and asks about him.  Or on some subsequent 
occasion S may use the name to offer some new thought to one of the participants: ‘Louis was quite right 
to do that.’  Again he clearly denotes whoever was the subject of conversation in the pub” (Evans (1973, 
1985) pp.6-7).     
179 Bach declares boldly that we pick up the referents of proper names via the name’s form:  “Since the 
hearer’s mental token of the name ‘inherits’ the same object as the speaker’s, the object of the hearer’s 
thought is determined relationally, not satisfactionally.  […] A token of a name can function as a de re 
mode of presentation because its reference is determined not by its meaning but by its ancestry.  It plays 
this role by being of a certain form (sound or shape), generally the same as the one to which it is linked.  
When the meaning of the token does not matter, its referent cannot be determined satisfactionally.  
Indeed, that only its form matters is what constitutes its being used as a [proper] name.  And that is what 
enables one to form de re thoughts about an unfamiliar object referred to by that name.  Since the token of 
a [proper] name represents in virtue of its form, not its meaning, representational features can be 
perceived by the hearer, who can then and thereafter use mental tokens of the same name to think of (or 
refer to) the same object” (Bach (1987) pp. 32-33).  Of course Kaplan would probably quarrel with the 
idea of a name form.  Perhaps Kaplan could agree to a notion of two tokens displaying the same form, if 
they didn’t do so based on a resemblance relation – perhaps we can say that the hearer intending to repeat 
token t and thereby produces t’ results in t and t’ constituting the same word or name form.  But as I will 
explain towards the end of this chapter, this is not what Kaplan set himself up to do.  He believes the 
speaker is thus repeating the word not merely the word form.   
180 I will discuss cases of this sort in greater detail in chapter 4.   
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what constitutes an appropriate intention to repeat a word-token t such that the resulting 
performance t’ is a node of the same repetition tree as t.   
Suppose a person, Jane, finds a piece of paper with only the mark ‘Pompey’ written on it.  
Let’s stipulate further that the original producer of that mark meant to write the name denoting 
the famous Roman statesman known as ‘PompeyP’.181  Jane has never before encountered this 
word.  She subsequently wonders:  ‘What is PompeyJ?’.182  The last token occurring in her 
question is intended as a repetition of the name she found on the piece of paper.  Kaplan would 
have to say that Jane succeeded in repeating the public name ‘PompeyP’ – denoting the Roman 
statesman Pompey.183  So, is Jane’s question inquiring about Pompey?  Jane intends to find out 
about the name or word the original producer of the token wrote on the piece of paper – which 
would entail finding out about what it denotes.  She would therefore regard information about 
that very token, as used by the person who produced it, as relevant.  These details accord with 
Kaplan’s theory and similar considerations may very well have inspired it.   
Still, my inclination is to say that Jane is not at this point capable to use the name ‘PompeyJ’ 
to ask a question about Pompey.  For one thing, why should she even assume that the name 
denotes an individual?184  At this point Jane’s word is a blank slate; she doesn’t associate any 
substantial conceptions with it.  Although she knows that the name is of some interest to her 
fellow speakers.  Even though we allow speakers to be under-informed about a given topic, we 
                                                
181 I am using the subscript ‘P’ to designate that it is the public name that was produced on the piece of 
paper.  The mark is a node on the public repetition tree:  ‘Pompey’.   
182 I am using the subscript ‘J’ to designate that the mark is one produced by Jane and that it is a word of 
her own idiolect.  Whether ‘PompeyP’ and ‘PompeyJ’ are one and the same word – in the thick sense – 
remains to be seen.   
183 The exception clause that I will discuss later doesn’t help Kaplan here, since Jane doesn’t have any 
conceptions regarding the name ‘Pompey’ and thus cannot have any conceptions that conflict with how 
the producer of the original mark uses ‘Pompey’.   
184 Thanks to Ebbs for bringing this to my attention.   
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expect speakers to know some essential truths about what a given public word denotes in order to 
be entitled to participate in the given practice.185   
Consider what would happen if Jane were to receive the following response by a person other 
than the producer of the original mark:  ‘Pompey was a historic Roman town-city’.  Something 
isn’t quite right, but I am sure that I don’t want to argue that Jane was given false information 
about Pompey.  Pompeii was a historic Roman town-city (destroyed by an eruption of Mount 
Vesuvius); Pompey was a prominent military and political figure in Rome.186  While the standard 
pronunciations of ‘PompeiiP’ and ‘PompeyP’ are distinct but similar, one can easily see how Jane 
may attach the (standard) spelling or pronunciation of ‘PompeiiP’ to ‘PompeyP’ and the same 
goes for the person answering her question.  Remember that even incorrectly spelled nodes can 
be causally linked to the repetition tree of a given word (i.e. ‘PompeiiP’).   
Interpreting Jane’s question as one pertaining to Pompey, leads to unacceptable inferences.  If 
we leave her intra-subjective word-individuations intact, she comes to believe that Pompey (the 
man) was a city, which is absurd (and renders anti-individualism vulnerable to serious self-
knowledge problems).  Imagine Jane were to tell us:  “I wonder what life in Pompey was like 
prior to the eruption.  I wish I could have experience life there.”  If we were to interpret her name 
‘PompeyJ’ as denoting the same individual as our name ‘PompeyP’ – Jane would be wishing to 
have lived in a person!  We simply cannot make sense of such a desire.  What states of affairs 
would have to be actual for her wish to come true?  We find ourselves at a loss of how to begin 
answering this question.     
                                                
185 Recall Putnam’s example, where a person points at a snowball and exclaims:  “This is a tiger!” 
186 I intentionally picked two words that are not considered homonymic in anticipation of the objection 
that the case I consider is merely a problem of ambiguity.    
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Taking for granted that a particular token cannot constitute a node on two distinct repetition 
trees, we could, nevertheless, argue as follows:  even though Jane believes to be using the same 
word ‘PompeyJ’ (in the thick sense) over time, her various ‘PompeyJ’ performances stand for 
different words – without her noticing that they do.  As a result, it would be possible to interpret 
some of her ‘PompeyJ’ tokens as repetitions of the word ‘PompeyP’ (i.e the question “What is 
Pompey?”), while other ‘PompeyJ’ tokens constitute (misspelled) repetitions of the word 
‘PompeiiP’ (i.e. her assertion “Pompey is a historic Roman town-city”).  This would clash with 
Jane’s intentions to keep repeating the same word with the tokens in question.  Can we make 
sense of Jane’s inability to keep track of her own word-repetitions, as described?   
So far, I relied heavily on speakers being right about individuating their own words across 
time.  Otherwise, it becomes difficult to explain why I am able to state satisfaction conditions for 
my own words, such as when I utter:   
“x satisfies ‘dog’ if and only if x is a dog.” 
The same ability is ascribed to other speakers.  I do not want to give up this assumption of 
infallible individuation of one’s own words.  Kaplan’s proposal assumes that individuals can 
keep track of their own words – otherwise, what use is the ability to repeat other speaker’s 
words, if I cannot store testimony thus conveyed and use it as an inference in an argument at a 
later time?  Given that a speaker has privileged access to her own conceptions associated with a 
given token, it seems puzzling at best why we should generally be capable to repeat other 
people’s words (in the thick sense) if we cannot do so for our own words.  For those reasons I 
argue that we must ascribe to Jane, as well as other speakers, the ability to successfully repeat 
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their own words, even if this means that Jane deviated from the accepted performance standards 
of how to pronounce ‘PompeiiP’.187 
We interpret Jane (in retrospect) as having inquired about Pompeii, because we accept that her 
later beliefs as pertaining to Pompeii.  Assuming this to be correct and given that Jane is assumed 
infallible at individuating her own words it follows that Jane simply used a deviant (but still 
recognizable) spelling or pronunciation for our word ‘PompeiiP’:  Jane’s word ‘PompeyJ’ is our 
word ‘PompeiiP’.  That means the content of Jane’s question q was determined by how the 
person responding to q interpreted q and by the resulting beliefs Jane comes to acquire as a result 
about the referent of ‘PompeyJ’.   
If at some future point in time somebody alerts her that there are two similar words:  one 
‘PompeiiP’ denoting a Roman town-city, the other one ‘PompeyP’ denoting a prominent Roman 
statesman, Jane would revise her spelling of the word ‘PompeiiP’ (from ‘PompeyJ’ to 
‘PompeiiJ’).  She would not take herself to have confused Pompeii the town with Pompey the 
man.  In this case Jane would change the spelling of her word ‘PompeiiJ’ from ‘PompeyJ’ to 
‘PompeiiJ’ such as to adhere better with the performance standards of her linguistic community – 
these distinctly spelled tokens would nevertheless belong to the same repetition tree.   
Recall, however, how I also remarked on Jane’s inquiry being guided by the desire to know 
the meaning of the word written on the piece of paper.  She would therefore regard information 
about that very token, as used by the person who produced it, as relevant.  If Jane never gets the 
chance to find out what name or word the person intended to write on that piece of paper, then 
her name ‘PompeyJ’ clearly denotes the city Pompeii, not the man Pompey.  What would 
                                                
187 I will explain in a later chapter that when Jane picked up the token ‘Pompey’ she created a mental file 
or register labeled ‘Pompey’.  At this point the file is empty and Jane cannot use this token t1 to convey 
beliefs about the referent connected tot his file (yet).  Gradually she will acquire information that gets 
stored in this file (i.e. PompeyJ (“our” Pompeii) is a Roman town-city…).  Eventually we can view Jane as 
having acquired a new word ‘PompeyJ’ (not to be translated as out ‘Pompey’).   
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happen, if after years of using ‘PompeyJ’ as the name of the city, she were to discover that the 
name written on that original piece of paper is the name of a person and was written to denote 
Pompey?  Jane would judge that her own word ‘PompeyJ’ wasn’t an appropriate repetition of the 
original.  I don’t view her discovery that the original mark denotes Pompey, a Roman politician, 
as sufficient evidence that her word ‘PompeyJ’ thus (also) denotes Pompey.188   
In this example Jane merely seems to have acquired the mark  ‘Pompey’ but not the word 
‘PompeyP’ that denotes Pompey the person.  Even though this very mark was produced with the 
intention to stand for the word ‘PompeyP’ (denoting Pompey) and Jane meant to repeat that very 
word, she failed in her attempt.  Whether Jane’s “what-is-question” is about Pompey, when she 
asks:  “What is PompeyJ?” depends on how she goes on to fill her conceptions regarding that 
mark.  If those conceptions turn out to radically clash with the word that the mark she originally 
encountered stood for (a person is not a city or vice versa), then the causal link to the repetition 
tree may fail to be established.189   
                                                
188 In chapter six I propose to solve slow-switching Twin Earth puzzles, where the speaker appears to 
draw invalid inferences, with merged registers.  The speaker stored information about two natural kinds 
for which two distinct public words exist in one register.  I do not view this a plausible option in Jane’s 
case.  The objects thus merged as one kind in a single register must at least appear similar to the 
individual.  This is not the case here.  She is not confusing the man Pompey and the city Pompeii as one 
kind or individual.  I therefore do not ascribe to Jane a register that merges Pompey and Pompeii.   
189 Kaplan conceives of the possibility of a new name being created:  “One might consider two kinds of 
polar cases:  In one case you intend to use (to repeat) a given common currency name with whatever 
referent it may have.  (“What is Hesperus?” you ask, overhearing a conversation in which the name is 
used.)  In the antipodal case, you intend to dub a particular thing using an apt generic name.  In the 
formed case there is continuity, in the latter, creativity, a new name is created”.  He even admits of there 
being a possibility for one intending to repeat and already existing name, while one also attaches 
descriptive beliefs with the token produced with the intention to repeat that name which conflict with the 
success of repetition.  “But there are those troubling cases (first thrust upon our consciousness by Keith 
Donnellan, and then Gricefully reconceptualized by Saul Kripke) that seem to lie in between:  the man 
with the Martini, the false introduction, and their ilk” (Kaplan (1990): p.117) .  Just imagine a case where 
your neighbor points at a woman across the street carrying several books and tells you that her name is 
‘Mrs. Wagner’.  As it happens this woman, let’s call her ‘Virginia’, is Mrs. Husting.  Mrs. Wagner is a 
different woman, who also goes by ‘Ursula’ and lives several blocks down the street.  Your neighbor 
knows that Mrs. Husting goes by the name ‘Mrs. Husting’, but he has poor vision and thought he saw 
Ursula when in fact he saw Virginia.  You recall the event:  “Mrs. Wagner was carrying an awful lot of 
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This means I must qualify my earlier conclusions about the ‘dinheiro’ and ‘argent’ example.  
Although I appeared instantly capable of using those words, mere exposure to the mark doesn’t 
enable me to use the respective word that the mark was produced to stand for.  It matters how I 
“fill” in my beliefs about what the word that the mark instantiates denotes.  Those conceptions in 
turn are formed on the basis of information passed on to me by other speakers and their 
interpretation of the mark in question. Individual conceptions regarding a word cannot be 
entirely set aside when we individuate words.  
Perhaps we can account for Jane’s mistake as one trying to repeat two distinct words, but she 
is under the impression that they are one and the same.  When Jane forms the belief:  “Pompey is 
a Roman town-city” her mark ‘Pompey’, she thereby intends to repeat the word originally 
produced on the piece of paper, as well as, the word her informant was using.  Mercier explains 
how this fails to be a well-formed intention on Jane’s part:  “Now, in order for my intention to 
use a word with its meaning to be a well-formed intention, it has to be the case that the word 
about which I have that intention is indeed one word.”190  
But when Jane first asks the question “What is Pompey?” she has not yet encountered her 
informant’s word ‘Pompey’ (which is to be identified with our public word ‘PompeiiP’) and can 
thus not yet have the intention to repeat his word(s).  So, only some of her later ‘PompeyJ’ tokens 
could be linked to two distinct repetition trees (‘PompeyP’ and ‘PompeiiP’).  I don’t think we can 
make sense of Jane’s word ‘PompeyJ’ denoting a person and a city – especially if she (by then) 
intends to repeat a proper name.   
                                                                                                                                                       
books” (Kaplan (1990):  p. 117).  Since you have never met Ursula, it is natural to assume that your 
memory pertains to Virginia.  Thus your name ‘Mrs. Wagner’ denotes Mrs. Husting, even though your 
neighbor’s name ‘Mrs. Wagner’ denotes Mrs. Wagner (Ursula).  Your intention to denote the woman 
across the street (Virginia) conflicts with your intention to repeat the name of your neighbor ‘Mrs. 
Wagner’ that denotes Ursula. 
190 Mercier, Adèle (1993):  p. 79. 
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I have shown Jane to have failed in her attempt to repeat another person’s word.  Jane is still 
committed to repeating some public practice (she still remains a language consumer); she 
happened to switch the standard “labels”.  Her mark “Pompey” is linked to the public name 
‘Pompeii’ (not the public name ‘Pompey’ – at least until other speakers correct her spelling and 
pronunciation).  Should we really worry about such confusions if they only constitute a problem 
for ambiguous or relevantly similar word pairs?  This is not an excuse Kaplan can help himself 
to, since he believes that “the difference in phonographology, the difference in sound or shape or 
spelling, can be just about as great as you would like it to be.”191 
As I clarified in my discussion of Cappellen’s objections against Kaplan not everything goes.  
We would have a hard time to make the case that ‘alligator’ stands for ‘onomatopoeia’.  It is hard 
to imagine a person in good faith intending to repeat ‘alligator’ and produce ‘onomatopoeia’ 
instead.  It is, on the other hand, possible to conceive of someone intending to repeat ‘Pompeii’ 
and produce ‘Pompey’ instead – the same goes for the word-pair ‘alligator’ and ‘allegory’.192  
Anybody who has learned a foreign language will attest to this, even when we are already overall 
competent in that language we may still attach very non-standard marks to words of that 
language.   
I have demonstrated how Kaplan’s intention-based account doesn’t yet provide us conditions 
for when two inter-subjective word tokens t and t’ are of the same word type.  Given that 
speakers may fail in their attempt to repeat a token (produced by another performer) that belongs 
to a public repetition tree, we need an account of what distinguishes successful from failed 
repetition attempts.   
                                                
191 Kaplan (1990):  p. 101.   
192 And this not being a slip of the tongue or pen! 
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Perhaps Kaplan could be interpreted as offering an alternative criterion for the first step (i) of 
the word individuation process (U).193  However, this is not what Kaplan describes himself as 
doing.  Kaplan clarifies: 
There are two phonographic words “base” (meaning ‘low’ and bottom), not, as the orthographic 
conception would have it, a single word with two meanings.194   
[W]e are for the most part, language consumers.  Words come to us prepacked with a semantic 
value.  If we are to use those words, the words we have received, the words of our linguistic 
community, then we must defer to their meaning.195 
Kaplan attempts to solve word-ambiguity.  There are two words ‘bank1’ (the financial institution) 
and ‘bank2’ (the slope at a river).  They happen to be spelled and pronounced the same way and 
both represent nouns.  Ambiguity thus means that one and the same mark can, depending on 
context, either constitute a standard replica of ‘bank1’ or ‘bank2’.  It is not the case that there is 
one word with distinct meanings or uses.  Therefore, Kaplan distinguishes between the intention 
of repeating ‘bank1’ versus ‘bank2’, thereby rendering word-repetition semantically loaded.  
Eventually, we are interested in more than labels, we want to know what beliefs our interlocutor 
is trying to convey to us!   
3.5 Thought examples demonstrating repetition failures   
Receiving repeated significant misinformation about how a mark m is used in a given 
linguistic community L may inhibit a speaker’s ability to communicate with members of L by 
using m.  In the following two thought-examples I will show that there are also other sources for 
                                                
193 Ebbs’s rejection of the two-step word individuation process: 
(U) Two word tokens t and t’ are of the same word type if and only if  
(i) t and t’ are each tokens of the same orthographic or phonetic type, and 
(ii) facts about the ex-use of t and t’ determine that they each have semantic values 
and that their semantic values are the same. 
Ebbs (2009):  p.112; Ebbs rejects the token and ex-use model of words (U). 
194 Kaplan (1990):  p. 100. 
195 Kaplan (1989): p. 602.   
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miscommunication.  Sometimes a given mark m stands for different words w and w’ in different 
languages, such that w and w’ ought not to be translated for one another – this causes the 
speaker’s failure to repeat w.  In the second example, either through radical underinformation or 
some misunderstanding, the speaker fails to establish appropriate linguistic connections to a 
public word practice.   
Allow me to recall an experience I once had at the dentist.  I was asked to pick from a long list 
of medical conditions those that I am suffering from at present or had been diagnosed with in the 
past.  I affirmatively placed a checkmark next to ‘angina’.  In German – my mother tongue – 
‘Angina’ is ordinarily used to refer to strep throat also known as ‘angina tonsillaris’.  English 
speakers, on the other hand, tend to ordinarily refer to angina pectoris with ‘angina’, whereas 
Germans would commonly name this condition ‘Brustenge’ (chest constriction) or ‘Stenokardie’.  
Since chest constriction and angina (tonsillaris) are clearly distinct medical conditions, the 
ordinary German word ‘Angina’ is not to be translated as the ordinary English word ‘angina’.  
Even after many years of immersion in English speaking communities, I hadn’t learned the 
(ordinary) English word ‘angina’ yet.  Perhaps you can already see where this is going.  I clearly 
meant to convey that I have had strep throat in the past.  Admittedly, at the time, I was 
wondering why this would be of any concern to a dentist.  Then again, most of those medical 
forms seem overly elaborate, so I didn’t continue puzzling over the matter.  The dentist, on the 
other hand, was interested in whether I am suffering from angina pectoris.  When going through 
my papers the technician asked further questions about my suffering from “angina”.  Since she 
showed a significant degree of concern I suspected some miscommunication and clarified my 
response.  In the end, I was able to convey what I had intended to by paraphrasing. 
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The initial misunderstanding could very well have gone unnoticed.  Time constraints often 
render us less inquisitive than we should be.196  I thought that that word ‘angina’ was to be 
translated as ‘Angina’ into German – which is false.  I was using the word ‘angina’ to mean 
angina tonsillaris, while the technician used ‘angina’ to mean angina pectoris. 
What is so difficult to explain in this example is that I certainly meant to use the same word 
‘angina’ as the one printed on the medical survey;197 however, I had specific expectations as to 
what kind of word it is, unlike in the case of ‘dinheiro’.  Whether I ought to be considered 
having had a false belief about angina (pectoris) or having used a different word ‘angina 
(tonsillaris)’ depends on how I go on to use repetitions of my token ‘angina’.   
There are several ways of how I could interpret my own mistake.  Do I say:  “Oh I thought 
angina causes pain in the throat, not in the chest.”  Or do I instead go on to reflect:  “The 
technician is using a different word ‘angina’ from mine.  We are talking past one another.”  
Given my translation into ordinary German the latter is the more plausible interpretation of my 
word.  It matters very much which beliefs are “dear” to me.  What I cannot do is view my 
attempt to repeat the technician’s word ‘anginaT’ as successful and hold on to the translation that 
my “English” word ‘angina’ is to be translated as my German word ‘Angina’.198  If I want to 
maintain that the belief I meant to convey was that at some point in my life I have suffered from 
strep throat, then I must – if I am committed to successfully communicate with the technician – 
add a new word ‘angina’ to my idiolect.   
                                                
196 Verdonik (2010).  
197 I actually re-used an already existing mark – originally intended to stand for the English word 
‘angina’.  When an individual re-uses an already existing mark m, m does not thereby necessarily retain 
its previous denotation (and its membership in a specific repetition tree).  This case is similar to the one 
discussed earlier with the found mark ‘Can you spare a quarter’ that acquired word-hood or semantic 
content through the communicative intentions the speaker (Cappellen) associated with that mark.   
198 A legitimate worry is that we generally don’t reflect on our words this carefully and thus may miss 
such inconsistencies.   
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Perhaps we can brush this example aside as one where the speaker simply lacks a well-formed 
intention, since the utterances she intends to repeat and views as performances of the same word 
are actually performances of two distinct words.  I intended to repeat the word ‘angina’ written 
on the questionnaire, but at the same time also thereby thought I was repeating a word to be 
translated into German as ‘Angina’.  In anticipation of such examples Kaplan writes: 
The second kind of error is a short circuit – two different circuits got wired together – zap, the 
whole thing goes up in smoke.  I am inclined to think that when two different common currency 
words are wired together in this way in a given black box, which then pulls from that common 
source and transmits, nothing whatsoever is being said.  Is it transmitting the first word?  Is it 
transmitting the second word?  I think there is just no answer to that question.199 
 Even though I saw myself as committed to two distinct public repetition trees (that I falsely 
interpreted as translations of one another) I view this (in retrospect) as a case where my linguistic 
commitment to one was so overwhelming that it inhibited my commitment to the other repetition 
tree.  Kaplan correctly identifies the phenomenon, but I disagree with his conclusion, one can 
clearly make sense of my thought that I would express in English thus:  “I have had angina as a 
child.”  It states that I have had strep throat as a child.  I had attempted to repeat an English word, 
but failed to do so.  Nevertheless, my utterance was a repetition of some public word. 
In the next thought example, I demonstrate how sometimes speakers intend to repeat some 
public word w, but the resulting token marks the beginning of an entirely new repetition tree (one 
that doesn’t exist yet in any language).  Evans presents such an example, which we now know to 
be historically incorrect, but no less philosophically illuminating.  He writes:   
We learn from Issac Taylor’s Names and their History (1898):   
In the case of ‘Madagascar’ a hearsay report of Malay or Arab sailors misunderstood by Marco 
Polo... has had the effect of transferring a corrupt form of the name of a portion of the African 
mainland to the great African Island.200,201 
                                                
199 Kaplan (1990):  p.109. 
200 Evans (1973, 1985):  p. 11. 
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Although Marco Polo meant to repeat the word of his Malay or Arab encounters, we must 
conclude that he failed to do so.  Otherwise, unbeknownst to us we are referring to some part of 
mainland Africa and not to the island we believe to be talking about, when uttering 
‘Madagascar’.  Since the referential chain reaching back from our tokens to those of Marco Polo 
are assumed intact, he must have somehow failed to pick up the word of the foreign sailors.  This 
again leads us to the conclusion that the intention to repeat a word doesn’t guarantee our success 
in doing so.  Whereas in my previous ‘angina’ thought example my word ‘angina’ was able to 
connect to some public word, the German word ‘Angina’, Marco Polo’s word ‘Madagascar’ had 
no practice to “latch on” to – except for the one that would have made his name denote some part 
of mainland Africa.  
What allowed Marco Polo’s token ‘Madagascar’ to break off the Malay and Arab public 
repetition tree ‘Madagascar’?  How was it possible for a new word-chain to be initiated?  
Mercier points out how this development is most often not driven by the more competent 
speakers or experts202 (i.e. the eventual creation of a new word chain for ‘livid’ denoting the 
                                                                                                                                                       
201 From an interview with Lepore about a paper in progress:  “Here’s an example that John [Hawthorne] 
and I [Lepore] put in the paper [“On Words,”]. Most people would agree that performances of the word 
‘moan’ and the word ‘mean’ are totally separate words. I can’t imagine anyone denying it. However, if 
you take the cluster of performances of the one word and the cluster of performances of the other word, 
you could trace them back to a single cluster of performances in Saxon England. Now, from that, I don’t 
think anybody would feel compelled to say, ‘Oh, isn’t that interesting: in Saxon England they had a 
homonym that was two words.’ I think most people would agree that whatever they were doing in Saxon 
England, those performances were performances of one word. So that raises the interesting question, 
since those performances of that single word somehow or other provoked and inspired performances of 
distinct words, contemporaneously, when did these two words come into existence, exactly?”  (Baggini, 
Julian (2009) “Words don’t come easy” in The Philosopher’s Magazine, 43; 
http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=67).   
202 Mercier (1993):  pp.  85-86.  I cannot agree with Mercier that those new word creations are based on 
mistakes.  We don’t want to say that people are misusing the (original) word ‘livid’ to denote the facial 
color red or pink.  This would not get the point across, since then we would admit that those people 
indeed are repeating the original word ‘livid’.  Mercier and I want to argue that they are using a different 
word ‘livid’.  I also don’t want to say that the use they attach with the mark ‘livid’ ceases to be a mistake 
once dictionaries condone it.  This would entail that prior to the new dictionary entry ‘lividR’ (meaning 
the color of a reddish face) some people were mis-using the original word ‘lividBG’ and post dictionary 
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opposite color of a pale face; a new expression ‘begging the question’ recently entered the 
lexicon, stating that a question ought to be raised203).  Sometimes, speakers view themselves as 
language consumers, but due to some misunderstanding, they unintentionally break off the 
existing linguistic practice and give birth to a new word.  Marco Polo didn’t mean to impose his 
geographic expertise or his social status on the Arab (or Malay) sailors when he named some 
island ‘Madagascar’.  Clearly, it isn’t up to just anybody to name an island and have that name 
enter public usage.  Still, Marco Polo merely intended to use the same name as his encounter, but 
failed in his attempt.    
3.6   An exception clause threatens to undermine anti-individualism altogether 
Kaplan is not oblivious to the kinds of examples I discussed above and he offers a solution of 
his own.  I will show that the exception clause Kaplan proposes is in need of being contained, or 
it could threaten to undermine standard (social) anti-individualist thought examples.   
Kaplan suggests that a word may undergo a change in reference.204   
                                                                                                                                                       
amendment they are suddenly employing a new word ‘lividR’ correctly.  Marco Polo’s mistake can only 
consist of his attempt to repeat the word of the locals, when he is really giving birth to a new word.    
203 There is a (similar) older word ‘livid’ meaning bluish gray; there is also a (similar) older expression 
‘begging the question’ denoting a circular argument.  I suppose if somebody begs the question there is 
indeed a question that begs to be asked, namely:  how does she support her conclusion?   
204 Perhaps the word ‘livid’ is such an example.  Apparently many people are under the misconception 
that it denotes the color of a reddish face, whereas it actually denotes a bluish gray color.  George 
imagines a person checking what ‘livid’ means in the dictionary and thereby revising the meaning of her 
word ‘livid’ (George (1990):  p. 289).   
As I will lay out later, I won’t accept that a person can be so radically wrong in interpreting her own 
word. George’s analysis of the case is along the lines of Kaplan’s notion of word.  The individual 
intended to repeat the public word ‘livid’ and only later found out what it means.  Prior to consulting the 
dictionary, she said of Peter’s face: “Peter’s face is livid”.  Suppose Peter’s face was red.  I simply cannot 
make sense of the claim that her utterance states a false belief (especially since she believes that ‘a livid 
face’ describes a red face).   
For reasons I will describe later, I would say that when she looks up the word ‘livid’ in the dictionary, she 
acquires a new word ‘livid’.   
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[Can] a common currency name undergo a change in referent? […]  It is a matter for further 
analysis to say whether such an entity could change meaning (or reference).  It is certainly no part 
of my conception that it cannot. 205 
We can see that he hesitates to endorse this possibility.  And so he should!  Much of what 
attracted us to the common currency notion of words depends on the interlocutors talking about 
the same topic (which pre-supposes that the reference remains constant206) – the existence of 
trans-theoretic terms is evidence for this!207   
He proceeds by suggesting the following strategy: 
Try to show that something like Donnellan’s referential use is involved in cases of apparent 
change of referent of a given common currency name.  Then try to show that this sort of 
referential use is sufficiently like creating a new common currency name from the genus of a 
given name so that by the time a new ‘semantic referent’ appears, a new name does also.  I don’t 
know that such a strategy would be successful.208   
 
Kripke suggests in a similar vein the following solution to Evans’s Madagascar thought-
example: 
In all cases [where a reference shift occurs], a present intention to refer to a given entity (or to 
refer fictionally) overrides the original intention to preserve reference in the historical chain of 
transmission.209 
According to Donnellan, 
[a] speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion [...] uses the description to 
enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that 
person or thing.210 
It is not quite clear how we should take this to apply to words.  In Donnellan’s example a person 
P is being mistaken for drinking a Martini (perhaps he is only holding a Martini glass which 
                                                                                                                                                       
What about the fact that linguists consider ‘lividRED’ and ‘lividBLUISH-GRAY’ to be the same word from an 
etymological point of view?  Again, this is not a problem for my view, since I am after an epistemic 
notion of word-sameness.  It would be nice if all our pre-theoretic uses of the term ‘word’ could be 
captured in one theory, but this is unlikely.   
205 Kaplan (1990):  p.118.   
206 I am thinking of the reference of our word ‘gold’ remaining constant throughout changes in theories 
pertaining to the nature of gold over time.   
207 Putnam (1973, 1975); Putnam (1974, 1975); Putnam (1975, 1975).    
208 Kaplan (1990):  p.118.   
209 Kripke (1972):  p.163.   
210 Donnellan (1966):  p.267.   
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happens to be filled with water).211  The assertion “The man who is drinking a Martini is 
handsome”, according to Donnellan, may still be accurately interpreted to pertain to P even if P 
is not (at the time the conversation takes place) drinking a Martini.  Now suppose that the 
speaker instead uttered:  “James Bond is handsome.”  She meant for her audience to connect that 
James Bond’s trademark drink is the Martini and that she thus meant to denote P with the 
fictional name ‘James Bond’ (the man who appears to drink a Martini but actually is drinking 
water, unbeknownst to the people talking about him).   
It is not entirely clear what Kaplan had in mind.  When a description is asserted referentially, 
according to Donnellan, the speaker intends for his expression ‘the Martini drinker’ to keep 
referring to P (within a given context) even if the description is false of P (at time t).  The 
intention to refer to that person P overrides the attempt to make a true assertion (namely that P is 
drinking a Martini).  
I am not sure how this is supposed to work when we are trying to explain why a speaker 
violates public practice.  Marco Polo’s intention to refer to that island (the one he presently 
stands on) overrides his intention to repeat his Arab encounter’s word.  Donnellan contrasts the 
referential use with the attributive use and argues that a “speaker who uses a definite description 
attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so.”212  
Perhaps the parallel to the attributive use would be “Whatever place my interlocutor denotes 
with ‘Madagascar’ is what I will call ‘Madagascar’.”  A more appropriate name here would be 
‘deferential use of expressions’.   
                                                
211 Even though the definite description may not uniquely pick out anybody, it could still referentially 
pick out one salient person or object as the one being spoken of.    
212 Donnellan (1966):  p.267. 
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According to Donnellan it is the speaker who has a sense of whether she wants her description 
to pick out the object she is attributing a certain quality to referentially or attributively.  I think 
this is an insight we can exploit for our present explanatory goals:  when does a speaker fail in 
her attempt to repeat a given word?  When Marco Polo failed to repeat his Arab or Malay 
interlocutor’s word ‘Madagascar’ he didn’t intend to go against his status as a language 
consumer.  Just like the speaker whom Donnellan calls to our attention didn’t mean to assert a 
description that failed to denote.  It is once those speakers get faced with their failure that they 
hold on to their referential intentions – “regardless of whether this man is drinking a Martini, he 
is the one I am talking about.”  Marco Polo may say (after he has used ‘Madagascar’ in a many 
conversations) “regardless of what my Arab or Malay encounter meant with ‘Madagascar’ I 
mean this island when I say ‘Madagascar’.”  What seems to be clearly different between the 
distinctions attributive versus referential and deferential versus referential is that there is no 
problem with using a description D in some contexts attributively, but referentially at others.  It 
seems to me that Marco Polo must commit to one use once and for all or else his proper name 
‘Madagascar’ would sometimes denote a geographic area on mainland Africa and at other times 
it denotes an island – which goes against our epistemic goals.   
Wouldn’t the individualist here intercept and argue that this is what she has been arguing all 
along?  Words are being used referentially and not deferentially.  We need a way of containing 
the referential use.  A convincing story that tells us how the speaker commits herself to a public 
language practice in such a way that she is willing to violate her referential intentions is needed.   
Couldn’t we say that Alice had the referential intention to have ‘arthritis’ denote the condition 
that causes pain in some thighs?  I certainly had the referential intention to have ‘angina’ denote 
the condition that caused the pain in my throat (many years ago).  While we want Kaplan and 
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Kripke’s exception clause to operate in the angina thought example, we do not want it to come 
into effect in the arthritis thought example – or else anti-individualism collapses into 
individualism! 
The idea that my referential intentions were stronger than Alice’s does not create a robust 
enough barrier between the two antagonistic theories.  Sometimes strongly held beliefs are 
challenged and get revised, for instance, the belief that space is Euclidean, or the belief that all 
adult swans are white. 213   
My belief that all adult swans are white may be so strong that I am unwilling to believe the 
Australian ornithologist that this black bird in front of me is a swan (even under the assumption 
that she is sincere).  At that moment I may even decide that – unlikely as it is – she simply is 
wrong about that bird.  Ludicrous, I think to myself a black swan?  I view myself in 
disagreement with the relevant expert.  But then I take the time to do some research on the 
matter and sure enough, it turns out there are indeed black swans in Australia.  Only after 
consultation of a second source am I willing to abandon the belief in the truth of which I 
formerly was so certain.  It seems that over time even powerful referential intentions are open to 
revision.   
Getting back to Alice the arthritis patient, what seems to play a crucial role is that Alice didn’t 
mean to have the belief “arthritis is the kind of condition that occurs in (thigh) bone tissue” 
override her intention to repeat her doctor’s word ‘arthritis’.  She is prepared to defer to the 
expert even if that means that some of her referential intentions may turn out to be false.214   
                                                
213 There are black adult swans in Australia.   
214 This may change if the doctor were to point at a snowball and exclaim:  “This is arthritis!”.  Even 
Alice’s deferential intentions have their limits.    
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3.7 Refining amendments 
Burge and Putnam acknowledge that speakers can fail in their attempts to repeat a public word 
– mere exposure to a mark is not sufficient to acquire the word the respective mark stands for.  In 
this section I will discuss under what conditions Putnam and Burge view the identity between 
public and idiolectal words to be missing.  Given that they are, like Kaplan, social anti-
individualists, I hope to lean on Putnam and Burge’s respective analyses to refine Kaplan’s 
notion of words such as to account for the repetition failures I mentioned above.  Something that 
puts the speaker adequately en rapport215 with the referent of the word seems to be lacking.  
How can we establish this epistemic link between speaker and referent without thereby 
regressing back to individualism? 
In order to (roughly) determine whether a speaker can be considered to partake in a public 
word practice, Putnam suggests a “passing muster” clause: 
Extension may be determined socially, in many cases, but we don’t assign the standard extension 
to the token of a word W uttered by Jones no matter how Jones uses W.  Jones has to have some 
particular ideas, and skills in connection with W in order to play his part in the linguistic division 
of labor.  
   […] We shall speak of someone as having acquired the word ‘tiger’ if he is able to use it in 
such a way that (1) his use passes muster (i.e. people don’t say of him such things as ‘he doesn’t 
know what a tiger is’, ‘he doesn’t know the meaning of the word “tiger”, etc.) […].216,217 
                                                
215 I am using the phrase 'S is not en rapport with Fs' as a way of saying that she is not using the public 
word w to denote Fs.   
216 Putnam, Hilary (1975, 1975):  pp. 246-247.   
217 Putnam goes on to clarify:  “and (2) his total way of being situated in the world and in his linguistic 
community is such that the socially determined extension of the word ‘tiger’ in his idiolect is the set of 
tigers”.  The second part of Putnam’s condition for participating in the public  ‘tiger’ talking practice is 
question begging.  When we wonder whether Alice is using our word ‘arthritis’ we are asking whether 
with her word ‘arthritis’ she denotes all and only arthritic conditions.  When we are asking whether Jane 
is using our word ‘Pompey’ we want to know whether she is denoting Pompey with her name ‘Pompey’ 
or whether she is denoting a different object Pompeii.  
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We don’t want to ascribe outrageous or as Putnam states “mind-boggling” statements to rational 
agents.  From a select group of key truths, we expect competent speakers to not fail to maintain a 
critical number of those truths.218,219  
What I contend is that speakers are required to know something about (stereotypical) tigers in 
order to count as having acquired the word ‘tiger’; something about elm trees (or anyhow, about 
the stereotype thereof) to count as having acquired the word ‘elm’; etc. [...] The linguistic 
community [...] has its minimum standards, with respect both to syntax and 
‘semantics’.220,221,222,223  
                                                
218 Neely considers the objection that a speaker may never use some esoteric word in conversations.  She 
proposes to reformulate the requirement of “passing muster” counterfactually by claiming that “a person 
is competent if her use would pass muster with her community (under the appropriate circumstances)” 
(Neely (2005):  p.45).  She ultimately favors an account that assesses a speaker’s competence with regard 
to a word based on beliefs the speaker has, rather than beliefs that were attributed to her.  She is worried 
that speakers could deceive others by bluffing even minimal competence (ibid.:  pp.46-47) and shies away 
from an account that offers two clauses with distinct functions for the determination of word competence 
(ibid. p.39).  I believe that Putnam consults the beliefs a speaker has, as well as those we ascribe to her 
regarding a given topic, due to the reciprocal roles resulting from participating in a practice.  The 
participant must (minimally) master certain rules or tasks and be perceived as (minimally) mastering them 
by other participants.   
219 Perhaps it is permissible to doubt whether orangutan are animals (perhaps Joe believes they are spy 
robots from Mars), but if Joe were to also say the following:  “Orangutan are the size of an ant and they 
are transparent” – it seems impossible to understand Joe’s word ‘orangutan’ as denoting orangutan.    
220 Putnam (1975, 1975):  p. 248 
221 Putnam goes on to explain that how many true beliefs one must to associate with a word and its 
referent is context and culture dependent:  “In our culture speakers are required to know what tigers look 
like (if they acquire the word ‘tiger’, and this is virtually obligatory); they are not required to know the 
fine details (such as leaf shape) of what an elm tree looks like.  English speakers are required by their 
linguistic community to be able to tell tigers from leopards; they are not required to be able to tell elm 
trees from beech trees” (Putnam (1975, 1975):  pp. 226-227).  King considers that different categories of 
words may have different standards of competence associated with them (King (1998):  p.169).   
222 Neely points out that treatment of competence with regard to a public word is an idealization.  
Sometimes we must acquire the competence of a cluster of expressions or concepts.  She writes:  “Terms 
such as ‘set,’ ‘set membership,’ and ‘element of a set’ are very closely related; just as we cannot 
understand the notion of set membership without having some idea of what a set is, so too we may 
wonder whether it is truly possible to be competent in ‘set’ without knowing what it is to be a member of 
a set.  Competence in one notion seems linked to competence in the other two; it may well be that we 
must consider them together” (Neely (2005):  p. 29).   
223 Neely raises several important criticisms against Putnam’s account of word acquisition.  She objects to 
the idea that all speakers minimally competent with regard to tiger must share the same stereotype (it is 
perhaps better to speak of paradigms here).  “It is possible to imagine a case where we simply must have 
sufficient overlap with other speakers; I may know that tigers are large orange and black felines, while 
Jones knows that tigers are orange and black felines from Asia, and Smith knows that tigers are large 
carnivorous animals from Asia” (ibid. p. 42-43).  I would even go so far as to claim that no such overlap 
is necessary.  We could imagine one person defining ‘money’ such:  money is a medium of exchange, 
while a second person (the diligent child who puts her pocket money in the piggy bank) may think of it as 
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This fits with our previous observations that we simply cannot make sense of a person confusing 
tigers with snowballs or somebody confusing Pompey with Pompeii – if you believe that 
Pompeii is a person, then you don’t understand (at all) what Pompeii was.  We can, however, 
imagine a patient wondering whether her arthritis has moved from her knees to her thighs.  
Putnam’s passing muster clause is merely a rule of thumb and doesn’t provide us with specific 
advice of how to proceed with our word-individuation in such tricky cases.   
Putnam’s passing muster clause is not sufficiently fine-grained, as the following case will 
show.  I will provide an example where a speaker S1 intends to repeat a word w with S1’s 
production of token t and another speaker S2 interprets t as standing for w – that is S1’s use of t 
passes muster as w – but t turns out to be a repetition of a different word w’.  Suppose that 
Charles is from England and familiar with the British English word ‘robinBE’ that denotes the 
European Robin.  British speakers have described the bird to Charles and he remembers that it is 
easy to recognize by its distinctive red chest.  He has not yet had the pleasure to see one with his 
own eyes.  Let’s further assume that Charles has not yet spoken to Americans about (American) 
robins.  I take for granted that Charles’s word ‘robin’ cannot be a node on two distinct repetition 
trees; it will either have to constitute a performance of the British ‘robinBE’ or ‘American 
                                                                                                                                                       
the stuff to accumulate in her piggy bank, a means to savings.  A third person may think of that very same 
(coin and paper) money as a useless relic.  Still, we would want to argue that those people can all talk 
about money – even though they will clearly have some disagreements about how one ought to treat 
money.  Neely is worried that people with physical restrictions (i.e. blindness) may not be able to share 
some key beliefs generally present in other people’s paradigms i.e. that tigers are yellow and black striped 
(ibid.:  p. 42).   
More importantly, she points out Putnam’s dual account of word acquisition:  “This ambiguity in 
Putnam’s talk highlights the distinction between belief and attributed belief. The beliefs a person has and 
the beliefs others attribute to him do not always coincide”  (ibid.:  p. 43-44).  As an approximation Neely 
suggests:  “I thus suggested pursuing a belief-based account of competence in which the community sets 
standards for competence but does not judge whether someone meets those standards”  (ibid.:  p. 58).  I 
will ultimately argue that defining which beliefs a speaker must have or be ascribed to by her linguistic 
community is the wrong approach.  Which beliefs a speaker must have in order to be considered 
competent in a public word w or having acquired w will depend on the retrospective judgments the 
speaker makes.   
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‘robinAE’.224  Given the description of the case I find it obvious that Charles uses the British word 
‘robinBE’, not the American word ‘robinAE’.   
During a phone conversation with an American friend Joe, Charles is asked: “Have you ever 
seen a robinAE before?”  Charles responds:  “No, I have not yet seen a robin, but I am keeping 
my eyes open for one.”225  Can Putnam explain how Joe should interpret Charles’s word ‘robin’?  
Charles’s mark ‘robin’ passes muster – Joe would not say of him that he doesn’t know the 
meaning of the word ‘robinAE’ or he doesn’t know what a robinAE is.  Interpreting his mark to 
stand for ‘robinAE’, Charles’s performance passes the “minimum standards” of Joe’s linguistic 
community “with respect to both syntax and ‘semantics’.”226   
It is not clear how stringent Putnam wishes his passing muster clause to be interpreted.  The 
more cases of “talking past” one another one attempts to account for through the passing muster 
clause, such that in the conversation imagined above we should not individuate Joe’s word 
‘robin’ to denote the American Robin – the more we threaten the standard anti-individualist 
thought examples.  Since Charles expects to be able to view this bird in Europe (which is not the 
                                                
224 In later chapters I discuss the case of Oscar being switched back and forth between Earth and Twin 
Earth.  I don’t allow for Oscar’s word ‘water’ to constitute a node on two different repetition trees.  Please 
consult chapter six for further discussion.   
225 Now you may argue that Charles also meant for ‘robin’ to be a repetition of the word his fellow British 
speakers are using.  I don’t deny that.  This is part of the problem; Charles attempts to repeat the word he 
heard from Joe and the word he has head from his British fellow speakers – it turns out that this not a 
well-formed intention.  I just don’t think that this is sufficient evidence to argue that Charles thus doesn’t 
say anything at all.  I think that if Charles were told that there is the European Robin and there is a 
different bird-species:  the American Robin and Joe was asking him about the latter, then Charles would 
view himself as having misunderstood Joe.  It somewhat depends on how committed Charles is to the use 
of ‘robinBE’ of his British English linguistic community.  If he has had many conversations where he used 
and heard the word ‘robinBE’, he would take himself to have consistently used that same word (all the way 
up to his conversation with Joe).  Hence, he would take himself to have mis-communicated with Joe.   
226 I don’t think that the division of linguistic labor could do much work here.  We would need an 
explanation as to why Charles defers to the British experts and not the American experts.  The intention to 
repeat Joe’s word ‘robin’ could be presented as evidence to have Charles potentially defer also to 
American experts.   
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natural habitat of the American Robin) – we could view this as a false belief about American 
Robins potentially threatening his performance to pass muster.   
This couldn’t be the correct interpretation of Putnam’s passing muster clause, since it would 
get us into trouble with Burge’s arthritis thought example.  Alice has the false belief that arthritis 
can sometimes spread from the knee to the thigh.  If false beliefs mean that the speaker fails to 
pass muster, then Alice is not even minimally competent with regard to the public word 
‘arthritis’ – which is a charge we want to avoid (as anti-individualists).  Not every false 
conception or lacking true belief should be cause for exclusion from the respective public 
linguistic practice – or else we threaten the entire social anti-individualist project.  Therefore, 
Putnam’s passing muster clause is either going to be too strong such as to undermine some 
standard (social) anti-individualist thought examples, or too weak such as to fail to account for 
Charles’ lack of competence with regard to the American word ‘robinAE’.  I don’t see how any 
set of conceptions that render a speaker competent with regard to ‘robinAE’ would ever make one 
fail to pass muster with regard to ‘robinBE’ (and vice versa).   
Some entities are very similar in the sense that many characteristics attributed to entity a are 
also true of entity b and vice versa.  There are only a few significant characteristics c1 … cn that 
aren’t true of both entities and thus can potentially be referred to as criteria that distinguish a’s 
from b’s.  At the heart of social anti-individualism lays the assumption that a speaker S can be 
under- or misinformed about what a given word w denotes and S can still use w to effectively 
talk about w’s referent.  It can therefore appear to the linguistic community that S is making a 
true claim about a’s, even though S is making a false claim about b’s.  The passing muster clause 
cannot tell us whether a speaker is using the American word ‘robinAE’ or the British word 
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‘robinBE’ – because the conceptions any speaker associates with either term should pass muster 
in both linguistic communities.    
Burge, like Putnam, acknowledges the appropriateness of deviant interpretations of other 
people’s words in some cases: 
There are, of course, numerous situations in which we normally reinterpret or discount a person’s 
words in deciding what he thinks.  [... We do so in situations where] a foreigner (or anyone) utters 
something without comprehension.227 
Misuses or failure of understanding exemplified by malapropism, tongue slips, extreme 
‘category’ misuses, the first uses of words by very young children, and the fumblings of 
foreigners, all normally and rightly occasion reinterpretation.  Most other cases are more 
complex. […] 
  It is not part of my view that just because a person is using the same word forms as others in a 
given social network, the person’s words express the same concepts that his fellows’ words 
do.228,229   
He stresses how difficult it is to decide, at times, whether a speaker merely succeeds in repeating 
a mark or whether she also succeeds in repeating the word (in the thick sense):   
Of course, it is often difficult to find evidential grounds for attributing an object-level attitude as 
opposed to its metalinguistic counterpart.  […]  We do want a general account of these cases [of 
reinterpretation].230   
Determining whether a speaker is competent with regard to a given word is important to Burge.  
His description of what competence entails reminds us of Putnam’s “passing muster” clause: 
The expression, ‘understanding (mastering) a notion’ is to be construed more or less intuitively.  
Understanding the notion of contract comes roughly to knowing what a contract is. […]  Talk of 
notions is roughly similar to talk of concepts in an informal sense.231 
According to Burge, being part of a linguistic community comes with responsibilities or 
commitments.  
People are frequently held, and hold themselves, to the standards of their community when 
misuse or misunderstanding are at issue.  One should distinguish these cases, which seem to 
                                                
227 Burge (1979, 2007):  p. 118. 
228 Burge (2007):  p. 176. 
229 Such re-interpretations are very much a last resort for Burge.  He suggests that we can even make 
sense of a person confusing an orangutan with a fruit drink.  Contrary to Burge, I don’t find this 
believable.  See Burge, (1979, 2007):  p.120. 
230 Burge (1979, 2007):  p. 126.  
231 Ibid.:  p. 102. 
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depend on a certain responsibility to communal practice, from cases of automatic 
reinterpretation.232 
When “reinterpretation” of a speaker’s word or words is appropriate, she never did or has not yet 
committed herself to a given public linguistic practice or word repetition tree.  Burge attempts to 
clarify when it is appropriate to regard another speaker as simply not using a mark in the same 
way that her community does – that is, she is not competent in the respective public word: 
A person born and bred in the parent community might simply decide (unilaterally) […] to 
fashion his own usage with regard to particular words, self-consciously opting out of the parent 
community’s conventions in these particulars.  In such a case, members of the parent community 
would not, and should not, attribute mental contents to him on the basis of homophonic construals 
of words.233  
Clearly, when I was visiting the dentist, I didn’t intend to opt out of the ‘angina’ linguistic 
practice.  I was convinced that I was using the mark on the questionnaire like the technician and 
the dentist would.  The same goes for Marco Polo who sincerely attempted to participate in the 
‘Madagascar’ linguistic practice as a consumer.  
Burge suggests other possible conditions that may engender reinterpretation: 
Individuals can fashion idiosyncratic uses of communal words.  If their usage corresponds to their 
own understanding, and they do not rely in unconscious ways on others for fixing the applications 
of their words or concepts, individuals can cut themselves off from the communal usage. […]  
Any dependence on others for linguistic or psychological content derives from reliance on others 
through certain types of causal relations to them.234 
In Burge’s arthritis thought example Alice, in contrast, does rely on the doctor for “filling in” her 
missing knowledge of arthritis and what her word ‘arthritis’ exactly denotes.  She adapts her 
conceptions in accordance with the knowledge the doctor offers her.  Alice allows the doctor to 
persuade her on this issue and defers to his knowledge about arthritis.  Recalling my visit to the 
dentist, I was not willing to defer to the technician as to whether “angina” is the kind of 
condition that causes pain in the chest, rather than pain in the throat – as I thought.  I was 
                                                
232 Ibid.:  p. 119.   
233 Ibid.:  p. 147. 
234 Burge (2007):  p. 176. 
  
 
 
 91 
unwilling to let her persuade me as to where the condition that my word ‘angina’ refers to causes 
pain.235  I also didn’t think that she was offering me false or mistaken information.  It is not as if 
I thought to be more informed about “angina” than she; I quickly came to suspect that we were 
talking past one another and thus not disagreeing.  In turn, her mark ‘angina’ and my mark 
‘angina’ do not belong to the same repetition tree.   
Burge further describes the mechanism of deference thus: 
The language does not present a standard of competence independent of individuals’ activity.  
Minimal competence consists in conformity to the practice of others.  ‘Greatest competence’ 
consists in abilities to draw distinctions, to produce precisifications, to use numerous linguistic 
resources, to offer counterexamples to proposed equivalences – that elicit the reflective 
agreement of other competent speakers.  We may imagine a vast, ragged network of 
interdependence, established by patterns of deference which lead back to people who would elicit 
the assent of others.  […]  To put it crudely, a person counts as among the most competent if he or 
she would be persuasive to other competent speakers in the use and explication of the language.  
The point about persuasion is fundamental.236 
So, some speakers are more active in shaping the practice of how a given word is used, while 
others follow their lead.  This pre-supposes that the minimally competent speakers M (who 
maintain a significant amount of false conceptions and may also be under-informed) allow the 
more competent users C to correct their conceptions regarding the topic accordingly and, if 
needed, members of group M will generally defer to the knowledge of members of group 
C.237,238,239   That doesn’t mean that a language “consumer” must always bend her beliefs to those 
of experts.  There are people who doubt that global warming is man-made and they still consider 
                                                
235 I don’t think that my intention to make an assertion in English is sufficient evidence for my having 
been using my word ‘anginaN’ to denote angina (pectoris).  The person who is pointing at the snowball 
and exclaims:  “This is a tiger!” presumably also believes that she is making an intelligible assertion in 
English.   
236 Burge (1986, 2007):  pp. 258-259.   
237 Putnam alludes to a “division of linguistic labor”:  “[w]henever a term is subject to the division of 
linguistic labor, the ‘average’ speaker who acquires it does not acquire anything that fixes its extension.  
[…] it is only the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that 
fixes the extension” Putnam (1975, 1975):  p.229.  
238 Kaplan is also a proponent of dividing speakers into consumers and producers (Kaplan (1989)). 
239 Evans proposes a similar division.  He labels the less competent ‘consumers’ and the experts 
‘producers’  Evans (1982):  pp. 376-377.   
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themselves to be using the mark ‘global warming’ with the same meaning – describing the same 
condition – as the experts.  They view themselves in disagreement with the experts.  When the 
defining characteristics are concerned, the language consumer must show some willingness to 
defer to the relevant experts.  Was I willing to defer to the technician with regard to “angina”?  
Up to a point I was.  I trusted the dentist’s assessment of needing to know whether I had suffered 
from anginaN in the past in order to offer me better dental treatment (even though I had my 
doubts I diligently took the time to fill out the laborious questionnaire).  If she had told me 
“angina can cause serious complications during a variety of dental treatments” – I would have 
believed her and would have made the appropriate changes in my conceptions regarding anginaN.  
I was not willing to defer to her when it came to determining whether anginaN causes pain in the 
chest or the throat.  I considered myself to know that it causes pain in the throat.  This, judgment 
went hand in hand with my belief that we were not talking about the same condition.  To what 
degree a speaker’s tolerance for corrections is actually being tested is arbitrary.  Had the 
technician been less inquisitive, I would have appeared to be the language consumer.  A proven 
attitude of deference can be deceiving, unless it has been considerably put to the test.   
Angina pectoris and angina tonsillaris happen to be quite different medical conditions.  If, on 
the other hand, the two terms denote rather similar kinds of things such as the European Robin or 
the American Robin, the speaker may not notice that she ought not to defer to the expert.  Recall 
the earlier robin thought example, where I assumed myself familiar only with the British word 
‘robinBE’.  Imagine my American friend to be particularly fond of American Robins.  He reads 
several books devoted to the species and spends hours studying their behavior in his backyard.  
When he tells me “the RobinAE is the state bird of Michigan and can frequently be sighted in that 
state” I consider this to be something I didn’t know about robinsBE.  I thus defer to my friend, 
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even thought I shouldn’t have, since his statement is false of the European Robin.  A speaker’s 
willingness to defer to more competent speakers of a word w thus cannot be a sufficient 
condition for minimal competence with regard to w – or else I would have automatically become 
competent with regard to American Robins.  What Burge, however, gets right, is that if I were to 
defer frequently to my American friend (or other competent speakers of the word ‘robinAE’), then 
my word ‘robin’ would also denote the American Robin.240   
Sometimes people are particularly stubborn and are unwilling to defer to the expert 
community, which leads me to conclude that an attitude of deference on significant 
characteristics of a given phenomenon does not represent a necessary condition.  Admittedly 
there are only a handful of such examples.  Some Americans doubt whether global warming is 
man made, even though there exists an overwhelming consensus among experts that such a 
correlation exists.  Global warming skeptics still view themselves as talking about the same 
topic.  Perhaps deference is secondary and what matters is whether after prolonged linguistic 
exchanges the interlocutors take each others words at face value (whether they extend practical 
judgments of sameness of extension to each others words).241   
The Madagascar thought experiment is tricky.  Marco Polo viewed himself as a language 
consumer, but he failed to defer to his interlocutor who introduced him to the same 
‘Madagascar’.  Insufficient information about what their mark ‘Madagascar’ denotes was 
conveyed to Marco Polo such that a misunderstanding had him believe that ‘Madagascar’ 
denotes the island he was standing on.  He was not under the impression of having a firm “grip” 
(that is, significant understanding) of the topic and was thus very much open to being corrected 
by others.  We don’t really know why (perhaps nobody dared correcting Marco Polo), but the 
                                                
240 I will further discuss cases of this sort in chapter six.   
241 Ebbs (2009):  chapter 4.   
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corrections didn’t happen (or they were misunderstood).  In Macro Polo’s case, deference would 
have played a constituting role.  Had he been appropriately set right by the relevant competent 
speakers, Marco Polo would have become a competent speaker of their word ‘Madagascar’.  It 
seems to me that the more the speaker views herself as competent with regard to a given word w 
and believes herself to be learned about what w denotes, the less open she is to corrections 
regarding significant characteristics of what w denotes. 
In the arthritis thought example, the speaker was willing to defer and minimally competent; 
the angina thought example showed the speaker to be unwilling to defer and not minimally 
competent – those cases led us to suspect a close connection between a speaker’s willingness to 
defer and minimal linguistic competence.  In contrast, the global warming skeptics are unwilling 
to defer and minimally competent; Marco Polo was willing to defer, but lacked minimal 
linguistic competence – those cases had us doubt the determining role of deference.  Still, Marco 
Polo’s interaction with the Malay (or Arab) sailors was probably too insignificant and the 
attitude of global warming skeptics strikes many as borderline rational or at least ignorant.  It is 
probably no accident that those skeptics are generally hostile towards contributions by 
academics.  The degree to which experts are generally trusted appears to be partially dependent 
on culture. 
It is partly up to the speaker whether she is acquiring a new word or whether she is acquiring a 
new belief.  We cannot argue that if a speaker intends to repeat an expert’s word, she must 
commit herself (in lure of being the layman) to the expert’s word.  Only after already having 
individuated the speaker’s word can we assess whether her interlocutor can be viewed as having 
superior expertise.  I know more about the referent of the German word ‘Angina’ than the 
English-speaking dentist.  Of course, we want to shield ourselves from counterexamples where 
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speakers are excessively stubborn.  If Marco Polo were to have said “I don’t care what they call 
‘Madagascar’.  I am Marco Polo!  I thereby declare this island to be Madagascar…” we would 
take him to have deliberately opted out of a public practice.  The powerful counterexamples 
against Kaplan all involve a certain naïveté on the part of the speaker, since they “humbly” 
attempted to repeat the words of their interlocutors.   
I am sympathetic with Burge’s strategy of taking the speaker’s attitude of deference to more 
competent speakers seriously when interpreting her words.  Alice is willing to be corrected by 
her doctor, while I am not willing to be so corrected with regard to what my (original) word 
‘angina’ is true of (due to my additional commitments to the German word ‘Angina’.  Sometimes 
it takes more than one expert source for the information that conflicts with our deeply engrained 
beliefs to “sink in”.  Even though I am quite certain that there are no black swans, I am willing to 
revise my beliefs in the face of overwhelming evidence from respectable sources to the contrary.   
3.8 Conclusion 
We have seen that merely intending to repeat another person’s word is not sufficient to do so.  
Kaplan doesn’t achieve what he sets himself up to deliver at the inter-subjective level.  We need 
to explain how it is possible that the false beliefs Burge’s arthritis patient has regarding the 
doctor’s word ‘arthritis’ (that she means to repeat) do not prevent her from repeating that word, 
whereas in the above angina thought example my false beliefs regarding the technician’s word 
‘angina’ do interfere with my repetition of that word.  What “makes” those cases so different?   
I will elaborate upon Burge’s idea that the speaker must be willing to defer to other competent 
speakers.  I argue that it is the speakers’ own informed word-individuations that render the two 
cases different at the semantic level.  Even if the patient were to be encouraged to make further 
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inquiries about the doctor’s word ‘arthritis’ she wouldn’t cease to identify her word ‘arthritisP’ 
with his word ‘arthritisD’.  My dental visit progressed differently.  The more I learned about the 
technician’s word ‘anginaT’, the more I was convinced that I was using a different (albeit 
homophonic and homographic) word.  The judgments the speaker makes about her own words 
and how they relate to the words of her interlocutors must be taken seriously.  For now I want to 
observe that Kaplan doesn’t seem to have the resources to distinguish Burge’s arthritis thought 
example from cases where speakers intend to repeat a word but fail to do so.  The intentions to 
defer exist in both examples, but the speaker only succeeds in one of the two.   
I discussed Kaplan’s suggestion that something like Donnellan’s referential use may be at 
play in situations where the speaker fails in her intention to repeat a given word.  Since Kaplan 
doesn’t exactly tell us how this is supposed to work, it remains unclear whether the strategy is 
successful.  What I would like to carry into the next chapter is the observation that the speaker 
generally has a sense of which conceptions (or referential intentions) she would be willing to 
revise in order to do justice to her intention to repeat a given word.  
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CHAPTER 4 
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ARE TWO UTTERANCES PERFORMANCES OF THE 
SAME WORD?  PROPOSAL:  RESTROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS 
Kommunikationsgestörete interessieren mich am allermeisten.  Alles was ich als komisch 
empfinde, entsteht aus der zerbröselten Kommunikation, aus dem Aneinander-vorbei-reden.    
 -- Victor von Bülow (alias ‘Loriot’) 
 
Communication-defective people interest me the most.  Everything that I find comical emerges 
out of shattered communication, out of talking-past-each-other.   
 -- Victor von Bülow (alias ‘Loriot’ 
4.0  Introduction 
I am fascinated by the observation how, at times, we realize in retrospect that during some 
conversation we were entirely talking past our interlocutors.  A multitude of conditions can bring 
about such miscommunication.  I will focus on those resulting from semantic misunderstandings, 
where the utterance of one speaker is similar to some utterance of her interlocutor without those 
constituting performances of the same word.242  Such linguistic exchanges prima facie comprise 
a threat for Kaplan’s notion of words, which relies on the speaker succeeding in her attempt to 
repeat her interlocutor’s word w such that her own word w’ (thus produced) “inherits” its 
reference from w.  
In the last chapter I recalled my visit to the dentist, where the technician was using ‘angina’ to 
mean angina pectoris, while I was using the mark ‘angina’ to stand for angina tonsillaris.  I was 
intending to successfully communicate with my audience; in fact, I “re-used” one of the 
technician’s marks by placing a checkmark next to ‘angina’ on the pre-printed questionnaire.  I 
observed that in spite of my intention to repeat my interlocutor’s word ‘angina’,243 I failed.  My 
word ‘angina’ was already bound by prior commitments to a different public repetition tree:  the 
                                                
242 The respective word is here assumed not to be indexical.   
243 That is, I fail to repeat the word in the semantically loaded thick sense of using a word.  
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German word ‘Angina’.  If there are two distinct public words sharing a relevantly similar 
form,244 that compete having tokens of the speaker’s word w as instances, we have to figure out 
which corresponding repetition tree w is related to, such as to individuate w unambiguously.245  
Evans’s counterexample reveals how a person can unknowingly create an entirely new 
repetition tree, while intending to repeat some already existing public word.  As the historically 
inaccurate story goes, Marco Polo attempted to repeat the word ‘Madagascar’, which he 
encountered for the first time during an exchange with his Arab (or Malay) encounter.  He 
developed referential intentions that ‘Madagascar’ denotes the island both speakers were 
standing on, while in fact, his interlocutor was using ‘Madagascar’ to denote some area on 
mainland Africa.  Marco Polo viewed himself as a language consumer intending to repeat an 
already existing foreign name; nevertheless, he failed in his attempt.  Kaplan (and Kripke’s) 
explanations of how reference inheritance can fail, exploit the circumstance that Marco Polo’s 
referential intentions conflict with the reference of the Arab (or Malay) word ‘Madagascar’.  The 
same goes for my referential intentions to use ‘angina’ to denote the condition that caused severe 
pain in my throat many years back.  So far, Kaplan and Kripke’s exception clause functions as 
intended.   
Since Kaplan and Kripke’s suggestions towards a solution are vague, it isn’t entirely clear 
what the notion of referential intentions entails.  In Burge’s arthritis thought-example – one of 
the standard thought examples and a crucial source of support for anti-individualism the patient 
                                                
244 That is, we recognize them as displaying a relevantly similar form (see chapters one and two for 
further details).   
245 Evans raises a similar concern pertaining to ambiguous marks within a given language:  “The precise 
statement of the way in which individual utterances exploit the general practices of the community must 
be a little complicated, because of the possibility of there being several distinct practices in the 
community involving the same name [form].  If a speaker is to refer to something by using a name, then it 
is necessary that he manifest which name-using practice he intends to be, and to be taken to be, 
participating in” (Evans (1982):  p. 384). 
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intends to refer to a specific condition that may cause pain in the thigh when she utters ‘arthritis’, 
but that condition couldn’t be arthritis;246 hence, the conflict with her intention to repeat her 
doctor’s word ‘arthritis’.  With many false beliefs potentially being at variance with the intention 
to preserve reference in the historical chain of word transmission the recommended exception 
clause potentially threatens to undermine anti-individualism altogether.  Kripke and Kaplan need 
it to be the case that Alice’s false beliefs do not constitute the kind of referential intention that 
override her deferential intentions – her intention to repeat her doctor’s word ‘arthritis’.  In this 
chapter I will be exploring ways to contain this referential use such as to render it compatible 
with the standard anti-individualist thought experiments.       
I will propose an approach that occupies the middle ground between (social) anti-
individualism and the kind of individualism that individuates a speaker’s words without input 
from the speaker’s linguistic community.  According to my proposal, the content of the mental 
register doesn’t by itself individuate the individual’s word w, although it cannot be entirely 
ignored either when it comes to individuating w.  Mental registers are the individual version of 
                                                
246 Burge suggests “If their usage corresponds to their own understanding, and they do not rely in 
unconscious ways on others for fixing the applications of their words or concepts, individuals can cut 
themselves off from the communal usage” (Burge (2007):  p. 176).  Suppose there are several conditions 
a, b, and c that could potentially cause such pain in the thigh.  The patient thus still relies on medical 
experts to determine which one of those conditions, whether it is a, b or c, that afflicts her thigh.  Her 
definition for the new word ‘arthritis’ is vague.  Does it denote arthritis plus a, or arthritis plus b…?  The 
heart of the matter cannot be the element of vagueness, since the experts’ definition of arthritis is 
similarly vague.  We know so little about arthritis that we don’t even know whether it is a conglomerate 
of distinct conditions or one single condition.  Nevertheless the patient wants to have her pain alleviated.  
She therefore relies on experts identifying the true cause of her pain.  A referential intention of ‘arthritis’ 
refers to whatever condition causes the pain in my thigh (and my knees) seems hesitant to begin with.  At 
the same time it isn’t as if Marco Polo may not want to rely on some experts to determine the exact 
physical extension of Madagascar.  How far into the sea does an island reach?  This is why I think 
Burge’s other suggestion of a willingness of being corrected offers a deeper understanding.  After years of 
filling out maps and official documents with his word ‘Madagascar’ Marco Polo finds out that the 
original word ‘Madagascar’ he heard refers to a place on mainland Africa.  It is unlikely that Marco Polo 
would now decide:  I had all those maps drawn wrong.  He would probably judge:  well, their word 
‘Madagascar’ is not our word ‘Madagascar’; we will have to keep the two separate.  The arthritis patient, 
in contrast, even if she believed for years that arthritis is the kind of condition that afflicts the muscles, 
she should be open to correction from medical experts.   
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Kaplan’s public repetition trees.  The speaker S’s own inter-personal judgments of word-
sameness resulting from her intentions to repeat a token t previously performed by S  (herself) 
and the resulting performance t’ make it the case that t and t’ belong to the same (mental) register 
or word-repetition tree.  I argue that the speaker has linguistic control over which tokens belong 
to the same word type.  We consult the mental register’s content, when it comes to deciding 
whether it is linked to any public repetition tree and if so, which one.  I will argue that in the end 
we must leave it up to the speaker’s own judgments whether she interprets her word w as 
repeating a particular public word w’.  Of course, we often don’t know enough about the 
potential public word w’ to reliably assess whether w’ and w constitute performances of the same 
word.  This is why the speaker must make such judgments from an informed perspective – one 
not every speaker will actually take the time to acquire.  I thus propose a hypothetical rule:  if 
from an informed perspective the speaker were to interpret w’ and w as performances of the same 
word, then w is linked to the public repetition tree that w’ belongs to.  That is, w and w’ share the 
same semantic ancestry.  Conflicting referential intentions only interfere with the word-identity 
of w and w’, if – from an informed perspective – the individual decides that her beliefs pertaining 
to what w denotes cannot be interpreted as beliefs pertaining to what w’ denotes.247 
At the heart of my account lies the observation that the speaker cannot be wrong about 
individuating her own words in terms of intra-subjective practical judgments of sameness of 
satisfaction.248,249  This does not entail that she cannot be wrong about how she translates her 
                                                
247 This is only a sufficient condition.  My proposal leaves out cases where the speaker may never acquire 
an informed perspective.  Seeking out information about the public word w’ may effect the content of w.  
If Mr. Anchovy, whom I will introduce later, would have consulted a dictionary about the mark “lion” 
early on, then he would have been more successful with his attempt to repeat the public word ‘lion’.   
248 Ebbs describes commitments of this sort as ‘practical judgments of sameness of satisfaction’ (‘PJSS’ 
for short).  He explains:  “I call such judgments practical because they are exercises of a learned yet 
typically non-deliberative ability that is acquired over a period of years.  I call an exercise of this ability a 
judgment because we will reject it if we come to think it is wrong” (Ebbs (2009):  p. 5). 
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words into the public language.  Quite the contrary, in order for the speaker to always be right 
about her own word identities, she must sometimes deem wrong translations into the public 
language which she previously judged appropriate.  Remember that I used to think that some 
tokens of my word ‘angina1’ were correctly to be translated into ordinary English as ‘angina’.  I 
also maintained that some tokens of my word ‘angina2’ were to be translated into ordinary 
German as ‘Angina’.  The ordinary English word ‘angina’ and the ordinary German word 
‘Angina’ denote entirely different medical conditions.  As a result, some identities have to be 
abandoned:  either ‘angina1’ is a different word from the ordinary English public word ‘angina’, 
or ‘angina2’ is a different word from the ordinary German word ‘Angina’, or ‘angina1’ and 
‘angina2’ are not tokens of the same word.  Since the speaker judges her own utterances 
‘angina1’ and ‘angina2’ to be instances of the same word, I argue that this is an identity we 
cannot revise (or else we threaten the a priority of logical reasoning).250  If we ascribe to the 
speaker two distinct words that merely share the same form ‘angina’ – even though the speaker 
herself is oblivious to that fact – this may force us to ascribe to her irrational or invalid 
inferences which she is unable to correct (without input from others).  We usually don’t consider 
the false beliefs of regarding one entity to be two, or the other way around, confusing two 
distinct entities to be one, as grounds for accusing a person of irrationality.  This is why I 
maintain that the speaker is infallible about intra-subjective practical judgments of sameness of 
satisfaction – an individual is never wrong about thus individuating her own words.251 
                                                                                                                                                       
249 See also Fiengo & May (2006):  p.53.   
250 See my chapters five and six for further analysis.   
251 Unless there are serious neurological defects disrupting the proper function of the individual’s 
cognitive apparatus. 
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Kaplan therefore was exactly right:  I cannot fail in my intentions to repeat my own words!252  
This is why in my own account I ascribe intra-subjective practical judgments of sameness of 
satisfaction priority over inter-subjective practical judgments of sameness of satisfaction.  In 
order to do justice to the inferences an individual is in a position to draw from her own (limited) 
first person perspective, I introduce mental registers to allow us to keep track of how the 
individual individuates her own words.   
4.1  Lion taming:  a thought example 
From Monty Python’s “Vocational Guidance Counselor”253  
[Background:  A chartered accountant, Mr. Anchovy, consults a vocational guidance counselor 
about a suitable new career.  After Mr. Anchovy rejects the counselor’s advice of keeping his 
current job, the following dialogue unfolds:] 
Anchovy:  But don't you see, I came here to find a new job, a new life, a new meaning to my 
existence. Can't you help me? 
Counselor:  Well, do you have any idea of what you want to do? 
Anchovy:  Yes, yes I have. 
Counselor:  What? 
Anchovy:  (boldly) Lion taming! 
Counselor:  Well yes. Yes. Of course, it's a bit of a jump isn't it? I mean, er, chartered 
accountancy to lion taming in one go. You don't think it might be better if you 
worked your way towards lion taming, say, via banking... 
Anchovy:  No, no, no, no. No. I don't want to wait. At nine o'clock tomorrow I want to be in 
there, taming. 
Counselor:  Fine, fine. But do you, do you have any qualifications? 
Anchovy:  Yes, I've got a hat. 
Counselor:  A hat? 
Anchovy:  Yes, a hat. A lion taming hat. A hat with ‘LION TAMER’ on it. I got it at 
Harrods. And it lights up saying 'lion tamer' in great big neon letters, so that you 
can tame them after dark when they're less stroppy. 
Counselor:  I see, I see. 
Anchovy:  And you can switch it off during the day time, and claim reasonable wear and 
tear as allowable professional expenses under paragraph 335C... 
                                                
252 This doesn’t mean that the individual cannot have delusional memories.  When I utter u1:  “I suffered 
from angina1 [strep throat] at the age of seventeen” – I may very well be wrong about that.  If I believe 
that my own words ‘angina1’ and ‘Angina2’ keep track of the same medical condition, then I know that 
my utterance u2: “In meinem siebzehnten Lebensjahr litt ich unter Angina” [I suffered from strep throat at 
the age of seventeen] and u1 express the same state of affairs.   
253 This sketch appeared in the Flying Circus TV Show, episode 10; it also appeared in the movie “And 
Now for Something Completely Different,”.  I would like to thank Steve Wagner for bringing the 
relevance of this sketch to my attention.   
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Counselor:  Yes, yes, yes, I do follow, Mr. Anchovy, but you see the snag is... if I now call 
Mr. Chipperfield and say to him, “look here, I've got a forty-five-year-old 
chartered accountant with me who wants to become a lion tamer”, his first 
question is not going to be “does he have his own hat?” He's going to ask what 
sort of experience you've had with lions. 
Anchovy:  Well I ... I've seen them at the zoo. 
Counselor:  Good, good, good. 
Anchovy:  Lively brown furry things with short stumpy legs and great long noses. I 
don't know what all the fuss is about, I could tame one of those. They look 
pretty tame to start with. 
Counselor:  And these, er, these lions ... how high are they? 
Anchovy:  (indicating a height of one foot) Well they're about so high, you know. They 
don't frighten me at all. 
Counselor:  Really. And do these lions eat ants? 
Anchovy:  Yes, that's right. 
Counselor:  Er, well, Mr. Anchovy ... I'm afraid what you've got hold of there is an 
anteater. 
Anchovy:  A what? 
Counselor:  An anteater. Not a lion. You see a lion is a huge savage beast, about five feet 
high, ten feet long, weighing about four hundred pounds, running forty 
miles per hour, with masses of sharp pointed teeth and nasty long razor-
sharp claws that can rip your belly open before you can say ‘Eric Robinson’, 
and they look like this. 
(The counselor pulls out a large picture of a lion and shows it to Mr. Anchovy who screams and 
passes out.) […] 
Assuming that the hat-maker was using the public word ‘lion’ we know that Mr. Anchovy has 
been exposed to our word ‘lion’.  He clearly means to repeat our word ‘lion’, or else he wouldn’t 
think that the neon letters ‘LION TAMER’ intelligibly describe to others the profession he would 
like to pursue.  At first, the counselor takes Mr. Anchovy to express his desire to switch his 
profession from chartered accountancy to lion taming, but he quickly develops suspicions as to 
whether Mr. Anchovy really knows what he is talking about.  The counselor soon suspects that a 
better interpretation for Mr. Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’ is the public word ‘anteater’.   
The counselor is clearly not taking Mr. Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’ to denote lions.  When he 
inquires:  “And do these lions eat ants?”, his choice of words shows that he is distancing himself 
from a face-value interpretation of Mr. Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’:  he considers Mr. Anchovy’s 
“lions” to be unlike actual lions (different from what the public word ‘lions’ denotes).254   
                                                
254 The consultant’s surprise is an indication that he at first took Mr. Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’ to denote 
lions.  As the conversation goes on, however, he retracts this interpretation and takes ‘lionA’ to denote 
some other animal (perhaps anteaters).   
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At some point Mr. Anchovy must have been exposed to our public word ‘lion’.  This is what 
caused the creation of a mental register (or file) with the label ‘lion’.255  Registers are theoretical 
devices reflecting how Mr. Anchovy can “keep track” of his various tokens of his word ‘lionA’ 
throughout conceptual changes.  He acquires richer conceptions over time without changing 
what his word ‘lionA’ denotes.256, 257  Since I am asserting the possibility that Mr. Anchovy’s 
word ‘lionA’ may not be adequately connected to any public word, public concepts do not 
provide me with a reference point to “keep track” of the various tokens of ‘lionA’.  Even if Mr. 
Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’ ends up being fictitious, he had in mind the same topic when uttering 
‘lionA’ from whence he purchased the lion tamer hat until his conversation with the counselor.   
From the above conversation we can infer some of the conceptions Mr. Anchovy associates 
with his lionA-register over time:   
LionsA are animals.   
LionsA can be tamed.   
LionsA are less stroppy in the dark.   
LionsA can be seen at the zoo.   
LionsA are lively.   
                                                
255 Some understand these registers to constitute cognitive mechanisms.  See for example Schroeter 
(2008):  “Mental Files = df the stable cognitive mechanisms that bind together a changing body of 
attitudes and cognitive dispositions in such a way that, from the subject’s perspective, it seems obvious 
[…] that they pertain to the very same subject matter”.  I am not committed to this interpretation of 
‘register’.  Especially when we are first exposed to a word – recall my ‘Pompey’ example in chapter three 
– we do not yet associate any conceptions with it.   There are (not yet) any cognitive mechanisms that the 
subject intends to interpret as pertaining to the same subject matter.  How would consulting the cognitive 
content of what the speaker associates with ‘Pompey’ at this point be of any help?  
256 “Or suppose that I learn more about how to discriminate water from other (possible or actual) 
colorless, tasteless, potable liquids.  In such cases, I learn something about chairs or wate that I did not 
know before.  In these cases it is simply not true that the reference of my words ‘chair’ and ‘water’ must 
change.  Although it is trye that my conceptions – my explication – changes […]” (Burge (1989):  p.284).   
257 “Usually, all participants begin the discussion without being able to give a precisely correct normative 
characterization; […] Participations commonly regard their object-level thoughts (thoughts about, say, 
chairs) as undergoing correction in the course of the inquiry” (Burge (1986):  p. 261).   
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LionsA have brown fur.  
LionsA have short stumpy legs.   
LionsA have great long noses.   
LionsA eat ants.   
LionsA aren’t frightening…   
We don’t know how Mr. Anchovy acquired these beliefs, perhaps people deliberately 
misinformed him or he repeatedly misunderstood what people intended to sincerely convey to 
him about lions.  We do know that we can’t interpret his mental register with the label ‘lionA’ to 
pertain to or be en rapport with lions.  Mr. Anchovy clearly doesn’t interpret his own word ‘lion-
A’ to denote lions either, or he wouldn’t be so shocked when faced with the picture of an actual 
lion.  We can reasonably assume that Mr. Anchovy would concur with the counselor’s 
interpretation that his word ‘lionA’ does not denote lions but perhaps anteaters.  Upon finding out 
what the expression displayed on his hat really denotes he will very likely retract his application 
for lion tamer – Mr. Anchovy is not that reckless!   
Unlike Marco Polo, Mr. Anchovy is not in a position of power, nor is he an animal expert.  
Other speakers are unlikely to catch on to his idiosyncratic use of the mark ‘lion’.  This means 
Mr. Anchovy ought to make some changes.  If he thinks that the public word ‘anteater’ is a good 
interpretation for his lionA-register, then he can simply change the label of his register from 
‘lion’ to ‘anteater’.  From then on he will be able to successfully communicate his beliefs about 
the original lionA-register by talking to others about anteaters.  If, on the other hand, Mr. 
Anchovy has several significant beliefs associated with his lionA-register which are entirely 
incompatible with our public word ‘anteater’ then Mr. Anchovy has to look for a better match or 
perhaps admit that his word ‘lionA’ simply doesn’t refer and that it is a fictitious term.   
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Of course Mr. Anchovy could doubt whether the counselor knows what he is talking about.  
After all, what does a vocational guidance counselor know about animals?  If Mr. Anchovy 
wants to be epistemically responsible he ought to consult some reliable source of reference, such 
as an encyclopedia or dictionary.  ‘Lion’ and ‘anteater’ are the kind of words one is likely to find 
referenced in such sources.  He will eventually find out that the counselor was speaking 
truthfully.   
The informed perspective is achieved by consulting a wide selection of reliable resources, 
such as experts, respected dictionaries or encyclopedias.  This should allow the speaker, here 
Mr. Anchovy, to adequately “grasp” what the public word in question expresses.  For example, 
he looks up ‘lion’ and reads:  “A large tawny-colored cat that lives in prides, found in Africa and 
northwestern India.”  My suggested approach pre-supposes that the speaker understands most of 
the words contained in the description of what ‘lion’ denotes.258  
My proposal accords with Putnam’s observation that if we were to encounter somebody, let’s 
call him ‘Oscar’, pointing at a snowball uttering:  “This is a tiger!”259 – then there wouldn’t be 
much use in talking to Oscar about tigers using our words ‘tiger’ or ‘tigers’.  I cannot imagine 
Oscar consulting a dictionary and looking up what ‘tiger’ stands for and then declare as a result 
that his word ‘tigerO’ is the same as the public word ‘tiger’ (in English).  It seems to me that 
from an informed perspective Oscar would come to realize that his use of the mark ‘tiger’ is 
confusing.  If he wants to communicate successfully with his linguistic community he must 
adopt a new ‘tigerN’ register and use the label of that new register for communicative purposes.     
                                                
258 This is something I am entitled to assume, since my proposal is not meant to constitute an analysis of 
linguistic competence with regard to a language, but instead explores competence with regard to a 
particular (public) word, thus taking for granted the speaker’s overall competence in the respective 
language. 
259 We are assuming that this snowball doesn’t even have the shape of a tiger.   
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When Mr. Anchovy decides that the public word ‘anteater’ “fits” his lionA-register, I thereby 
don’t mean to argue that all the characteristics Mr. Anchovy finds listed under ‘anteater’ must 
also be contained in his lionA-register.  It is likely that some characteristics are missing in his 
lionA-register and that furthermore, some of his conceptions will conflict with what is being 
claimed of anteaters in the reference book – Mr. Anchovy is not an anteater expert!  What is 
crucial is whether Mr. Anchovy can interpret himself as having some false beliefs about anteaters 
and being partly mis- or under-informed about them (i.e. there is no profession dedicated to 
taming anteaters).  It is not plausible that Mr. Anchovy would interpret his lionA-register to be en 
rapport with lions once he consults a reputable encyclopedia about the entry ‘lion’.  His own 
potential judgment decides the case!  
I can’t require that a speaker must actually consult expert sources in order for her word-token 
t to constitute a performance of a public repetition tree.  If I merely require that we have her 
hypothetically consult a dictionary and judge her token t to constitute a repetition of the given 
entry, then I will get results conflicting with how the speaker keeps track of her words.  Imagine 
we had Mr. Anchovy consult a dictionary shortly after his initial exposure to the public word 
‘lion’ (perhaps after he purchased the lion-tamer hat).  This would change how Mr. Anchovy 
would come to use his word ‘lionA’ – he would not come to use it to denote anteaters.  So we 
must ask what Mr. Anchovy would decide if he were to consult a dictionary at the end of his 
performance history of ‘lionA’.260    
Once Mr. Anchovy realizes that the counselor described an existing type of animal, which 
other members of their linguistic community refer to with ‘lion’, a new mental register will be 
                                                
260 As I will discuss in the last chapter, it is not sufficient to hypothetically ask the speaker to go through 
this exercise, because sometimes a person’s use may seem mature, but then undergo a significant change 
in use.  Oscar associates new stuff with his word ‘water’ after he has been switched to Twin Earth.   
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created with the title ‘lionN’, one to be kept separate from his original ‘lionA’ register.  This 
entails that when Mr. Anchovy acquires new information about one entity, he will not associate 
it with the register of the other entity.  I may have two friends with the name ‘Jessica Ramirez’.  
If I find out that one of them is about to get married, I don’t thereby infer that the other Jessica 
Ramirez is also about to get married.  I must keep information about those two individuals 
separate, except for characteristics that happen to be true of both of them (i.e. they are both 
women, they both have brown hair, they are both of Mexican decent…).261  I cannot infer 
characteristics of one Jessica Ramirez on the basis of characteristics of the other Jessica 
Ramirez.262   
4.2  The labels of non-mature registers 
I don’t deny that in most cases the hearer’s word or mental register will inherit reference from 
the public word – Mr. Anchovy’s ‘lionA’ is an exception!  Usually people are epistemically 
responsible:  we attempt to pass on true and justified beliefs.  When a person encounters a word 
for the first time she will inquire about it:  “what is a lion?” or “what does ‘lion’ mean?”.  The 
audience automatically interprets such questions as inquiries about lions.263  This is why 
typically the newly formed lion-register will predominantly be filled with characteristics that are 
true of lions.264  It is this mechanism of interpreting questions such as “what are lions?” as 
pertaining to lions – or the reference of other public terms we are familiar with – which will 
                                                
261 I will discuss a case where two individuals are mistakenly linked to one proper name register later.   
262 Unless they are identical twins, in which case one may infer some genetically determined 
characteristics to hold true of both women that go by that name, even though one only experienced those 
characters to be true of one Jessica Ramirez.   
263 See also Ebbs (2009):  p. 5. 
264 I don’t mean for other people to use considerations of charity here.  I am arguing that it is their duty to 
interpret Mr. Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’ as denoting lions such as to facilitate his ability to participate in this 
public practice – until they are presented with evidence to the contrary.   
  
 
 
 109 
eventually create a lion register (a register that is linked to the public ‘lion’-repetition-tree 
within the cognitive apparatus of the novice.  Nevertheless, the mere existence of a register with 
the label ‘lion’ is not sufficient for it to be en rapport with lions (contain beliefs about lions), 
even if that label is an intended copy of a token of the public word ‘lion’.  It matters what gets 
associated with the register over time, since this will effect how the individual will relate her 
word ‘lionI’ to the public word ‘lion’ in the future (or any other words for that matter).   
If, however, Mr. Anchovy considers from an informed perspective that our public word 
‘anteater’ is a good translation for ‘lionA’, then ‘lionA’ is (and always was) individuated through 
the public word ‘anteater’.  This means that Mr. Anchovy can be under- or misinformed about 
what his word ‘lionA’ denotes.  Facing this kind of “switching behind the scenes” should not 
raise doubts as to whether we can generally communicate successfully.  As we have seen in Mr. 
Anchovy’s case, it takes some considerable accumulation of unfortunate exchanges for one to be 
so confused about what other speakers talk about.  Even if in that process of collecting content 
for one’s lion-register the individual adds some false information, she won’t thereby be 
prevented to interpret her word ‘lionI’ as a performance of the public word ‘lion’ in the future.  
Only a very unusual accumulation of unfortunate circumstances must have led Mr. Anchovy to 
predominantly receive information that either doesn’t pertain to lions to begin with, or is simply 
false.   
How can anyone then ask a question about lions without having acquired the word ‘lion’ (in 
the thick sense), without the ability to describe them and without the ability to directly point at 
them (unless the inquirer already knows the answer to her question)?  When Mr. Anchovy was 
first exposed to the public word ‘lion’ let’s imagine him intending to repeat that very same word 
in order to find out about the things it denotes:  “What is a lion?”  We would generally interpret 
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this to be a question about lions.  But how can this be a sensible and grammatically complete 
question inquiring about lions, if the speaker lacks the word ‘lion’?265  
For Kaplan this question is easily answered.  The novice attempts to repeat the word that was 
produced by the competent speaker (in the thick sense).  According to Kaplan such attempts 
(generally) succeed, the novice thereby repeats the word ‘lion’ of the competent speaker 
denoting lions and thus asks a question that pertains to lions.  It thus seems that a new word is 
acquired abruptly – Kaplan’s account doesn’t suggest a gradual acquisition process.  How could 
Mr. Anchovy possibly, at this point, that is, prior to having received an answer, be considered as 
having acquired the public word ‘lion’ (in the thick sense) – if he doesn’t even know anything 
about lions.  His use couldn’t even pass muster (except for in inquiries as imagined above).   
If the novice is merely using a word of the same form, then anything goes – that is, any 
answer would be potentially apt.  A mere label of a register, devoid of conceptions could turn out 
to denote anything whatsoever.  Perhaps this is a consequence of the acquisition of competence 
in a word developing gradually, but it surely would be odd if all our what-is-x questions266 were 
grammatically incomplete (unless the inquirer already knew the answer to her question).  
Furthermore, why do we so strongly believe that if somebody were to answer:  “lions are robots 
operated by aliens from Mars” – she thereby fails to answer the original question?  This neglects 
how we – as competent speakers – should facilitate membership in our linguistic community, not 
deceive people about what our word ‘lion’ denotes.  Therefore, teaching novices our public 
                                                
265 Of course I could indexically refer to another person’s word ‘lion’.  I could ask:  “What kind of entity 
does the third word of your last sentence denote?”.  But this is not what is happening here.     
266 Usually when people have a register devoid of content or almost devoid of content their questions take 
on a very general form.  The analysis I am offering below would also apply to specific questions that are 
linked to an almost empty register such as:  “Are lions dogs?” or “Do lions eat meat?” – we can’t really 
imagine competent speakers raising such questions.   
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words and explain what they denote – to the best of our knowledge – is our responsibility as 
members of the linguistic community.   
The competent speaker ought to provide an answer to the novice (Mr. Anchovy) that will 
facilitate membership in the linguistic community with regard to the word ‘lion’.  This is why the 
competent speaker ought to interpret Mr. Anchovy’s question as an inquiry about lions.  When 
the competent speaker answers she has accepted linguistic control.  In such situations people 
simply don’t respond:  “Lions aren’t anything because you don’t know what you are talking 
about.” 
At the same time, for a speaker’s token t to inherit reference form the competent speaker’s use 
of the corresponding public word w (i.e. ‘lion’) the speaker S must be receptive to the linguistic 
control.  S must be paying attention to their utterances, trust their sincerity and knowledge.  S 
must also be willing to be corrected about what S thinks is true of what t denotes by the 
competent speakers of w.   
The speaker’s token t inherits reference first and foremost from future tokens (i.e. t’) that 
constitute repetitions of t – from those the speaker associates rich conceptions with.  Whether t 
inherits reference from a given public word w, depends essentially on whether S would interpret 
t’ as a repetition of w (from an informed perspective).   
I cannot argue that reference is always inherited from the interlocutor’s word ‘lion’, that is, 
the competent user of the word ‘lion’, since this could potentially violate my previous claim that 
intra-subjective word-individuations must be correct.  Suppose Mr. Anchovy at some point t1 
asked a competent user of the word ‘lion’:  “What are lionst1?”.  Perhaps the interlocutors get 
interrupted and proceed to forget Mr. Anchovy’s question.  If his word ‘liont1’ is at this point 
denoting lions, then this will conflict with his later retrospective judgment that his word ‘lionA’ is 
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not to be translated as the public word ‘lion’ (and it doesn’t and never did denote lions) – 
assuming ‘liont1’ and ‘lionA’ are nodes on the same intra-personal repetition tree.267  But then 
how can the question have been an inquiry about lions?   
I don’t see how I can avoid driving a wedge between how the question is and ought to be 
interpreted and what the question actually inquires about from Mr. Anchovy’s perspective – 
unless I am willing to allow speakers to be wrong about their intra-subjective word 
individuations.  The ‘lionA’-register that is thus being created won’t ever connect to the public 
‘lion’ repetition tree.  This is only a problem for cases where the speaker’s word-form is not 
appropriately connected to the public language.  For other individuals who pick up the word 
‘lion’ and ask questions such as:  “what is a lion?”, but later go on to fill their ‘lionI’-registers 
with conceptions compatible with the matured register to denote lions, there is no such 
discrepancy between the two perspectives.  The competent speaker who answers the question 
ought to interpret the question as pertaining to lions and the quasi-word ‘lionI’ contained in the 
question turns out to be connected to a lion-register, which in turn is linked to the public-‘lion’-
repetition tree.  Being a language user comes with responsibilities.   
I propose to make sense of the above observations as follows:  The word w (whether public or 
idiosyncratic) is acquired instantly, by speaker S even though she only gradually learns how to 
use it as a tool in communication or reasoning processes; competence with regard to w is 
acquired gradually!  If the word w is idiosyncratic (such as Marco Polo’s word ‘Madagascar’ 
                                                
267 But he will create a new register with the label ‘lionN’ that will denote lions, since he wants the ability 
to talk to others about lions.  Let me also clarify that the associated register with ‘liont1’ is assumed 
empty, which means that at t1 Mr. Anchovy’s ‘liont1’ is not yet a full-blown word with the possible 
denotation of all and only anteaters.  As I will explain later his mark ‘liont1’ is merely a quasi-word.  Still, 
it is linked to the same register that his fully developed word ‘lionA’ will also be linked to.  This is why 
strictly speaking we cannot say that ‘liont1’ and ‘lionA’ are instances of the same word since the former is 
merely a quasi word.  Nevertheless, ‘liont1’ is linked to the same topic. 
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was at first), then the content of the mature register268 constitutes the target for the conceptions S 
ought to come to associate with w over time.  If the word w is public, then the content of the 
public word constitutes the target for the conceptions S ought to come to associate with w over 
time.269   
4.3  The informed perspective 
I stipulate that the topic of a mental register doesn’t alter over time270 (such as to avoid 
potential self-knowledge problems that also cause epistemic problems271).  I furthermore 
consider the speaker’s register as connected to a public register (with rare exceptions).  I am also 
saying that it is up to the speaker to judge whether she views herself committed to a given public 
word-practice (that is, a public repetition tree) when she uses her word w.  We can clearly 
conceive of speakers changing their mind on whether their word w is to be identified with a 
given word w’.  For example, I used to think that my word ‘anginaI’ is the same word as the 
ordinary English word ‘angina’ and later came to realize that it is better translated as ‘strep 
throat’.  I can’t permit that in such cases the topic of my mental register changes from ‘angina’ to 
‘strep throat’.272  As a result, I am defining a point of reflection from which the speaker can view 
herself as committed once and for all.  Post identification, she interprets discrepancies between 
the content of her own register and popular or expert opinion as one of substantial disagreement 
                                                
268 The content of a mature register is what a token t of that repetition tree expresses.   
269 I allowed for Mr. Anchovy’s word ‘lionA’ to possibly constitute a node on the public repetition tree 
‘anteater’.  In that case Mr. Anchovy will have to change the spelling of ‘lion’ to ‘anteater’.   
270 I admit that splitting one register into two, or merging two registers into one is a change of topic, but it 
is one the individual is aware of.  This is why those structural alterations do not lead to her affirming 
invalid or irrational inferences she simply cannot recognize as invalid or irrational (without corrections 
from the outside).   
271 Please consult chapter six for further analysis.   
272 This is guaranteed by how I define ‘register’.   
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on a given topic.  In order to attain such a stable point of reflection, I propose that the speaker 
judges her commitment to ‘arthritis’, ‘tiger’, ‘angina’, ‘Madagascar’ etc. from an informed 
perspective.  This position is achieved by consulting a wide selection of reliable resources, such 
as experts, respected dictionaries or encyclopedias.  This should allow the speaker to adequately 
“grasp” what the public word in question expresses.  For example, she looks up ‘tiger’ and reads:  
“A very large cat with a yellow-brown coat striped with black; native to the forests of Asia but 
becoming increasingly rare.”  My suggested approach pre-supposes that the speaker understands 
most of the words contained in the description of what ‘tiger’ denotes.273 
When a speaker commits to a public word w with a given register, then the tokens t1 through tn 
connected by that register express what w expresses.  The speaker must display an openness to 
allow more knowledgeable speakers to correct her about what her tokens t1 through tn denote.  In 
cases where she decides not to be persuaded against her own conceptions, she thus views herself 
in genuine disagreement about what w denotes.  These are all signs of the attitudes of a language 
consumer.   
I do rely on speakers within a linguistic community having been trained to adhere to the 
performance standards of how to pronounce, gesture or write words.  As discussed in chapter 
two this can sometimes lead to productions other speakers may not instantly recognize (recall my 
mistaken intonation as ‘reciprocal’).  Still, with a little “help” of how to look at the token, they 
should be able to recognize the connection and how perhaps a novice performer could have come 
to produce t.  Due to this comportment as a consumer, the speaker will only want to violate his 
status as a consumer if there are radical discrepancies between what (a sensible number and 
                                                
273 This is something I am entitled to assume, since my proposal is not meant as an analysis of linguistic 
competence with regard to a language, but as an analysis of competence with regard to a particular 
(public) word, thus taking for granted the speaker’s overall competence in the respective language. 
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unbiased selection of the more) competent speakers believe about the referent of w.  So, when 
Mr. Anchovy looks up ‘lion’ he won’t be able to extend a practical judgment of sameness of 
satisfaction to the public word ‘lion’ (even though he may now come to acquire it as a new word 
which will require its own register distinct from the old ‘lionA’).  If he now comes to realize that 
other members of his linguistic community call ‘anteaters’ what he used to call ‘lionsA’ and he 
wants to remain committed to effectively communicating with his linguistic community, then he 
ought to change the label of his register to ‘anteater’.  This is interesting development suggesting 
that an already existing register can come to be identified with a public word – this constitutes a 
slight deviation from the scenario Kaplan had in mind.   
Some may wonder how Mr. Anchovy knows which ones are the appropriate entries to check.  
How would he know that ‘lion’ is the relevant word to look up?  Mr. Anchovy will begin with 
those words that have a similar form as his ‘lionA’.   Given that Mr. Anchovy is already a 
competent English speaker and thus meets the performance standards with respect to most other 
words he uses, I can assume that what he considers similar word forms (based on the physical 
characteristics) is going to largely agree with the judgments members of his linguistic 
community will make.  So, he should check the entries ‘lion’, ‘ion’, ‘lamb’, ‘lemon’ and move 
on to increasingly more deviant word-forms… until he finds ‘anteater’.  Our vocabulary is finite, 
so this task can in principle be mastered.   
When other public words (sometimes from other linguistic communities) compete with each 
other for word-sameness with a speaker’s idiolectal word, it can become more difficult for the 
speaker to decide which word she is committed to.  Examples of these were my word ‘angianaN’ 
and Charles’s word ‘robinC’.  I think that in my case it wasn’t reasonable to take myself as 
having meant angina pectoris, especially, since I was aware of my commitment to the German 
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word ‘Angina’.  In Charles’s case I stressed that he had many interactions with British English 
speakers using his ‘robinC’ and regarding it as a repetition of his British interlocutor’s word 
‘robinBE’, but that with the exception of a few cases (i.e. his conversation with Joe over the 
phone), he lacks these linguistic interactions with American speakers.  If, on the other hand, 
Charles has a critical amount of substantive conversations involving the tokens ‘robin’ in 
conversations with both linguistic communities, then this may constitute a really complicated 
case of a merged register, which I will discuss in chapter six.   
The question remains, how could Charles in principle find out which word he is using, since 
he could potentially look at either entry ‘robinBE’ and ‘robinAE’.  What I am trying to say is that 
Charles should look at both entries but take into account that he has at many times intended to 
repeat ‘robinBE’ and only a few times intended to repeat ‘robinAE’.  Since his register cannot be 
individuated by both words, he will have to choose one of the two public words in question.  The 
way I described the case, ‘robinBE’ is the better candidate.   
Neely has serious initial reservations against speaker-centered approaches to word-
competence:   
Presumably the speaker alone does not determine what beliefs are relevant; I cannot merely 
declare myself competent with respect to ‘tiger’ on the grounds that I think I have enough beliefs 
about tigers to qualify.  […] if this were our standard for competence the notion would be useless; 
competence would be idiosyncratic to each speaker.  In such a case, calling someone competent 
would be devoid of general content.274 
What are Neely’s main concerns?   
a) How does the speaker know which beliefs are relevant when it comes to competence with 
regard to ‘tiger’? 
b) How does the speaker know that she has enough beliefs about tigers to qualify as 
competent in the use of the word ‘tiger’? 
                                                
274 Neely (2005):  p.48. 
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c) The standards for competence with respect to any word (i.e. ‘tiger’) cannot be 
idiosyncratic. 
Demanding that speakers (at least hypothetically) compare their own word against the 
corresponding public word from an informed perspective should put to rest some of Neely’s 
concerns, since it introduces (somewhat) uniform standards of competence.  This approach 
doesn’t allow individuals to decide which beliefs concerning ‘tiger’ are relevant.  When 
consulting reliable sources she thereby finds out what the appropriate experts of her community 
believe are the salient beliefs a competent speaker ought to have regarding what ‘tiger’ denotes.  
This responds to a) and c).  It is true though that (once she has adequately consulted those 
resources) I leave it up to the speaker to decide whether her corresponding ‘tigerI’-register 
contains those community wide accepted descriptions listed and whether her register can be 
sincerely interpreted as containing a sufficient amount of those descriptions.  When judging 
whether her word can be thus translated into the public language, the speaker needs to consider: 
a) whether any of her own beliefs conflict with the encountered descriptions or publicly 
accepted beliefs; and 
b) whether she interprets the conflict as a substantial disagreement, and if so, should she 
i) drop her respective beliefs because they are mistaken, or instead,  
ii) hold on to them because she regards the received view as partly mistaken on 
those aspects.275 
Since speakers are taken to be competent in the language overall, which pre-supposes 
competence in how to participate in the practice of speaking some common language in general, 
I assume that speakers have been sufficiently homogenously trained by their linguistic 
                                                
275 This latter option must be used with great caution.  
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community such that from this informed perspective and with identical content in the register at 
hand, speakers are not going to make radically divergent decisions on whether they are 
competent in a given word.  In other words, there is no Mr. Anchovy twin in some twin world 
(which is identical to our own world) who has the same conceptions about what his word ‘lion’ 
denotes as Mr. Anchovy, but the twin sincerely comes to the conclusion during the conversation 
with the vocational guidance counselor that he simply had very strange beliefs about lions and 
that he still intends to apply for a lion taming position.  I simply don’t find this scenario very 
believable.  There could, however, be gray cases, where – even from an informed perspective – 
the conceptions contained in a register could reasonably be viewed compatible with the 
corresponding public concept or not.276  This is where I want to leave it up to the speaker and 
would allow for inter-subjective discrepancies in judgment.   
Unlike Neely, I don’t think we commit ourselves to a concept or word lightly.  If I decide that 
my word ‘anginaI’ is not the ordinary English word ‘angina’, then I thereby also admit that all 
my past conversations with English conversation partners containing the word ‘angina’ non-
vacuously were unsuccessful – in the sense that I didn’t successfully convey my beliefs 
concerning anginaI (strep throat, that is).  This judgment comes with significant costs! 
Question b) is particularly interesting – what happens if the individual’s tigerI-register is still 
relatively empty and she then compares its content to the ‘tiger’ entry of a reliable dictionary?  
                                                
276 In cases where “experts” radically disagree about how to even frame a given research project – a case 
where one could say what the topic is still developing and hasn’t found a stable equilibrium yet – it may 
indeed be difficult for the layman to make up her mind on whether her idiolectal word is adequately 
related to the corresponding public word (words such as ‘ghost’, ‘monster’, ‘happiness’ perhaps).  I 
venture to argue that in such cases we all have such high variations in understanding that there is no well-
defined common topic:  at best the contents of our registers sufficiently overlap and we roughly have the 
same topic in mind.  Even if a well-defined framework of how to talk about the phenomena in question 
were to be developed, it would be hard to link the layman to the corresponding public word, since she had 
very little basis from which to ever judge her possible commitment.  In some such cases, experts may 
simply not exist (yet).   
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How does the individual know enough about her own developing register to judge whether it is 
compatible with the corresponding public concept?  Actually, this is getting things entirely 
confused!  This case is not at all a problematic case, but the way our word acquisitions ought to 
work.  While the register is still developing, the speaker is exposed to appropriate information277 
regarding the relevant public concept tiger and her register thus correctly develops into one 
pertaining to tigers.  Admittedly, it is hard to say at what point we ought to consider the 
speaker’s w-register sufficiently matured (regardless of whether it is related to a public concept) 
such that she can be considered expressing something with w.  When it comes to words that are 
not linked to public repetition trees, it is up to the speaker:  when does she believe she is 
expressing something substantial with w – as a result of careful and sincere reflection (it 
shouldn’t be merely as a result of a “gut” feeling)?  If w is appropriately linked to a public 
repetition tree – I propose the same test:  does the speaker believe to be saying something 
substantial with w?  I simply don’t find it believable that a speaker would be under the illusion of 
uttering something (of substance) when her register is still meagerly filled with content.278  
Of course, speakers sometimes wrongly view themselves committed to public repetition tree 
a, but then later realize that they were really committed to repetition tree b.  This was 
demonstrated by my angina thought example.  I thought that my word ‘anginaI’ and the ordinary 
English word ‘angina’ were performances of the same word.  As I later came to realize, my word 
‘anginaI’ was better translated as ‘strep throat’ – it was thus not a node of the ‘angina’ public 
repetition tree (it was a node on the ‘strep throat’ public expression tree).   This is why I suggest 
this commitment is decided from an idealized standpoint of evaluation at the end of the 
                                                
277 ‘Appropriate’ here is always relative to the current state of knowledge  
278 Some technical terms such as ‘muon’ that rarely make it into conversations of the larger public may be 
exceptions; it seems permissible for laymen to have very meagerly filled registers.   
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performance history of a given register.  Nevertheless, it is a standpoint accessible to the speaker 
in principle.  
Imagine King Louis II of Bavaria having traveled to Australia (which of course he didn’t).  
His favorite animal was the swan, which he pictured white, once fully grown (since all adult 
swans in Bavaria, or Europe in general for that matter are white).  During his visit he encounters 
a bird looking very much like an adult swan:  a rather large “duck-ish” looking water-bird with a 
very long neck – but covered with black feathers all over.  His guide informs him (through a 
translator) that this animal is a swan.  Assuming his translator correctly transmitting the words of 
the guide, King Louis may trust the guide and alter his image of swans accordingly (inferring 
that there are white and black species).  If we want to interpret King Louis’s word ‘Schwan’ to 
be the same as our word ‘swan’ (or ‘Schwan’) today (as opposed to merely denoting a subspecies 
of swans) and assume the same for the Australian guide, then King Louis ought to maintain one 
single register that keeps track of his own word ‘Schwan’ and the word ‘swan’ of the guide 
jointly – thereby coming to the conclusion that swans can be white or black.   
It is quite possible that King Louis may have made an (initial) judgment to the contrary by 
holding on to the distinguishing feature that all (adult) swans are white, such that he is unwilling 
to extend a practical judgment of sameness of satisfaction to the word ‘swan’ the guide is using.  
So far, it seems King Louis could have decided either way.  But if he had consulted an 
ornithologist on the matter to make a decision from an informed perspective, he would have 
come to realize that there are indeed black and white species of swans, thus concluding that the 
Australian ‘swan’ is the same as his word ‘Schwan’.     
We can easily describe the converse situation, where an American traveler to England at first 
extends a practical judgment of sameness of satisfaction to the British word ‘robin’.  As a result, 
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she falsely keeps track of the British word ‘robin’ and the American word ‘robin’ in one single 
register.  Again, I rely on her coming to see her mistake and revising her registers accordingly, if 
she were to consult the appropriate expert sources.    
Of course, speakers sometimes change their mind on how their own words relate to those of 
others.  I suggest that from an informed perspective the speaker commits herself to a given 
public word once and for all.  Even if at some point she disagrees with experts on a given topic; 
for instance, whether global warming is caused by human activity, or whether it is simply the 
result of natural cycles of warming and cooling which the planet undergoes (and would undergo 
to the same extent without the existence of human beings).  Even though this constitutes a 
radical disagreement, we don’t view it as one that leads to a change of topic between laymen and 
the majority of scientists – we can imagine a person holding such beliefs and still minimally 
engaging with the public debate on global warming.  This disagreement is mostly about the 
causes of global warming, not what constitutes global warming (although too many substantial 
disagreements on causes and effects can add up to a disagreement on what one is talking about).  
I rely on it never being the case that from an informed perspective a speaker commits herself to 
engaging in the public practice of global-warming talk, or what have you, but then at a later point 
in time radically disagrees with how to define ‘global-warming’ (or the respective word).  Could 
a person who sincerely points at a snowball and utters:  “This is a tiger! 279” have at some point 
in the past interpreted (from an informed perspective) her own word ‘tigerI’ and the public word 
‘tiger’ as interchangeable?   Speakers, who view themselves committed to a public linguistic 
practice after having consulted the appropriate sources, will rarely, if ever, take back this 
                                                
279 This is not meant to state that the snowball looks like a tiger, but that literally the snowball is a tiger.   
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commitment.   Such in-decisiveness may threaten inter-subjective communication of beliefs 
about the external world.   
Why are public words so important?  Sure, they explain why Putnam can be under- or mis-
informed about elms – given that Putnam deferred to speakers who know more about elms (i.e. 
Quine).  But then how can we account for the possibility of experts being wrong or misinformed 
about a given topic?  The arthritis patient can defer to her doctor, but whom can her doctor defer 
to – given how little medical experts know about arthritis?  The idea of public words or concepts 
is supposed to keep track of a single research topic or project (i.e. arthritis or elms) such that our 
present experts can defer to the knowledge of future experts.280  There is nothing objective that 
makes it the case that the arthritis patient ought to defer to her doctor – it has to make sense to 
her from her own (informed) perspective.  Today’s experts cannot actually obtain an informed 
perspective from which the content of their own registers looks incomplete and partly mistaken, 
since the information is not yet “out there” to be acquired.  How can they view themselves 
committed to the way future experts are pursuing the research in question (i.e. research on 
arthritis)?  I can propose that future medical experts view themselves as continuing the same 
research project, but that would still amount to an external perspective.  I could, however, rely on 
an overlap of experts between those living today and future experts.  Some of today’s experts 
(group a) may still be alive when the new discoveries about arthritis are being made by future 
experts (group c) and will be able to interpret the new resulting definitions of what constitutes 
arthritis as apt.  The experts that are not alive anymore (group b) are then linked to the use of the 
                                                
280 This still leaves some questions unanswered.  In the counterfactual world in which experts never 
discovered that there are two types of jade – perhaps their chemical theories are too unsophisticated to 
distinguish nephrite from jadeite – is it still true that there are two kinds of jade in that world?  In such a 
world there wouldn’t be any future experts to defer to who have the concept of the two kinds of jade – 
even thought jadeite and nephrite exist both in that world.  Then again, I don’t think this is a question that 
a public word theory must answer.     
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word ‘arthritis’ of group c, via group a:  since members of group b viewed themselves as 
investigating the same topic as group a (and vice versa) and members of group a view 
themselves as investigating the same topic as group c (and vice versa), group b can therefore be 
assumed to be causally linked to the investigation of group c such that the word ‘arthritis’ 
denotes the same medical condition(s) in all three groups a, b and c.   
How can the novice speaker judge who is competent?  How can she assess which resources 
are reliable, given that she is not herself an expert on the topic?  That is why we have social 
processes that select experts.  Even though we may at times pick people to fill that role who have 
some false beliefs, or individuals who may even be motivated to deliberately misinform us281 – 
we nonetheless selected people who are particularly knowledgeable on the topic and who are 
well positioned to frame the research project by defining the topic and manage to keep track of it 
over time through progressive changes in attitudes and beliefs.  I do assume that we wouldn’t 
trust experts that collectively lead us radically astray – such that they “feed us” beliefs that are 
entirely false of the topic to a degree that the aggregate of those deceptions render us too 
confused to even talk about it.  It appears to me that this would entirely defeat the purpose:  if 
they prevent us from thinking about the topic intelligibly in the first place, experts can’t deceive 
us anymore either.282  Isolated cases of deliberate misinformation by single experts or a 
profession as a whole shouldn’t undermine my proposal (i.e. false information on whether a 
given artificial sweetener is carcinogenic may threaten our health, but ought not threaten our 
linguistic competence with regard to the name of that sweetener).  Widespread deception across 
                                                
281 Neely (2005):  chapter 3. 
282 Unless, of course we live in the distopia conceived by George Orwell described in Nineteen-Eighty-
Four.  In a society where history is always revised according to the whims of the governing party, without 
the slightest attempt at accuracy, but instead blatantly aiming at manufacturing public consent to whatever 
political agenda is being pursued – it seems the academic practice, formerly known as ‘history’ ceases to 
exist entirely.   
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a vast array of aspects regarding what a name refers to would render the novice incapable of 
judging whether her name n expresses the same as the public name n’.  Although she did her best 
to attain the necessary information by consulting a variety of expert sources she cannot even 
begin to make sense of what n’ denotes.  I doubt that in such a case any layman, except for 
perhaps those who are in on the fraud, is still able to meaningfully talk about the topic in 
question.  Perhaps each individual privately keeps track of their mental register without those 
being connected in any significant way to public discourse.   
Since we know that scientific progress sometimes alters definitions gradually in the short run, 
but sometimes radically in the long run, it may very well be the case that a speaker if she were 
able to consult some of our dictionary entries today, she would be entirely at a loss.  Does that 
entail that she is thus not linked to the content of that entry?  This could clearly cause problems.  
Therefore, a speaker’s informed perspective is always relative to the received knowledge of her 
linguistic community at a given time (her present time).  For instance, a proponent of the 
phlogiston theory may be utterly confused if she were presented with our dictionary entry on 
‘combustion’, such as to suspect that the word ‘combustion’ ought not to be confused with her 
own word ‘combustion’.  Since I want to allow for trans-theoretic terms, I want the above 
linguistic judgments of the phlogiston proponent to be wrong.  All the informed perspective 
requires is that the laymen would identify her word ‘combustionL’ with the word ‘combustionEP’ 
used by experts (of her time).  The commitment to the present word ‘combustionET’ is 
established throughout history by experts attempting to repeat the words of previous experts; 
their word ‘combustionET’ is a node on the same repetition tree that ‘combustionEP’ belongs to.283  
                                                
283 Grice and Strawson insist on there being statements we simply cannot make (literal) sense of and 
therefore necessitate re-interpretation (Grice & Strawson (1956)): 
 (1’)  “My neighbor’s three-year old child is an adult”. 
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Since the speaker commits herself to repeating ‘combustionEP’, she thereby commits herself to 
repeating ‘combustionET’ – even though she could perhaps not have actually made sense of 
consulting today’s experts on the topic.   
4.4  Comparisons 
Individualists can use the conceptual tool of registers to their advantage.  By allowing 
individual speakers to keep track of a particular topic through registers, individualists are in a 
position to explain why a mark m uttered while the respective register is relatively empty and a 
mark m’ uttered while that same register is rich in content constitute performances of the same 
word w:  if m and m’ are appropriately connected to the same register, they constitute 
performances of the same word w.  In the previous chapter I proposed that when the individual 
speaker intends to repeat the same word with both marks m and m’, then those marks stand for 
the same word (in the thick semantic sense of word-sameness); the marks in question are thus 
appropriately linked to the same register.   
Registers also allow us to explain why Putnam may utter different words when producing 
‘elmP’ and ‘beechP’ respectively, although both registers were stipulated to contain the same 
                                                                                                                                                       
Imagine the following utterance: 
(2) “My neighbor’s son is turning into a woman”.   
First sex-“change” surgeries were attempted in the 1920’s (those first surgeries didn’t yet change an 
individual’s sexual organs to those of the opposite sex, they merely removed sexual organs).  We can 
imagine how in the 1800’s we would not have been able to interpret an utterance such as (2) literally.  
Even if one day with the right scientific advancements we were able to administer pills that speed up the 
cognitive development of children, so that a three-year old child has cognitive capacities comparable to a 
young adult – that doesn’t mean that we can understand utterance (1’) literally today such that we can 
conceive of somebody uttering (1’) sincerely and have meant it literally today.  From the perspective of 
our present scientific abilities (1’) seems absurd – even if it turns out to be true in the future.  These 
scientific developments shouldn’t entail that the word ‘adult’ is a different word then from what it is 
today – in the sense of what it denotes.   
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conceptions.284  Recall that the challenge was Putnam’s confession that he attaches identical 
descriptions to both words.285  If m and m’ are connected to distinct registers, they constitute 
performances of different words.  The individualist will in the end still individuate the word in 
terms of the content of the mental register.  In order for words to persist throughout conceptual 
changes, individualists could propose that words are to be individuated in terms of the content of 
mature registers.  This is admittedly merely a sketch, but since I don’t intend to endorse this 
view, I will leave it at that.   
Can individualists explain why a speaker can be under- or mis-informed about a given topic?  
They could claim that we are psychologically wired to adopt information from people whom we 
judge more knowledgeable on a given topic.  This information would appear in the individual’s 
matured register and can then be accounted for within an individualist framework.  In contrast, I 
don’t require that the individual actually view herself as committed to a public word.  I regard it 
as a hypothetical condition:  if the individual were to judge herself committed to the public word 
from an informed perspective, then she is so committed regardless of whether she actually ever 
invests the required time and effort into acquiring this informed perspective and then reflects on 
the use of her own words.  The word ‘arthritis’ of Burge’s patient denotes arthritis regardless of 
whether she goes through with the visit to her doctor during which she is told that arthritis only 
afflicts joints.  What I don’t want to ignore are cases where a speaker (in retrospect) actually 
judges herself not committed to a public word – just like I had come to realize that my word 
‘angina’ (uttered during some visit to the dentist) wasn’t committed to the ordinary English 
‘angina’-repetition-tree.  Individualists can only account for this transmission of reference of the 
                                                
284 Please consult chapter two for the full analysis of this case.   
285 Putnam (1975, 1975):  pp. 226-227. 
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doctor’s word ‘angina’ to the patient’s word ‘angina’ – if the patient actually makes the 
respective changes to the content of her mental register.   
I propose to take seriously what the individual associates with her own words.  At the same 
time, I do not suggest we individuate words in terms of contents of mature registers (unless the 
speaker’s word fails to be connected to any public repetition tree or collections thereof).  Doing 
so would wrongly ignore the commitment to public words.  I demonstrated in chapter two how 
individualism fails to explain why Putnam’s word ‘elmP’ is the same word as Quine’s word 
‘elmQ’, but that Putnam’s word ‘beechP’ cannot be translated as Quine’s word ‘elmQ’.  Given 
that Putnam associates the same conceptions with both words, they bear equal claim to 
individuation with Quine’s word ‘elmQ’ (within the individualist framework).  Kaplan offers an 
elegant solution to the problem:  when Putnam utters ‘elmP’ he thereby means to repeat Quine’s 
‘elmQ’ or some other token which is a member of the same repetition tree that Quine’s ‘elmQ’ is 
a node of. 
What Kaplan’s as well as the individualist’s account fail to properly acknowledge is that 
Putnam has gotten substantial information right!  The word ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are each 
respectively true of distinct entities.  Putnam believes that his words ‘elmP’ and ‘beechP’ denote 
different kinds of trees (since Putnam indeed is competent in the public words ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ 
we can also say that he believes that elms and beeches are different kinds of trees) – he just 
cannot further substantiate how they are different (without deferring to experts or consulting an 
expert source).  For Kaplan this trivially follows from Putnam being competent in ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’.  Kaplan cannot describe a case where Putnam still effectively talks about elms and 
beeches, but mistakes the words ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ for one and the same.   
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The German words ‘Semmel’ and ‘Brötchen’ denote the same kind of bread bun (the former 
word being favored in Southern-German communities, the latter being favored in Northern-
German communities).286  A competent German speaker (of either linguistic community) usually 
knows that: 
x satisfies ‘Semmel’ if and only if x satisfies ‘Brötchen’287 
Competent speakers would not be tempted to assert something of Semmeln that they wouldn’t 
also automatically assert of Brötchen.288  This is something significant to have gotten right!  Why 
couldn’t Putnam have falsely believed that ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ behave like ‘Semmel’ and 
‘Brötchen’? 
Neither Kaplan nor individualists can explain the mistake that occurs if Putnam were to think 
that ‘elmP’ and ‘beechP’ constitute performances of the same word (that is, if he had two 
alternative labels for one and the same mental register – where he ought to have one register for 
each label).  Individualism rejects the notion of public words, so they entirely lack the resources 
to relate registers to public words.  
According to Kaplan, speakers are (almost) automatically competent in the use of a word (in 
the thick sense) once they are exposed to one of its tokens and attempt to repeat that token.  Bach 
explains in detail how this transfer of reference works: 
Now if the speaker is thinking of something by name, he is entertaining a mental token of the 
name; when he refers to it by name, he produces a physical token of that name; and the audience, 
upon hearing that token, forms a mental token of the same name, which he can then retain in 
memory.  Since the hearer’s mental token of the name ‘inherits’ the same object as the speaker’s, 
the object of the hearer’s thought is determined relationally, not satisfactionally. […] 
                                                
286 Those words behave somewhat like ‘soda’ and ‘pop’ in American English.   
287 This is of course not how a competent speaker would put it, unless she had the relevant philosophical 
training.  We could, however, ask her the right kind of questions from which we can infer that she holds 
this bi-conditional to be true.   
288 That doesn’t mean it is advisable to go into a Bavarian bakery ordering “Brötchen” – it seriously 
violates linguistic conventions to do so.   
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[The] reference of a [proper name] is determined not by its meaning but by its ancestry.  It plays 
this role by being of a certain form (sound or shape), generally the same as the one to which it is 
linked.  […]  Since the token of a name represents in virtue of its form, not its meaning, its 
representational features can be perceived by the hearer, who can then and thereafter use mental 
tokens of the same name to think of (or refer to) the same object.289,290  
Kaplan asserts that with the appropriate intentions reference of a word can be inherited from the 
word of the competent speaker – as just described by Bach.  Even if Putnam were to use ‘elmP’ 
and ‘beechP’ as labels of one and the same register, Kaplan has difficulties explaining how 
Putnam could ever fail to be competent in ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ (since Putnam intends to repeat the 
public word ‘elm’ with his ‘elmP’ and the public word ‘beech’ with his own word ‘beechP’), 
unless Putnam had seriously faulty referential intentions291 (which he does not292).  If Kaplan 
remains faithful to his own proposal, he can’t deny Putnam membership in the respective public 
repetition trees – even though something has gone seriously wrong.  He therefore simply 
                                                
289 Bach (1987):  pp. 32-33.  It is somewhat ironic that this immediate inheritance of reference is popular 
when it comes to proper names.  Come to think of it, conflicting referential intentions can occur much 
more immediately when they pertain to proper names.  The proper extension of kind terms is always 
somewhat in question.  Not only can the laymen speakers be mistaken about that, even experts can be 
wrong about the extension of a word.  When it comes to proper names (with the exception of possibly 
split and merged registers) the speaker knows at least that her name is true of one individual object only.  
Imagine my neighbor points across the street and tells me:  “Oh look, Patrick Espinoza is shoveling snow 
in front of his driveway”.  As it turns out my neighbor is shortsighted and the person shoveling snow is 
somebody else.  Who does my memory – “Patrick Espinoza was shoveling snow in front of driveway x” – 
pertain to?  I clearly have the referential intention to refer to the man I saw that day (whoever he was), 
even though at the same time, I intend to repeat the name my neighbor uttered (but his name ‘Patrick 
Espinoza’ denotes Patrick Espinoza).  It seems to me that when it comes to proper names it is much easier 
to fill the corresponding register with conceptions violating the transmission of reference – all it takes is 
one direct perception of the object one relates with the name in question that conflicts with the reference 
of one’s interlocutors name.   
290 Although Kaplan believes that with the appropriate intentions, reference of kind terms and proper 
names transfer thus, Bach only agrees this to be true for proper names.   
291 This is Kaplan’s exception clause, which I showed to be so strong that it threatens to undermine anti-
individualism altogether.   
292 Although Putnam intends to refer to what ‘beech’ denotes with ‘elm’ (and vice versa) this confusion 
doesn’t strike me as grounds to deny somebody membership in the ‘elm’-speaking practice (or ‘beech’ 
speaking practice for that matter).  We can make sense of somebody wondering whether there is any 
difference between beech and elm trees in a way that we simply cannot make sense of somebody 
wondering whether there is a difference between snowballs and tigers.     
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stipulates that if somebody who believes one of her own words w to be linked to two distinct 
public repetition trees, then “nothing whatsoever is being said” by w: 
I am inclined to think that when two different common currency words are wired together in this 
way in a given black box, which then pulls from that common source and transmits, nothing 
whatsoever is being said.  Is it transmitting the first word?  Is it transmitting the second word?  I 
think there is just no answer to that question.293  
According to Kaplan, the word of the individual must either be linked to the first public word or 
the second – he cannot conceive of it being its own muddled entity (somehow individuated by 
both public concepts).  Kaplan is correct about us not being able to straightforwardly translate 
this muddled word into the public language.   
This is how I understand the case:  Imagine the individual has a register labeled ‘jade’.  The 
public language contains the word ‘jadeite’ and ‘nephrite’, but counterfactually nothing 
equivalent to our actual word ‘jade’.  The individual’s word behaves like our actual word ‘jade’ 
that I stipulated non-existent in the public language of the counterfactual world – it denotes 
nephrite and jadeite (without distinguishing between the two distinct chemical compounds).  In 
the counterfactual public language ‘jade’ cannot be translated without some paraphrasing 
reservations.   
x satisfies ‘jade’ if and only if, x satisfies ‘nephrite’ or x satisfies ‘jadeite’ (without the 
ability to distinguish nephrite from jadeite). 
I don’t see why our actual word ‘jade’ should fare any better than those words that have muddled 
or merged public concepts.  Since we view assertions such as:  “You are wearing a beautiful jade 
ring” as expressing something that makes sense, we should accept that muddled words – 
muddled in the sense that they merge two separate public repetition trees) – say something 
                                                
293 Kaplan (1990):  p. 107.    
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meaningful as well.  I will discuss the implications of anti-individualism on discursive 
justification further in chapter six.   
When it comes to the flip-case, a speaker mistakes one name for two, Kaplan surprisingly 
judges differently.  Here, the speaker’s way of storing the respective words doesn’t interfere with 
competence in the respective word: 
A transmission of a word may come into the black box and then another transmission of the same 
word may come into the black box, and inside the black box this very same word might get stored 
in two different locations, stored, so to speak, as the transmissions of two different words. […] 
Somehow, in the black box, the different branches of the same word (i.e. the different input 
utterances of the same word) weren’t all properly linked together.  And that means that when the 
black box emits, it thinks it has two words, and it will make a choice as to which ‘word’ it is 
going to emit.294 
Kaplan seems to give precedence to the success of repeating a public word over successfully 
judging whether the speaker’s own utterances constitute performances of the same word.  The 
speaker, Peter, is exposed to an utterance of the public name ‘PaderewskiP1’, he then repeats that 
utterance and uses it as a label of one of his registers:  ‘PaderewskiI1’.  At a different occasion 
Peter is exposed to another utterance ‘PaderewskiP2’.  Again, he repeats that utterance and uses it 
as a label of one of his registers:  ‘PaderewskiI2’.  Since the individual believes the utterances 
‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ to constitute performances of different (common currency) 
names – that is, he understands them to each denote a different individual – he keeps track of 
what they denote in distinct registers.  This is where the individual is mistaken, the utterances 
‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ constitute performances of the same common currency names 
and denote one and the same individual.   
Kaplan wants to keep the identities between the words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiP1’ 
intact, that is, maintain that they constitute performances of the same name.  The same goes for 
the pair ‘PaderewskiI2’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ – given his criterion of repetition, Kaplan does not 
                                                
294 Kaplan (1990):  pp. 106-107.   
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conceive of an individual ever failing to repeat a public word or name (except for those cases 
where referential intentions seriously conflict with the reference of the interlocutor’s word and 
cases where public concepts are merged).  As the Paderewski puzzle goes it is assumed that 
‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ are utterances of the same name.  This means that the 
individual is wrong about thinking that ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ are utterances of 
different names.  It seems rather odd, to say the least, that we always succeed in repeating words 
produced by other speakers, but shall be able to fail repeating our own words.  Kaplan may 
object that when Peter intends to repeat ‘PaderewskiI1’ he doesn’t fail to do so, but rather, 
doesn’t notice that he is also repeating  ‘PaderewskiI2’.  Since he believes that ‘PaderewskiI1’ and 
‘PaderewskiI2’ constitute different names (in the sense that they refer to different individuals), he 
explicitly means not to repeat ‘PaderewskiI2’ when he repeats ‘PaderewskiI1’.  In other words, 
according to Kaplan, the individual cannot keep track of the identities (and non-identities) of her 
own words.   
This is a dangerous failure to make space for in any semantic theory.  The ability to repeat a 
public word, such as ‘tiger’ is only meaningful, if the speaker knows how to keep her 
corresponding ‘tigerI’-register separate from registers of other words (i.e. ‘anteater’).  We 
already know that she cannot do that in terms of similarity of content of the registers or else, for 
Putnam ‘elmP’ and ‘beechP’ are both alternative spellings of one and the same word.  I think 
allowing an individual to fail in her intentions to repeat her own words, creates a theoretic 
“mess”.  I think Kaplan shouldn’t give precedence to inter-subjective word-individuation over 
intra-subjective word-individuation.  By introducing this possibility of doubt towards a speaker’s 
ability to keep track of her own word-identities, he implodes his own proposal.  If individuals 
cannot keep track of their own words in problematic cases, why should they do any better in the 
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“normal” cases (where they do not confuse two words to be one, or one word to be two)?  The 
individual cannot distinguish the “normal” from the problematic cases from her own perspective!  
It seems to me that Kaplan’s proposal actually relies on our ability to at the very least keep track 
of our own words.  Wasn’t this an unquestioned assumption we made all along?  Since the 
supposed false individuation of words depends on factors that she is not aware of (unless she is 
being corrected from the outside), she is incapable of correcting such “mistakes”.295   
I will argue, instead, that Peter correctly judges his own words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and 
‘PaderewskiI2’ to represent different words.  He split one public name into two separate registers.  
Fiengo and May ascribe the individual the same linguistic control: 
We will find that the beliefs of individuals will be critical in the statement of those identity 
conditions on words: two occurrences of words are occurrences of the same word for an 
individual if and only if that individual believes they are the same.296   
This constitutes a failure to repeat the public word ‘PaderewskiP1’ when he utters: 
‘PaderewskiI1’.  Nevertheless, both registers are linked to one and the same public word 
‘PaderewskiP’ (of which ‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ are instances.  This link is not 
merely assumed in principle, but can be tested:  if the speaker finds out that there is only one 
Paderewski and that ‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ denote that Paderewski – will he as a 
result of that information merge his registers ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ into one register?  
If so, then her words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ were all along both linked to 
‘PaderewskiP’ – without her having been adequately competent in ‘PaderewskiP’ (since this pre-
                                                
295 I am puzzled by how deflationary accounts of meaning are supposed to work, unless we assume that 
speakers can express the meanings of their own words as in the following example:  “‘robin’ is true of x if 
and only if x is robin”.  If external factors (i.e. switches between linguistic communities) could bring it 
about that between the first token “water” and the second token ‘water’ the speaker looses track of how to 
individuate her own tokens, then the utterance could be false.  Unless I can tell whether I switched 
linguistic communities (which in the Twin Earth thought experiments one can’t) I wouldn’t be able to 
distinguish the unproblematic or true utterances from the false ones.   
296 Fiengo & May (2006):  p. 53. 
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supposes that he doesn’t “store” it under distinct registers).  Can a word w be linked to a public 
repetition tree without w constituting a repetition of the corresponding public word?  Remember 
how I argued earlier that somebody who does not yet know anything about tigers may utter the 
word form ‘tiger’ in a question such as “what is a tiger?” without yet being competent in the use 
of that word.  In that case the quasi-word ‘tiger’ is linked to the public word tiger without it 
constituting a performance of that public word.   
When Peter realizes that his words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ denote the same person, 
he will have to merge his two registers into one ‘PaderewskiI’ – or else he may in the future be 
tempted to assert contradictions.  It is this new merged register that he then identifies with the 
public word ‘PadereskiP’.  Since the conceptions associated with both registers ‘PaderewskiI1’ 
and ‘PaderewskiI2’ get transferred to the new ‘PaderewskiI’ register, there is a semantic 
continuity between those registers.  This semantic continuity does not pre-suppose semantic 
identity.  It is this relationship of continuity that establishes a semantic link between 
‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ and ‘PaderewskiP’ (but again, one that is weaker than 
identity).  It is not merely because ‘PadereskiP’ and ‘PaderewskiI1’ overlap in content (that is, 
Peter reads and hears many things about whom other people call ‘PadereskiP’ that he also 
believes to be true of ‘PaderewskiI1’) that establishes this connection.  This overlap is a result, 
not a cause of his semantic commitment.  It is the identity between his later merged register 
‘PaderewskiI’ (that arose from registers ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’) and ‘PadereskiP’ that 
establishes that link.  The realization that ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ ought to be merged 
represents a substantial change and will affect his inferential behavior.  I will discuss Kripke’s 
Paderewski puzzle in greater detail in chapter five.   
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The abrupt acquisition of competence, endorsed by Kaplan, brings with it significant 
explanatory shortcomings: 
(i)   An inability to account for deference failures:  a speaker attempts to repeat a public 
word but fails to do so and thus fails to defer to other competent users of the word in 
question.   
(ii)       We cannot make sense of utterances that merge two separate public concepts297 
unless a corresponding public word exists (i.e. ‘jade’ is true of nephrite and jadeite).   
(iii) We cannot retrace inferences that involve words linked to registers that split two 
separate public concepts298 without ascribing irrational beliefs to the individual 
(which she, however, is incapable of recognizing as such without input from other 
speakers).   
Does the speaker believe that her own marks m and m’ constitute performances of the same or 
different words (in the thick sense of ‘word’)?  The content of the registers are the basis on 
which the speaker judges whether with uttering her word w she is committed to a given public 
word w’.  The speaker will also take into account memory of past conversations she had during 
which she used w and how this possible individuation via w’ will affect the truth-value of her 
past assertions.  If this commitment to some public repetition tree can be established (in actuality 
or hypothetically), then the content of her w-register doesn’t (and never did) individuate w:  w 
and all past productions of w are individuated via the public word w’.   
     This is how my register-based version of anti-individualism compares to Kaplan’s anti-
individualism and register-based individualism in its explanatory power:   
 
                                                
297 This is what causes self-knowledge problems and will be analyzed in chapter six.   
298 This is what happens in the Paderewski puzzle, which I will discuss in the next chapter.   
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Corresponding 
thought example 
Anti-individualism 
without registers 
Anti-individualism 
with registers 
Individualism with 
registers 
Arthritis patient + Under- or 
misinformation about 
what one’s own word 
denotes possible 
+ Under- or 
misinformation about 
what one’s own word 
denotes possible 
- Under- or 
misinformation about 
what one’s own word 
denotes not possible 
Mr. Anchovy - Immediate 
acquisition of 
competence with 
regard to a word  
+ Acquisition of 
competence with 
regard to a word 
gradual 
+ Acquisition of 
competence with 
regard to a word 
gradual 
Marco Polo & dental 
visit 
- Involuntary 
deference failure not 
possible 
+ Involuntary 
deference failure 
possible 
[Not applicable] 
Paderewski puzzle  - Ascriptions of 
irrational inferences to 
an otherwise rational 
agent possible299 
+ Ascriptions of 
irrational inferences to 
an otherwise rational 
agent impossible 
+ Ascriptions of 
irrational inferences to 
an otherwise rational 
agent impossible 
Self-knowledge 
puzzles300 
- Utterances where the 
individual believes 
two distinct public 
words to be one are 
nonsensical. 
+ Utterances where 
the individual believes 
two distinct public 
words to be one are 
meaningful, but are 
difficult to translate 
into the public 
language 
[Not applicable] 
 Individual variations 
in understanding due 
to different beliefs 
Individual variations 
in understanding due 
to different beliefs and 
register structure 
Individual variations 
in understanding due 
to different content 
associated with 
registers 
 
                                                
299 I have in mind here the kind of irrational inferences that the individual cannot recognize as such from 
her first-person perspective without external input – she is unable to make the apparently necessary 
logical corrections on her own.     
300 Those will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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4.5  Conclusion 
I aimed at developing a position that occupies the middle ground between social anti-
individualism and the kind of individualism that individuates a speaker’s words without input 
from the speaker’s linguistic community.  According to my proposal, the content of the mental 
register doesn’t by itself individuate the speaker’s word ‘lionI’, although it cannot be entirely 
ignored either when it comes to individuating ‘lionI’.  We consult the mental register’s content 
when it comes to deciding whether it is linked to any public repetition tree and if so, which one.  
I don’t regard it as impossible that a person’s register may simply lack an appropriate 
corresponding public repetition tree it can “latch on” to (i.e. I may have a register that denotes all 
and only philosophy books that some recluse spider does or used to hide in and be under the 
impression that the label of my register is a word used in my linguistic community).  
Nevertheless, I view most words as allowing for a translation into the public language that 
doesn’t require paraphrasing.  The main advantage of individualism is that it can easily explain 
away invalid and contradictory beliefs that under certain conditions anti-individualism cannot 
help but ascribe to speakers.301  In my own proposal, I want to hold on to the social anti-
individualist idea that speakers can be under- or mis-informed about a given topic – but do so 
without threatening the a priority of their logical reasoning capacities.   
                                                
301 The speaker is unable to recognize those beliefs as contradictory or invalid even after careful 
reflection. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ARE INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS RELIABLE WHEN IT COMES TO INDIVIDUATING 
THEIR OWN WORDS?  TEST-CASE:  KRIPKE’S PADEREWSKI PUZZLE 
5.0  Introduction 
Social anti-individualism à la Burge and Kaplan is driven essentially by epistemic concerns.  
The individual’s acquisition of knowledge is in part structured by other members of her linguistic 
community.  We can’t be experts in all fields relevant to our research endeavors.  Kripke’s 
Paderewski puzzle exploits the resulting epistemic gap between how the speaker perceives the 
reference of the name ‘Paderewski’ and its actual reference to ascribe (simultaneously) a set of 
contradictory beliefs to a rational speaker.  In order to circumvent such threats to the individual’s 
logical abilities, I attribute maximum linguistic control to the individual over her own word 
individuations.  I will reveal the fine-grained individuation of belief ascriptions on the basis of 
individual conceptions as misguided, since they hinder the proper transfer of justification from 
testimony Τ to the belief τ formed through Τ.  If the topics of Τ and τ only ever partially overlap 
– unless all conceptions are shared between testifier and audience – then Τ can never be fully 
understood by the hearer.302  I will apply the notion of mental registers303 in a new way such that 
                                                
302 My own solution to the Paderewski case doesn’t lead to this result.  More is required between 
‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiP’ for communication to succeed (somewhat).  This communication is 
limited because it doesn’t allow for a transfer of knowledge.  It is Peter’s merger of his two ‘PaderewskiI1’ 
and ‘PaderewskiI2’ registers that demonstrates that he was all along committed to the public 
‘PaderewskiP’.  This is why I stress that the two ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ constitute a split public 
concept – not merely a split idiosyncratic concept.  This kind of commitment is lacking towards the 
British ‘robinBE’ for speakers who employ the American ‘robinAE’ – even though there is an overlap of 
register content this does not suffice for the kind of communicative success that I have in mind.  Thanks 
to Ebbs for pressing the concern I address here.   
303 In the relevant literature, mental registers are sometimes referred to as ‘dossiers’ or ‘files’ instead. 
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our belief ascriptions of the described case are rendered compatible with epistemic concerns that 
originally drew us to (social) anti-individualism.     
5.1  Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle applied to social anti-individualism 
Peter believes (falsely) that there are two famous individuals known as ‘Paderewski’ – one a 
celebrated pianist, the other a prominent Polish statesman.  As it turns out, the pianist named 
‘Paderewski’ and the politician called ‘Paderewski’ are actually one and the same person.  If 
prompted, Peter would assert: 
(i) Paderewski has musical talent. 
(ii) It is not the case that Paderewski has musical talent.304   
(i) is uttered as a statement about Paderewski, the pianist, while (ii) is uttered with Paderewski 
the politician in mind.  Given that the two occurrences of ‘Paderewski’ are instances of the same 
(public) proper name, we ascribe contradictory beliefs to Peter, merely by connecting (i) and (ii) 
through a conjunction:305, 306 
(iii) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and that it is not the case that 
Paderewski has musical talent.  
Furthermore, we as observers are maintaining a contradictory thought:307 
                                                
304 The same standards for musical talent are assumed throughout the paper.   
305 Assuming that the substitution of instances of one name with instances of a different but co-referential 
name is truth-preserving represents a substantial assumption.  It is trivial that the substitution among 
instances of the same name preserve truth-values.   
306 Usually the Paderewski puzzle is interpreted as an attack on direct reference accounts of meaning.  
Owens (1995) agrees with me that anti-individualistic intutitions provide all the motivation we need for 
the puzzle to arise. 
307 (iv) follows from (iii) if a strong disquotational principle is presupposed.  
There is also a strengthened ‘biconditional’ form of the disquotation principle, where once again 
any appropriate English sentence may replace ‘p’ throughout:  A normal English speaker who is 
not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to ‘p’ if and only if he believes that p.   
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(iv)  Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and it is not the case that Peter 
believes that Paderewski has musical talent.   
Peter is oblivious that the content stated in (iii) asserts a contradiction – he is incapable to see 
that he must choose between (i) and (ii).  From Peter’s first-person “perspective” (i) and (ii) 
neither agree nor disagree in content.  Unless some serious neurological condition is inhibiting 
the proper function of an individual’s cognitive apparatus, we assume that individual to think 
rationally.  We cannot comprehend how somebody who understands some statement of the form 
⎡α ≠ α⎤ – that is, understands what it asserts, could sincerely believe it to be true.  Taschek 
explains: 
[T]here is no making sense of persons, in the relevant sense, without the possibility of assessing 
their rationality.  This means at the very least, being able to assess their beliefs for logical 
consistency, to evaluate their inferences for validity, and to identify intersubjective agreements 
and disagreements between their beliefs and those of others.308  
In Peter’s case, social anti-individualism à la Burge and Kaplan prima facie conflicts with the a 
priority of logical reasoning.  According to Kaplan, given that Peter intends to repeat the public 
word ‘PaderewskiP’ in (i) as well as (ii), both assertions contain the same name without Peter 
noticing that he thereby produced two performances of the same name.  Thus, there is no getting 
around ascribing to Peter a contradictory belief.   
Owens argues that ascribing “permissible” contradictions to a person is compatible with her 
rationality.  He explains that a   
fully rational subject may subscribe to contradictory beliefs for the simple reason that belief 
contents are, in part, a function of contextual factors, and so recognition of sameness and 
difference among such contents may require much more than mere rationality.309 
                                                                                                                                                       
Kripke (1976):  p. 249. 
308 Taschek (1998):  p. 323. 
309 Owens (1989):  p. 311;  see also Owens (1995):  p. 251.   
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Owens simply denies that Kripke’s thought-example constitutes a puzzle.  Unless we can present 
a way to contrast permissible from non-permissible contradictions, it seems to me that Owens 
merely stipulates that rational individuals simply don’t assert non-permissible contradictions.  I 
think that we can learn more about language from Kripke’s puzzle, if we attempt to avoid 
ascribing contradictory beliefs to Peter.    
To render the original puzzle convincing to the reader, allow me to flesh out the 
circumstances.  When Peter listens to a CD he received as a gift, he is pleasantly surprised by the 
merit of the performance.  Curious about the person playing, he studies the label and reads 
‘Paderewski’ – listed under ‘pianist’.  This is how he comes to hold (i).  While listening to the 
recording he is also reading Paderewski’s biography, forwarded to him by the friend who gave 
him the very CD capturing his admiration.  Since the recording turns out to be so enjoyable, 
however, Peter’s attention oscillates between music and text.  He reads the beginning section, 
where Paderewski’s early interest in music is mentioned, as well as his teacher’s assessment of 
Paderewski’s insufficient talent for a professional career in music.  Peter then skips the sections, 
where Paderewski’s persistence towards his aspirations and his resulting fame in the musical 
world are recorded.  Peter’s attention returns to the text for the parts describing his political role 
in Poland’s reunification after WWI as its elected prime minister.  Peter thus concludes (ii).  
There are strong reasons to believe that Peter learned the public name ‘PaderewskiP’.  He 
acquired the public word ‘Paderewski’ – from separate public sources:  (a) the one printed on a 
CD; (b) the one used in a biography.  Those two occurrences are instances of one and the same 
name.  Peter intends to use the same name that is printed on the CD when uttering (i) and he 
intends to repeat the name that is used in the biography when he declares (ii) – those names just 
happen to be identical.  He certainly doesn’t deliberately opt out of the ‘Paderewski’-linguistic 
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practice.  He wants to communicate his thoughts effectively when he utters ‘Paderewski’ in both 
instances (i) and (ii).  Peter holds substantial beliefs, that would be true if we were entitled to 
interpret his word ‘Paderewski’ as our word ‘Paderewski’.   
Without explicitly stating it, Peter’s friend clearly attempts to convey to him that Paderewski 
the famous pianist and Paderewski the famous Polish statesman are one and the same individual 
– thereby drawing attention to Paderewski’s extraordinary life.  Did Peter learn anything from 
the CD or the biography?  It seems natural to say he has learned from the biography that, 
amongst other things, Paderewski was a politician.  Information imparted to Peter via the public 
name ‘Paderewski’.  Does this imply that Peter understands the public name ‘Paderewski’ (and 
thus is entitled to use it)?  We need an account of names that allows Peter to “understand” our 
name ‘Paderewski’ without thereby entitling his use of it.  That is, without identifying his 
utterances of “Paderewski” with the public name ‘Paderewski’ such that (iii) must be viewed as 
an instance of the schema ⎡α ≠ α⎤.   
If Peter were to claim: 
 (v)  As a young man Paderewski didn’t have red hair. 
we would consider ourselves to disagree with him, since Paderewski was known for his vibrant 
red hair.  We would naturally be tempted to take Peter’s words in (v) to express what we would 
express with (v) – a proposition which we consider to conflict with our belief that as a young 
man Paderewski did have red hair.  These observations speak for Peter’s name ‘Paderewski’ in 
(i) and (ii) to be identical with the public name ‘PaderewskiP’.  Does the successful transfer of 
information go hand-in-hand with word-sameness of the words in testimony Τ and the belief τ 
acquired as a result of Τ? 
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Some considerations, however, clash with our assumption that Peter uses the public name 
‘Paderewski’.  If we were to tell Peter: 
 (vi)  Paderewski had red hair. 
he would probably ask us “which one?”.  In comparison, it would never appear to us to raise 
such a question.  Isn’t it blatantly obvious?  Peter believes that Paderewski, the pianist, is not 
Paderewski the politician – and that’s that!  However, if we translate that into our public 
language, this is a longer version for: 
 (vii) Paderewski is not Paderewski. 
(vii) is an instance of the schema: 
 (vii’) α ≠ α 
It is very difficult to comprehend how somebody who understands some statement of the form 
⎡α ≠ α⎤ – that is, understands what it asserts, could sincerely believe it to be true.   
Upon reflection, the prima facie evident explanation is not sensible in our own words.  
Imagining an attempt to correct Peter’s beliefs:  how would our utterance ‘Paderewski is 
Paderewski’ – an instance of the schema ⎡α = α⎤ – be informative? 310   
In order to facilitate the discussion, let’s distinguish the occurrence of ‘Paderewski’ in (i) and 
(ii) as ‘PaderweskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ respectively.  Recall, that it is part of the description of 
Kripke’s case that Peter’s names ‘PaderweskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ denote the same individual, 
namely Paderewski (the politician and statesman).  If Peter were to claim about some person 
                                                
310 In his opening paragraph to “On Sense and Nominatum,” Frege writes:   
“a = a” and “a = b” are sentences of obviously different cognitive significance:  “a = a” is valid a 
priori and according to Kant is to be called analytic, whereas sentences of the form “a = b” often 
contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be justified in an a priori 
manner”.   
Frege (1892). 
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called ‘Paderewski’ that he1 has musical talent and of some other person called ‘Paderewski’ that 
he2 has no musical talent and he1 ≠ he2 – the puzzle wouldn’t even arise!   
We are facing a dilemma:  we must individuate Peter’s names – ‘PaderweskiI1’ and 
‘Paderewski2’ – such that they (a) co-refer with one another in order to avoid ascribing an overt 
contradictory belief to Peter and (b) co-refer with the public name ‘PaderewskiP’ such as to allow 
for the transfer of knowledge and successful inter-subjective communication.  Since I wanted to 
be cautious about the substitution of co-referential terms, we didn’t thereby prove that (i) and (ii) 
contradict.   
When we are attempting to solve Kripke’s puzzle, we are trying to do justice to two seemingly 
opposing explanatory goals:   
a) Account for the successful communicative exchange between Peter and his linguistic 
community with regard to utterances containing the name ‘Paderewski’ (non-vacuously).   
b) Avoid ascribing to Peter contradictory beliefs of the form ⎡p ∧ −p⎤ 
While b) tempts us to conceptualize Peter’s contents of belief as entities that change in 
accordance to Peter’s ways of perceiving the referent of the name ‘Paderewski’, we would 
thereby drive a wedge between the content of his belief c and the semantic content of Peter’s 
utterances that are meant to convey c.  Unless the audience A shares Peter’s ways of perceiving 
the referent of ‘Paderewski’, some element of c remains inaccessible to the audience.  Of course 
we generally take for granted that a name doesn’t communicate all our attitudes towards a given 
referent to A.  These attitudes are generally overlooked, since we don’t take them to have logical 
implications.311   
                                                
311 Even though these claims are reminiscent of a Fregean notion of Sinn, I want something much weaker 
in its effect than Sinn.  Fregean approaches to this problem are struggling accounting for a speaker S1 who 
can only think of Paderewski under the mode of pianist can successfully communicate with another 
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Perhaps we could argue that there are in fact two public words ‘Paderewski’, since the man in 
question is known for achievements in different fields.  One could easily imagine how most 
people tend to keep up with happenings in one field but not both.  The resulting one-sided and 
partial conceptions may have led to distinct public senses (some kind of non-referential 
contribution to the meaning of a name).312  Consider an utterance made by a speaker informed of 
Paderewski’s political career but not his musical fame: 
(viii) Paderewski has red hair.  
While the following one is made by a speaker who knows about Paderewski’s contributions to 
music, but not his political ones: 
(ix) Paderewski has red hair.   
Even if we want to argue that (viii) and (ix) do not make the same assertion (thereby allowing us 
to argue that (i) and (ii) are not contradictory) – which I find highly dubious – we wouldn’t want 
for every possible conception to create a new (public) name ‘Paderewski’.  Disregarding for a 
moment the original epistemic motivations of anti-individualism, this sketched solution won’t 
dissolve the puzzle.  In theory every imaginable conception regarding Paderewski can open up 
the possibility for Kripke’s puzzle.  Peter, for some reason or other, may falsely believe that 
there are two famous politicians who happen to have the same (generic) name ‘Paderewski’.  He 
believes that one of them is passionate about the piano in his spare time, while the other one 
doesn’t care much for music.  He thus attributes musical talent to one, but not the other – even 
though there is only one public name for Paderewski, the politician.   
                                                                                                                                                       
speaker S2 who only thinks of Paderewski under the mode of politician.  In my own account, nothing 
speaks against those individuals both sharing the same public word ‘PaderewskiP’ and hence 
communicating successfully.   
312 I have to thank Steve Wagner for encouraging me to consider this view in the present context.   
Perhaps this is why the Superman and Clark Kent thought example is so convincing.  We attach different 
senses to Clark Kent in the persona of Clark Kent compared to the persona Superman.   
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5.2  Kaplan’s analysis of the puzzle 
In chapter three I discussed Kaplan’s exception clause that explains how a speaker can fail in 
her attempt to repeat a public word.  In this example, Peter doesn’t seem to hold any significantly 
false beliefs that the referential use exception clause could exploit (such as to create a conflict 
between referential intentions and the intention to repeat the public word ‘PaderewskiP’).  Of 
course, Peter holds the false belief that Paderewski the pianist is not the same individual as 
Paderewski the politician.  But as I explained above, this is not merely some false belief; it is one 
that cannot be true under any circumstances.  Kaplan cannot get around ascribing Peter a 
contradictory belief of the form ⎡p ∧ −p⎤ but he is perhaps in a position to contrast the kind of 
contradiction Peter asserts against those that we would deem unacceptable.   
Kaplan’s analysis of the puzzle is as follows: 
A transmission of a word may come into the black box and then another transmission of the same 
word may come into the black box, and inside the black box this very same word might get stored 
in two different locations, stored, so to speak, as the transmissions of two different words. […] 
Somehow, in the black box, the different branches of the same word (i.e. the different input 
utterances of the same word) weren’t all properly linked together.  And that means that when the 
black box emits, it thinks it has two words, and it will make a choice as to which ‘word’ it is 
going to emit.313 
He seems to give precedence to the speaker successfully repeating a public word over her 
successfully repeating her own words (over time).  He accuses Peter of not being able to keep 
track of his own utterances that constitute performances of the same word:  “the different 
branches of the same word […] weren’t properly linked together”.  Since identity between public 
and idiolectal word is assumed, this means that Peter repeats the name ‘PaderewskiI1’ when 
uttering ‘PaderewskiI2’ – even though he does not intend for these two performances to constitute 
repetitions of the same name (in the thick sense of name).   
                                                
313 Kaplan (1990):  pp. 106-107.   
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Peter is exposed to an utterance of the public name ‘PaderewskiP1’, he then repeats that 
utterance and stores it as a label of one of his registers:  ‘PaderewskiI1’.  At a different occasion 
Peter is exposed to another utterance ‘PaderewskiP2’.  Again, he repeats that utterance and stores 
it as a label of one of his registers:  ‘PaderewskiI2’.  Since Peter believes the utterances 
‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ to constitute performances of different (common currency) 
names – that is, he understands them to each denote a different individual – he keeps track of 
what they denote in distinct registers.  This is where Peter is mistaken, the utterances 
‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ constitute performances of the same common currency names 
and denote one and the same individual.  Peter is “taking one name to be two”.314 
Mercier explains how sometimes speakers fail to have a well-formed intention when 
attempting to repeat a word, because the various utterances the speaker groups together as one 
word are in fact utterances of several words:  “Now, in order for [a spealer’s] intention to use a 
word with its meaning to be a well-formed intention, it has to be the case that the word about 
which [she has] that intention is indeed one word.”315  
Peter commits the converse of the mistake Mercier describes.  He groups utterances into 
distinct word-categories, when on the contrary those utterances are all performances of the same 
word.  Does this mean that Peter succeeds in his attempt to repeat the “names” in question?   
Kaplan wants to keep the identities between the words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiP1’ 
intact, that is, maintain that they constitute performances of the same name.  The same goes for 
the pair ‘PaderewskiI2’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ – which is partly a result of Kaplan not conceiving of 
an individual ever failing to repeat a public word or name (except for those cases where 
referential intentions seriously conflict with the reference of the interlocutor’s word and cases 
                                                
314 Kaplan (1990):  p.108. 
315 Mercier (1993):  p. 79. 
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where public concepts are merged316).  As the Paderewski puzzle goes, it is assumed that 
‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ are utterances of the same name – “this very same word 
might get stored in two different locations.”  This means that Peter is wrong about thinking that 
‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ are utterances of different names.  It seems rather odd, to say 
the least, that we always succeed in repeating words produced by other speakers, but shall be 
able to fail repeating our own words.  Kaplan may object that when Peter intends to repeat 
‘PaderewskiI1’ he doesn’t fail to do so, but rather, doesn’t notice that he is also repeating  
‘PaderewskiI2’.  Since he believes that ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ constitute different 
names (in the sense that they refer to different individuals), he explicitly means not to repeat 
‘PaderewskiI2’ when he repeats ‘PaderewskiI1’.  In other words, according to Kaplan, Peter 
cannot keep track of the identities (and non-identities) of his own words.   
This is a dangerous failure to make space for in any semantic theory.  The ability to repeat a 
public word, such as ‘lion’ is only meaningful, if the speaker knows how to keep her 
corresponding ‘lionI’-register separate from registers of other words (i.e. ‘anteater’).  We already 
know that she cannot do that in terms of similarity of content of the registers or else, for Putnam 
‘elmP’ and ‘beechP’ are both alternative spellings of one and the same word.  The alternative is to 
have the public concepts keep track of the mental registers for the speaker.  But then we are 
forced to ascribe contradictions to the speaker – even though he is assumed rational.  Shouldn’t a 
statement such as ‘Sarah is Sarah’ be known a priori by the speaker if she uses the same proper 
name (in the thick sense) twice to assert the identity statement?  In the case where there are 
identical twins both called ‘Sarah’ and the speaker mistakes them for one and the same person, 
she would fail to repeat proper names (since each of her assertions ‘Sarah’ picks out both girls).  
                                                
316 See chapter three for a more detailed discussion.   
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According to Kaplan the public repetition trees ‘Sarah1’ and ‘Sarah2’ would somehow keep track 
of the performances for the speaker, let’s call him ‘Joe’, such as to keep them separate.  But then 
which conceptions does he associate with what ‘Sarah1’ denotes and which ones does he attribute 
to what ‘Sarah2’ denotes?  Let’s say Sarah1 plays the piano and Sarah2 plays the guitar.  Imagine 
that at different occasions Joe asserts:  “Sarah plays the piano” and “Sarah plays the guitar.”  If 
the public repetition trees do the work of individuating Joe’s words, then he would not actually 
assert something false or at least confused (namely that “Sarah” plays both the piano and the 
guitar).  According to Kaplan, Joe would draw an invalid inference from the two utterances in 
questions, which leads him to infer the false conclusion that “Sarah” plays the piano and the 
guitar.  But this seems odd.  It isn’t as if Joe somehow doesn’t understand the logical structure of 
the two utterances – it is that the premises are false or confused to begin with! 
I think allowing an individual to fail in her intentions to repeat her own words, creates a 
theoretic “mess”.  Kaplan shouldn’t give precedence to inter-subjective word-individuation over 
intra-subjective word-individuation.  By introducing this possibility of doubt towards whether 
speakers are able to keep track of their own word-identities, he implodes his own proposal.  If 
individuals cannot keep track of their own words in problematic cases, why should they fare any 
better in the “normal” cases (where they do not confuse two words to be one, or one word to be 
two)?  The individual cannot distinguish the “normal” from the problematic cases from her own 
perspective!  It seems to me that Kaplan’s proposal actually relies on our ability to at the very 
least keep track of our own words.  Wasn’t this an unquestioned assumption we made all along?  
Since the supposed false individuation of words depends on factors that she is not aware of, she 
is incapable of correcting such “mistakes”.  In chapter one we observed that apart from the intra- 
and inter-subjective word-individuations we were left with nothing that could explain how the 
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various tokens are grouped into a word-type.  Inter-subjective word-individuations clearly pre-
suppose correct intra-subjective word-individuations.   
Some readers may wonder whether I simply have forgotten what camp I belong to.  As an 
anti-individualist it shouldn’t come as much of a surprise to me that words are partly 
individuated by external factors that the speaker may not be cognizant of.  But just consider how 
far this failure reaches.  We take it as a given that we can state truth-conditions for our own 
words, such as: 
 x satisfies ‘dog’ if and only if x is a dog.   
How can I be so certain that the word ‘dog’ used on the right hand side of the biconditional and 
the word ‘dog’ mentioned on the left hand side of the biconditional are instances of the same 
word?  The biconditional holds true if and only if the used and the mentioned word are 
performances of one and the same word (in the thick sense).  The speaker is supposed to know 
whether such biconditionals obtain, since she knows whether she is pulling the respective 
utterances from the same “black box”.  We are simply repeating the word mentioned on the left 
hand side of the biconditional at the appropriate place on the right hand side of the biconditional 
– but this time we use it.  If there are exceptions where the speaker fails in her attempt to so 
repeat her own word, or she unknowingly repeats the same word, then this very basic assumption 
suddenly crumbles.  Peter would wholeheartedly assert that: 
 If x is PaderewskiI1, then x does not satisfy ‘PaderewskiI2’ 
and  
 If x is PaderewskiI2, then x does not satisfy ‘PaderewskiI1’ 
If speakers cannot keep track of their own words in this manner, then in those cases they either 
don’t know what they are thinking, or there is a discrepancy between thought and statement (the 
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one the speaker believes to express the thought accurately).  Sure, we accept that individuals may 
sometimes struggle to express a rather complex belief, but ‘Paderewski has musical talent’ 
doesn’t strike me as complicated enough to warrant such confusion.   
Can we contain the above skepticism about whether speakers are reliably keeping track of 
their own words by arguing that this happens only when their word-individuations – such as 
‘PaderewskiI1’ is a different name than ‘PaderewskiI2’ – are at odds with the judgments of the 
linguistic community as a whole (since other competent speakers judge ‘PaderewskiP1’ and 
‘PaderewskiP2’ to constitute performances of the same name)?  It would be an external state of 
affairs (something outside of the speaker’s consciousness, but potentially accessible) that would 
distinguish permissible contradictions from unforgivable ones.   
Allowing for intra-subjective word-individuations to depend on factors external to the speaker 
implies that speakers are unable to keep track of their own words.  Such a solution to the puzzle 
would come at too high a price! 
5.3 Modes of presentation to the rescue? 
Most responses to the puzzle look towards modes of presentation to dissolve it.  A straight-
forward individualist approach is no solution:  not all elements of Peter’s modes of presentation 
related to ‘PaderweskiI1’, or ‘PaderewskiI2’ respectively, determine reference – unless we are 
willing to accept that those names do not refer at all, which is absurd (there is no person called 
‘Paderewski’ who is a famous statesman, but not also a pianist).   
Modes of presentation also play a role in the Neo Fregean response, the Hidden Indexical 
Theory, as well as the Guise Theory – to name the main ones.  The disagreement is at what level 
these modes of presentation come into effect.  Do they partly individuate propositions, like the 
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Neo-Fregeans would have it?317  Do they instead leave the content of assertions unaffected, such 
as to individuate the belief ascriptions as a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition 
and a mode of presentation?318  According to the guise theory modes of presentations don’t 
affect the semantic content of assertions or belief ascriptions, they merely play a role in how the 
propositions are believed.319  All these views have had to face ample criticisms, which I won’t 
address here.   
Whether we understand modes of presentation to amount to:  uniqueness properties, general 
properties, percept tokens, “stereotypes”, “characters”, public language expressions, mentalese 
expressions, functional roles or causal chains320 they individuate thoughts in a fine-grained 
manner such that the thoughts expressed by (viii) and (ix) are distinct.321  Suppose Peter 
entertains the following while thinking of Paderewski the pianist: 
 (a) Paderewski has red hair.  
He entertains this while thinking of Paderewski the politician: 
 (b) Paderewski has red hair.  
Introducing modes of presentation (at any level) allows us to say that Peter’s thoughts expressed 
by (a) and (b) are not the same thoughts (in content or at least in manner), which is key to the 
resolution of the puzzle.    
                                                
317 Forbes (1990); Forbes (2006).   
318 Prior to having rejected HIT in Schiffer (1987) he first discussed a version of it in Schiffer (1977).  See 
also Crimmins & Perry (1989); Crimmins (1992); Recanati (1993).    
319 Salmon (1986); Salmon (1989); Soames (1987);  Soames (1988); Soames (2002).   
320 Schiffer (1992):  p. 511. 
321 For the guise theory (17) and (18) would merely be distinct in manner – how this could have 
implications on the resulting schemata is not clear to me.  At best this would allow us to explain why the 
contradiction in (7) is hidden from the agent – but the contradiction doesn’t disappear.  Why a rational 
agent, who fully understands his own thoughts cannot “see” that (5) and (6) entail a contradiction remains 
puzzling.  Schiffer develops a similarly spirited criticism against the HIT.  Since there are no explicit 
examples of the three-place form of belief ascriptions, they are at best adverbial qualifiers, in which case 
the puzzle is not dissolved.  The claim that Ralph kissed Emily in the most exciting way, still presupposes 
that Ralph kissed Emily (Schiffer (1992):  p. 518).   
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Introducing modes of presentation at any level drives a wedge between the cognitive content 
of the belief the speaker seeks to convey and the semantic content of the utterance that she 
produces to do so – thereby threatening the successful communication of any belief, unless 
speaker and audience share the same modes of presentation with regard to a given topic.  
Taschek explains 
A general difficulty for any such approach arises from the fact that while the demand to do justice 
to our inrasubjective logical assessments tends, notoriously, to require that senses be individuated 
in quite fine-grained ways, the demand to do justice to our intersubjective logical assessments 
tends to preclude such fine-grained distinctions322. 
A solution to the puzzle must also be able to deal with the inverse of the Paderewski puzzle.323  I 
will argue that modes of presentation approaches are not equipped to do so.  I conclude that they 
therefore do not hit the heart of the problem that the Paderewski puzzle unveils.   
In the original version there is a public name ‘PaderewskiP’ that denotes one particular person.  
Peter has two homophonic and homographic names ‘PaderweskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’324 that are 
“linked” to the public name ‘Paderewski’.  ‘PaderweskiI1’ denotes a pianist, while ‘Paderewski2’ 
denotes a politician.  Unbeknownst to Peter the pianist and the politician are one and the same 
individual:  Ignacy Ian Paderewski.  
Consider the inverse puzzle:  Peter believes that there is one public name ‘PaderewskiI’ where 
in fact there are two distinct homonymous names ‘PaderewskiP3’ and ‘PaderewskiP4’ – such that 
non-vacuous occurrences of one name cannot be interchanged with occurrences of the other 
without affecting the truth-value of the sentence as a whole.  Suppose furthermore we live in the 
counterfactual world in which there is an Ignacy Paderewski (named ‘PaderewskiP3’) and a Jan 
Paderewski (named ‘PaderewskiP4’).  Ignacy is a famous pianist (and not a politician); Jan is a 
                                                
322 Taschek (1998):  footnote 11, p. 331. 
323 See also Fiengo and May (2006):  chapter 4. 
324 I am using subscripts to distinguish the two homophonic and homographic names.   
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famous Polish politician (and not a pianist).  The two men are identical twins and look exactly 
alike the actual Ignacy Jan Paderewski.  In the counterfactual world, Peter falsely comes to 
believe that the pianist named ‘PaderewskiP3’ is the same person as the politician known as 
‘PaderewskiP4’.  The resemblance of the two men on photographs has reinforced that belief.  
Usually people refer to the two men in question only by their respective last name.  Even if that 
wasn’t the case, Peter so firmly believes that Paderewski the politician and Paderewski the 
pianist are one and the same, he would conclude that the person referred to by ‘Paderewski’ is 
called ‘Ignacy Paderewski’ or ‘Jan Paderewski’ – depending on whether the speaker is using 
Paderewski’s first or middle name.  Peter can pick out the person known to others as 
‘PaderewskiP3’ from a crowd.  He can also recognize the person known to others as 
‘PaderewskiP4’ and distinguish him from (most) other men (not from his identical twin).  Peter 
will call both men ‘PaderewskiI’ and believe to have selected the same individual at both 
occasions.   
Peter is being told on separate occasions: 
(c) PaderewskiP3 has red hair. 
(d) PaderewskiP4 has red hair.   
(e) PaderewskiP3 has musical talent. 
(f) PaderewskiP4 has a talent for public speaking.   
Other speakers will usually discern from context whether Ignacy or Jan Paderewski was meant 
by either one of those utterances.  Thus, speakers who are aware of both individuals (and their 
shared generic name) will know to distinguish (c) from (d), or will at least be aware of the need 
for disambiguation.  Suppose Peter trusts the person who utters (c) – which belief will he form in 
response?  Peter would express it thus:   
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(g) PaderewskiI has red hair.   
That’s the key question:  is (c) equivalent to (g)?  There is no reason for not also viewing it 
equivalent to (d) since Peter doesn’t distinguish between ‘PaderewskiP3’ and ‘PaderewskiP4’.  
That is the problem:  (c) and (d) are not equivalent in what they express.  Most of us probably 
feel uneasy to call (g) true (let alone justified).  Something must have gone wrong during the 
process of testimony although Peter had all intentions to use the “word-form” ‘P-a-d-e-r-e-w-s-k-
i’ like other speakers in his linguistic community.   
If presented with (e) and (f) Peter will conclude: 
 (h) PaderewskiI has musical talent and a talent for public speaking.325   
From which it follows that 
(i) There is some person that has musical talent and a talent for public speaking. 
Although quite possibly true, (i) clearly doesn’t follow from (e) and (f), since ‘PaderewskiP3’ and 
‘PaderewskiP4’ do not denote the same individual.  It would be an illogical inference to draw.  
Just like in the original Paderewski puzzle we are unwilling to judge Peter irrational.  While 
Peter in the original example realizes too little – he ought to choose between his two 
observations (i) and (ii), Peter in the reverse case goes beyond the evidence expressed by (e) and 
(f) – he draws a conjunction he ought not to and infers too much.   
A possible objection to my demand that the inverted puzzle should be given equal 
consideration as the original puzzle may go as follows:  Although Peter is assumed rational in 
both, he doesn’t even appear to be using the public names ‘PaderewskiP3’ or ‘PaderewskiP4’ in 
the inverse case.  In the original thought example we successfully communicate with Peter using 
                                                
325 Depending on what characteristics are true of the two men in question, Peter may be puzzled about 
testimonies that seem contradictory to him.  For instance, he may (truthfully) be told that Paderewski3 
likes to eat green peas while at a different occasion he is being told (truthfully) that Paderewski4 does not 
like to eat green peas.   
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the public name ‘PaderewskiP’, which is what leads us to believe that Peter is competent in the 
use of that name.  The same cannot be said for the reverse case.  The reference of Peter’s name 
‘PaderewskiI’ is neither equivalent to that of ‘PaderewskiP3’ nor ‘PaderewskiP4’.  We should not 
assume communicative success when his community talks to him about Ignacy or Ian with the 
names ‘PaderewskiP3’ and ‘PaderewskiP4’ respectively – since Peter’s name ‘PaderewskiI’ 
doesn’t distinguish between those individuals.  I disagree with this analysis.  Peter acquires 
information imparted through the name ‘PaderewskiP3’ from (c).  While a competent speaker will 
be able to discern whether (c) concerns Ian Paderewski or Ignacy Paderewski – or will at least 
know that it could apply to either one of them – Peter will conclude that it is true of both of them 
(while lacking the awareness that there are two distinct individuals possibly being spoken of).   
Somebody whose cognitive system is not at all “linked” to the public names ‘PaderewskiP3’ 
and ‘PaderewskiP4’ will merely conclude that somebody called ‘Paderewski’ has red hair – 
information of much inferior epistemic value.  Suppose there are thousands of individuals whose 
names are spelled ‘P-a-d-e-r-e-w-s-k-i’, then Peter, in contrast, at least narrows the subject of the 
statement down to two individuals (although he believes he has narrowed it down to one).  We 
wouldn’t want to say that the person who hears “Paderewski has red hair” but doesn’t know 
whether the speaker was talking about Ignacy, didn’t learn anything beyond ‘somebody called 
‘Paderewski’ has red hair’.  Information about Ian or Ignacy was conveyed via the name 
‘PaderewskiP3’.  The speaker who doesn’t know how to disambiguate the utterance still 
epistemically fares better than Peter, since at least he is aware of the need for disambiguation.  I 
conclude that communication is successful – albeit not fully successful – in the original, as well 
as the reverse case and must be explained.  Peter’s familiarity with the “name-form” alone will 
not account for the communicative success.  Recall that it was part of the description of this case 
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that if Peter were asked “who is Paderewski, the famous politician?” – while pointing at a crowd, 
Peter would correctly point out the right individual.   
Introducing modes of presentation to explain why (c) and (d) as entertained by Peter express 
one and the same proposition requires that modes of presentation don’t only allow the relevant 
individuations to be more fine-grained but also more coarse.  This could go roughly like this:  
since Peter doesn’t associate326 distinct modes of presentations with (c) and (d) respectively, they 
express the same proposition out of his mouth.  It must be pointed out that we would generally 
refrain from allowing modes of presentations to play such a role.  Consider: 
 (j) Elms are beautiful trees.  
 (k) Beeches are beautiful trees.   
Putnam is on record for confessing that he associates the same “modes of presentation” with the 
words ‘elm’ and ‘beech’.327  Are we willing to accept that Putnam’s utterances of (j) and (k) 
express the same assertion?  I think not.  Let’s not overlook how Putnam’s observation is backed 
by a strong belief that whatever kind of tree ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ pick out, they denote different 
trees.  He believes that (j) and (k) do not make the same claim, although he is unable to specify 
the difference between elms and beeches.  Putnam accounts for the distinction between (j) and 
(k) with the division of linguistic labor, which allows individual speakers to defer to the relevant 
experts to enrich their individual conceptions.328  I do not doubt that we intricately rely on more 
informed speakers (perhaps even in the way just described), but let’s also not overlook that our 
                                                
326 How modes of presentation are associated with or related to propositions will turn out to be different 
depending on the particular theory endorsed.   
327 Putnam (1975, 1975):  pp. 226-227. 
328 The expert conceptions (proposals for how to pick out the objects in question) are not entirely fixing 
the extension of the relevant terms, since even experts can be wrong about the nature of the subject under 
discussion.   
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deferring to other speakers may be hindered in the given case, if Putnam were to think that ‘elm’ 
and ‘beech’ behave like ‘hedgehog’ and ‘urchin’.329   
Solutions to the puzzle that rely on modes of presentation don’t have the resources to 
distinguish Peter’s situation in the inverse Paderewski puzzle from Putnam’s elm-beech thought 
example.  I conclude that those approaches therefore are not providing us with the appropriate 
solution to the puzzle.   
5.4 Assignments to the rescue? 
According to Fiengo and May, the name-type ‘Paderewski’ is a lexical item, but doesn’t refer, 
since it can name any number of things.330  Their notion of names is better identified with what 
Kaplan calls ‘generic names’ or what I refer to as ‘name forms’.  They argue that only 
expression-types in which names occur refer.  Expressions are “employed lexical items […that 
occur] as constituents of sentence types”. 331  Numerical subscripts distinguish among distinct 
expression types (such as ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’).   
At the heart of Fiengo and May’s account lies the idea  
that having distinct conceptions does not imply that distinct things are being conceptualized.  
Someone may think of Paderewski in this way or that, but from this nothing follows whether he is 
thinking of one person or two.332 
This is explained by reference to assignments.  De dicto use of assertions contain assignments in 
addition to propositions.  “Assignments are relations between syntactic expressions and values 
                                                
329 ‘Hedgehog’ and ‘urchin’ are co-referential.   
330 Fiengo and May (2006): pp.146-147.   
331 Ibid. p.146.   
332 Fiengo and May (2006):  p. 143. 
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[…]”.333  For example, “John believes [[Aristotle1 was the teacher of Alexander the great] and 
[“Aristotle1” has the value Aristotle1]].334 
Fiengo and May distinguish between Aristotle, the philosopher, and Aristotle, the shipping 
magnate through different indices. 
[T]he natural syntactic interpretation of indices is that coindexed expression-tokens (in a 
discourse) are occurrences of the same expression-type, but that noncoindexed expression-tokens 
are not.  So occurrences of “[1Aristotle]” and “[2Aristotle]” are occurrences of distinct expression-
types, for each of which there is a distinct Assignment;335 
In this case the individual employs different expression-types containing the same name and 
these expressions denote different objects.  Perception and reality coincide:  there are two people 
named ‘Aristotle’ and the individual thinks of them as distinct individuals.   
Fiengo and May adhere to a principle called ‘Singularity’, which states that a speaker S can 
have two expression types e1 and e2 that contain the same name, if and only if S believes that e1 
and e2 do not corefer.336, 337   
Peter’s naming practices adhere to the Singularity Principle:  He employs two distinct 
‘Paderewski’ expression types: ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’ that happen to corefer, even 
though Peter believes them not to.  When Peter informs us:  “Paderewski has musical talent” and 
                                                
333 Ibid. p.14. 
334 Ostertag raises concerns as to how to negate de dicto beliefs of the conjunctive form Fiengo and May 
put forth.  Suppose person S believes [P & A], where A is an assignment.  A denial of such a report 
should simply consist in a denial of belief in P & A.  “But whereas one can use a negative de dicto belief 
report to deny belief in P, one cannot use a negative belief report to deny belief in A (to do this is 
incompatible with the report’s being de dicto”.  Ostertag concludes that the conjunctive analysis is 
incorrect; assignments are not part of what is being asserted (Ostertag (2007)).   
335 Fiengo and May (2006):  p. 17. 
336 Ibid. pp. 70-75, p. 147. 
337 According to Fiengo and May, what they call ‘names’ do not refer.  Their terminology ‘name’ is better 
understood to stand for what Kaplan calls ‘generic names’, which allows us to say such things as:  “many 
people share the name ‘David’”.  I am interested in when speakers share the same name and how this 
facilitates their communication about the same topic.  It thus seems that neither, what Fiengo and May 
call ‘expressions’ nor what they call ‘names’ is well suited to find answers to my questions.  The former 
are too fine-grained and the latter don’t refer.  If the speaker believes that the name ‘Paderewski’ has 
different assignments, then she believes that ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’ behave like ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’, and she (falsely) believes that ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’ do not co-refer.   
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tells us at a different occasion “Paderewski has no musical talent”, then the de dicto content of 
those beliefs expressed is the following: 
(1) [Paderewski1 has musical talent] and [“Paderewski1” has the value Paderewski1]. 
(2) [Paderewski2 has no musical talent] and [“Paderewski2” has the value Paderewski2]. 
We ascribe to Peter the following beliefs: 
(3) Peter believes [[Paderewski1 has musical talent] and [“Paderewski1” has the value 
Paderewski1]]. 
(4) Peter doesn’t believe [[Paderewski2 has musical talent] and [“Paderewski2” has the value 
Paderewski2]]. 
Due to distinct assignments, Peter thus doesn’t contradict himself with (1) and (2), nor do we 
ascribe to Peter contradictory beliefs.   
Ostertag Points out that (3) and (4) contradict Fiengo and May’s principle of Singularity. As 
the enlightened speakers we cannot employ different assignments for the expressions that denote 
Paderewski the pianist and Paderewski the politician – precisely because we believe them to be 
one and the same.338  Fiengo and May are fully aware of this problem.  They write: 
Consider, in the context of Singularity, a sincere utterance of “Paderewski1 is Paderewski2.”  The 
immediate conclusion we come to is that no speaker is in a position to assert this consistently 
with his beliefs.339 
Rather the attribution [of assignments] is to the second party—that is, normally to the addressee.  
It is as if the speaker, in uttering “Paderewski is Paderewski” de dicto says in effect to the hearer, 
your “Paderewski”-expressions corefer, and this can be asserted consistently with the speaker’s 
beliefs about how many people are named “Paderewski”.340 
                                                
338 Ostertag (2007).   
339 Fiengo & May (2006):  p. 148. 
340 Ibid.:  pp.152-153.   
  
 
 
 161 
It is ad hoc to suppose that enlightened speakers simply mimic Peter’s state of mind in their 
belief ascriptions.  Ostertag asserts that it is equally ad hoc to suppose that in an enlightened 
context we mimic Peter’s assignments to reflect his usage of the name ‘Paderewski’.341   
What Fiengo and May’s account explains well is Peter’s motivation to merge his assignments 
into one.  Once Peter believes that there is only one Paderewski and that he mistakenly thought 
there were distinct men bearing that name, he must, in order to conform to Singularity, 
give up [the belief] that there are two distinct “Paderewski”-expression types, and replace it with 
the belief that there is just one.342, 343 
What remains unclear to me is why Peter must adopt the informant’s expression ‘Paderewski’, or 
that of his linguistic community (from the perspective of Fiengo and May’s account).  Peter 
clearly shares the name (form) ‘Paderewski’ with his linguistic community – but that name 
(form) can denote a variety of individuals.  What remains unexplained is that he shares with his 
community and interlocutor the same expression ‘Paderewski’ – the one denoting Paderewski the 
Polish statesman and pianist.  Coreference cannot be sufficient for sharing the same expression, 
or else ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’ would be tokens of one and the same expression.  So, 
given that Peter doesn’t use the same expression as his informant, how is he able to understand 
her utterance: “Paderewski is Paderewski”?  Supposedly, the informant mimics Peter’s 
expressions ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’.  Through the Gricean maxim of relevance,344 Peter 
knows that what the speaker means to say is that Paderewski1 is Paderewski2.  Even though Peter 
                                                
341 Ostertag (2007). 
342 Fiengo & May (2006):  p.154.   
343 In my eyes, Fiengo and May don’t sufficiently recognize that such a change in a person’s conceptual 
apparatus is going to be a gradual process.   
344 Grice (1989):  p. 27. 
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and the informant’s expressions in question share the same name (form) and are coreferential it 
is unclear why the informant is in a position to mimic Peter’s expressions.345   
Furthermore, why is Peter committed to adopt the informant’s expression ‘Paderewski’ upon 
hearing the identity statements?346  Fiengo and May want to argue that when Peter utters:  
(5) Paderewski has red hair. 
and we compare this with the following utterance of an enlightened speaker  
(6) Paderewski has red hair. 
then the non-de dicto content of (5) and (6) are identical.  It is merely the de dicto contents of (5) 
and (6) that diverge. 
(5') [Paderewski1 has red hair] and [“Paderewski1” has the value Paderewski1].   
(6') [Paderewski has red hair] and [“Paderewski” has the value Paderewski]. 
So far, so good!  But what do Peter and the enlightened speaker share in virtue of which (5) and 
(6) have the same content?  Again, it cannot be the name (form) – since name (forms) don’t 
refer.   
Suppose someone utters “Aristotle is a man” with Aristotle the philosopher in mind:  
(7) Aristotle is a man.  
The same person then utters in a different context “Aristotle is a man” with Aristotle the shipping 
magnate in mind.   
(8) Aristotle is a man.  
Clearly, (7) and (8) do not state the same de dicto or non-de dicto. 
(7')  [Aristotle1 is Athenian] and [“Aristotle1” has the value Aristotle1].   
(8')  [Aristotle2 is Athenian] and [“Aristotle2” has the value Aristotle2]. 
                                                
345 In my own account I will attempt to bridge that gap.  It is admittedly a tricky problem!   
346 I will also attempt to explain this commitment in my own account.     
  
 
 
 163 
But how can we show this, if the assignments only enter into the de dicto content?   
It seems to me that the non-de dicto content of the utterances must be the following: 
(7'') Aristotle1 is a man.  
(8'') Aristotle2 is a man.  
What do the subscripts designate? “They do not, on our view, use one tool “[Aristotle]” on some 
occasions to refer to the philosopher and on others to the shipping magnate.”347  But which are 
the different tools that they are using?  Are they using distinct expression types or name types?  
It seems that neither fits the bill.  Certainly not different name (forms); but do they symbolize 
different expression types?  If so, then Peter’s belief non-de dicto is also different from the 
enlightened speaker, since Peter is using different expression types than his informant.  Let’s 
designate the enlightened speaker’s expression with subscript ‘E’: 
(5'') Paderewski1 has red hair. 
(6'') PaderewskiE has red hair.   
Some third entity is needed that Peter and the enlightened speaker can share – in (5) and (6) – in 
virtue of which their expressions contain the same name (form) ‘Paderewski’ and in virtue of 
which their expressions are coreferential.  This entity is not contained in ‘Aristotle1’ and 
‘Aristotle2’.  What Fiengo and May seem to be saying is that understood non de dicto, Peter and 
the enlightened speaker’s expressions ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘PaderewskiE’ constitute performances 
of the same expression types because they corefer and contain the same name (form) – whereas 
this cannot be said of ‘Aristotle1’ and ‘Aristotle2’ (they fail to corefer).  In contrast, in the de 
dicto “mode” the two expressions ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘PaderewskiE’ do not constitute 
                                                
347 Fiengo & May (2006):  p. 17.   
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performances of the same expression type.  I struggle to make sense of expressions being 
identical under one mode, but not under another.   
In the previous section I criticized solutions to the Paderewski puzzle that employ modes 
of presentation because they cannot handle the inverse puzzle.  Fiengo and May recognize the 
need to deal with the flip-side of the Paderewski puzzle and offer the following solution: 
The hearer believes there is only one person named “Paderewski,” so the only relevant identity 
statement he would hold to be true would be “Paderewski1 is Paderewski1,” a sentence of the 
form ⎡α = α⎤.  But then the initial reaction of the hearer to the speaker’s utterance of “Paderewski 
isn’t Paderewski” is that it is the negation of this, that the speaker had uttered a logical falsehood.  
[…The hearer] could recognize that it is possible that the speaker’s intention was to utter a 
sentence of a different form, namely, “Paderewski1 isn’t Paderewksi2”.348 
Again, the informativeness of the identity statements or negated identity statement is explicated 
in terms of a mimicking of one’s interlocutor’s assignments in conjunction with the Gricean 
conversational maxim of relevance.349  Again, I am not sure whether their solution to the inverse 
scenario can explain why Peter is committed to adopting the informant’s epistemically superior 
assignments, given that now their expressions don’t corefer.    
Fiengo and May’s proposal is a novel approach to the Paderewski puzzle.  In my eyes what 
they get right is that we have to take seriously Peter’s de lingua beliefs, that is, how he keeps 
track of his own words (i.e. ‘Paderewski’) over time and across contexts.  In the following 
section I will propose a solution where Peter’s expressions flat out constitute different 
performances of the name form ‘Paderewsi’ than those performances of the enlightened 
speakers.   
 
                                                
348 Fiengo & May (2006):  p.155.   
349 Grice (1989):  p. 27. 
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5.5 Registers to the rescue! 
I agree with Fiengo and May that the distinct ways that Peter employs to think about 
Paderewski are part of what he asserts in (i) and (ii).  In my account there are no assignments or 
modes of presentation that are added to the content of what Peter asserts.  The difference in how 
Peter conceptualizes Paderewski, the pianist, and Paderewski, the politician, is reflected in the 
comparative content of Peter’s names ‘PaderewkiI1’ and ‘PaderewkiI2’ respectively.  I ascribe the 
speaker the kind of linguistic control that renders Peter’s beliefs fine-grained in such a manner 
that allows us to distinguish beliefs attributed to Paderewski under the guise “politician” from 
those attributed to him under the guise “pianist”.  Modes of presentation accounts fail to contain 
the multiplicity of beliefs that result from different conceptions associated with an individual or 
group of things – thereby threatening successful inter-subjective communication in general.  My 
own account sets limits to the fine-grainedness of beliefs across speakers.  Words are not 
individuated in terms of the content of the corresponding registers that contain the relevant 
individual conceptions.  Unless the speaker falsely believes one public word to be two, or two 
public words to be one, the content of the register is determined by what the public word 
expresses.350, 351  Finally, my own account is designed to deal with the original, as well as the 
inverse puzzle.   
In context A, Peter is exposed to ‘PaderewskiP1’, which he intends to repeat and produces 
‘PaderewskiI1’.  In context B, Peter is exposed to ‘PaderewskiP2’, which he also intends to repeat 
and produces ‘PaderewskiI2’.  The two performances ‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ are 
instances of one and the same name (in the thick sense), that is, competent speakers will 
                                                
350 Assuming the speaker doesn’t opt out of the respective public language practice.   
351 The content of a register not linked to a public repetition tree is simply what the idiolectal word 
expresses (of a matured register).   
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recognize them as performances of the same name.  Peter, on the other hand, will judge his own 
performances ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ to not constitute repetitions of one another.    
I will argue that the individual correctly judges her own words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and 
‘PaderewskiI2’ to represent different words.  Peter split one public name into two separate mental 
registers.  This constitutes a failure to repeat the public word ‘PaderewskiP1’ when he utters: 
‘PaderewskiI1’.  Nevertheless, both registers are linked to one and the same public word 
‘PaderewskiP’ (of which ‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ are instances).  This link is not 
merely assumed in principle, but can be tested:  if Peter finds out that there is only one 
Paderewski and that ‘PaderewskiP1’ and ‘PaderewskiP2’ denote that Paderewski – will he as a 
result of that information merge his registers ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ into one?  If so, 
then Peter’s words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ were all along both linked to ‘PaderewskiP’ 
– without his having been adequately competent in ‘PaderewskiP’ (since competence is 
incompatible with his labelling distinct registers ‘PaderewskiP’).   
Let’s indulge in drawing a metaphoric picture to make this distinction more palatable.  
Imagine that we have mental registers for proper names and kind terms.352  So, everything a 
person knows about arthritis goes into the arthritis-register.  If a person were to at one point 
believe that arthritis can afflict body-parts other than the joints and then learn that this is not so, 
she will do a little “house-cleaning” and dispose of or adjust the related beliefs.  We can also add 
beliefs to a register thereby leading to a more complete conception regarding a given topic.  The 
individuation of registers is not determined by the particular attitudes or dispositions that the 
speaker associates with it (at any given time).  What makes a register persist throughout the 
changes in conceptions such as to allow for it to pertain to the same topic?  The topic of each 
                                                
352 The register analogy is a popular one that has been used by several proponents in varying ways.  To 
name a few:  Bach (1987); Evans (1973);  Evans (1982); Forbes (1989);  Schroeter (2008). 
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register is anti-individualistically individuated – given that the speaker intends to participate in 
the relevant public practice.  It is not up to the arthritis patient to define what the ‘arthritis’ label 
of her respective register is about – external conditions, such as social and physical 
environmental factors will individuate that register (in part).  The existence of mental registers is 
compatible with anti-individualism.  At the same time the content of each register presents itself 
to the agents as pertaining to the same topic, while the content of distinct registers each present 
themselves as pertaining to different topics. 
Peter’s registers are all-along connected to the public name ‘Paderewski’.  Peter intends to 
successfully communicate with his environment and is thereby committed to merge his two 
separate Paderewski registers – when faced with the appropriate evidence (stemming from a 
source Peter trusts).  He has (unknowingly) adopted a split public concept.  When we say:  “Peter 
believes that Paderewski has red hair”, we speak truly (in a sense), since Peter believes of 
Paderewski that he has red hair.  The distortion of our translation is rendered plain when we have 
to say things such as:  “Peter believes that Paderewski is not Paderewski.”  We can only do full 
justice to Peter’s belief thus:  Peter has a split Paderewski-concept that divides into Paderewski 
under the guise of pianist and into Paderewski under the guise of politician.353  He believes that 
Paderewski under the guise of pianist [split concept 1] is not Paderewski under the guise of 
politician [split concept 2]”.   
Can a word w be linked to a public repetition tree without w constituting a repetition of the 
corresponding public word?  Remember how I argued in chapter four that somebody who does 
not yet know anything about lions may utter “lion” in a question such as “what is a lion?” 
without thereby yet being competent in the use of the public word ‘lion’.  In that case the quasi-
                                                
353 I am borrowing terminology from Soames and Salmon here, but my proposal is significantly different 
from theirs.   
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word ‘lion’ is linked to the public word ‘lion’ without it constituting a performance of that public 
word (yet) – provided that she uses future repetitions of that word to denote lions (and only 
lions).354 
The realization that ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ ought to be merged represents a 
substantial change in the structure of the cognitive apparatus and will affect his inferential 
behavior.  
Am I not facing the same problem as Fiengo and May?  How can Peter understand the identity 
statement “Paderewski is Paderewski” uttered by an enlightened speaker – if Peter and the 
enlightened speaker do not share the same word ‘Paderewski’?  Fiengo and May argued that the 
informant mimics Peter’s assignments.  Ostertag accused their solution of being ad hoc.  Does 
my account fare any better?  I claim both of Peter’s words ‘PaderewkiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ to be 
linked to the public repetition tree ‘PaderewskiP’.  Peter is thus already committed to merge his 
split registers into one pubic ‘PaderewskiP’ register – if presented with the appropriate evidence 
(i.e. he could follow Paderewski, the politician around and come to realize that he is in fact 
Paderewski the pianist355).  Can Peter understand the testimony:  “Paderewski is Paderewski”?  
The informant tells Peter that PaderewskiP is PaderewskiP.  In order for this identity statement to 
be informative it must have an effect on how Peter organizes his registers.  That is, Peter must 
“take it in” as ‘PaderewskiI1 is PaderewskiI2’.  But for Peter to understand the testimony, it 
would seem that he must share the word ‘PaderewskiP’ which would render the identity 
statement trivial.   
                                                
354 Recall Mr. Anchovy whom I introduce in chapter four.  He goes on to use ‘lionA’ to denote anteaters; 
his word is not linked to the public repetition tree ‘lionP’.  
355 Unfortunately this is no longer possible, since Paderewski is long dead.   
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Are there other examples of words that share the same denotation, but for one reason or other, 
need to be treated (in schemata) as distinct words?  Do we communicate successfully when these 
distinct but co-referential terms are used in conversations? 
Words and their pejorative counterparts come to mind such as:  ‘woman’ and ‘broad’, 
‘homosexual’ and ‘fag’, ‘obese’ and ‘fat’, ‘German’ and ‘Kraut’…  Clearly, there is a big 
difference between somebody calling me ‘Kraut’ versus ‘German’.  It gets a little more 
complicated if we imagine a person who severely dislikes Germans uttering:  ‘Nathalie is 
German’.  This person may have shied away form the explicit insult and opted for the implicit 
one.  On the other hand, a close friend may say jokingly:  ‘Nathalie is a Kraut’ – using the 
relevant term in an ironic and figurative manner and drawing attention to the fact that I like 
sausages and Sauerkraut without intending to insult me.  Such use would be comparable to 
feminists referring to themselves as ‘bitches’.  Perhaps several years down the line, this new use 
of ‘bitch’ becomes well engrained in ordinary practice and will enter the English lexicon as a 
new literal use for the word-form ‘b-i-t-c-h’ – as happened with the word-forms ‘l-i-v-i-d’ and 
‘g-a-y’.  For the time being, however, ‘bitch’ is literally insulting. 
I don’t want to argue that it is some kind of conceptual overlap between the ‘PaderewskiI1’ (or 
‘PaderewskiI2’) register and the informant’s ‘PaderewkiP’ register that allows Peter to understand 
the identity she attempts to convey, since this would make it impossible for me to solve the 
inverse puzzle using the same explanation.  So, I am not sure whether pejorative terms are of any 
help here.   
Peter could understand the identity statement to express that  
i)  PaderewskiI1 is PaderewskiI1. 
ii)  PaderewskiI2 is PaderewskiI2. 
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iii) PaderewskiI1 is PaderewskiI2. 
Only iii) renders the identity statement informative to Peter.  According to the Gricean maxim of 
relevance this is how Peter ought to interpret the utterance.  According to my own proposal, 
Peter is not able to fully understand the informant’s utterance, since (at the time) they don’t share 
the same words.  ‘PaderewskiI1’ is a distinct word (in the thick sense) from ‘PaderewskiP’.  The 
obvious alternatives that the “message” can be gotten across on the basis of an overlap of 
conceptions or merely by a shared word-form – I already rejected.  Nevertheless, once Peter 
realizes that ‘PaderewskiP’ denotes the same person as both of his words ‘PaderewskiI1’ and 
‘PaderewskiI2’ and he trusts the informant, he will merge his two registers into one.  For the 
purpose of logical consistency, it is advisable to do so, independently of public usage.  Once 
Peter merges those two registers, the new resulting register will then be individuated in terms of 
the public repetition tree ‘PaderewskiP’.  Part of the motivation for this merger is that this is 
Peter’s way of fixing his failed repetition attempts of ‘PaderewskiP’.  Of course, he won’t think in 
terms of registers clashing with public usage – but one ought not be using two distinct idiolectal 
words, to correspond to one public word.   
Peter must retire his registers ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ – from his new semantic 
point of view they are confused and thus of no more use.  As a result, Peter cannot reflect on his 
previous belief that “PaderewskiI1 is not PaderewskiI2” and state it to be false, since he can no 
longer use those words.  According to my account, the change in belief is one in structure, not 
(merely) content.   
Even though a transfer of knowledge is not possible until Peter merges the registers in 
question and thereby “unlocks” previously held beliefs about Paderewski as knowledge.  Prior to 
this merging procedure, when Peter hears from another speaker: “Paderewski has red hair” I am 
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forced to argue that Peter doesn’t acquire knowledge from that testimony, since he cannot 
understand the word ‘PaderewskiP’ contained in the utterance.  I want to argue that the semantic 
link between ‘PaderewskiP’ and ‘PaderewskiI1’ allows for Peter to acquire some information – 
conditional knowledge, that is.  If Peter follows through on his commitment to use his words 
‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ effectively when talking to other speakers (of his linguistic 
community), then if he is presented with evidence that his registers conflict with how the word 
he intends to repeat ‘PaderewskiP’ is used by the competent speakers, he will make the necessary 
changes to live up to the responsibilities as a language consumer.   
In the inverted case, Peter has one register where he ought to have two.  We should thus 
ascribe to Peter an amalgamated public concept corresponding to the two names ‘PaderwskiP3’ 
and ‘PaderewskiP4’.  His thoughts are somewhat challenging to make sense of.  When Peter splits 
his one PaderewskiI-register into register:  PaderewskiP3 and register:  PaderrewskiP4, he won’t 
know which beliefs apply to Ian and which ones apply to Ignacy – or to both of them.   
Peter’s belief of “Paderewski has red hair” will have to be translated as:  “Peter believes of 
Paderewski, the musician, and Paderewski, the politician, that they as one unit have red hair.”  If 
we were to opt for the simpler claim:  “Peter believes that Paderewski, the musician, and 
Paderewski, the politician, both have red hair” – we thereby ascribe to him the belief that there 
are two such individuals (a belief he lacks).356  Regardless of the complexity of our translation 
manual, there is a clear link from Peter’s ‘PaderewskiI’ to the public concepts, which in principle 
allow us to express Peter’s beliefs.     
 
                                                
356 For the same reason we cannot simply claim that his name ‘PaderewskiI’ is ambiguous.  If a speaker is 
competent in the use of an ambiguous word-form, he knows that the various instances can apply to 
different reference groups or individuals.  Peter is altogether unaware of the need for disambiguation. 
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Admittedly, the original and the reverse case are different:  nothing speaks against having two 
names for one and the same person – as long as one remembers that whatever one predicates of 
the one name, one must predicate of the other (which Peter fails to do).  However, one ought not 
have a single proper name for two distinct individuals to begin with.   
I have shown how a register analogy can be compatible with anti-individualism.  In both 
puzzles, the original and the inverse, it is not up to Peter what changes to implement in his 
conceptual apparatus.  Once faced with reliable information challenging his confused register 
system pertaining to Paderewski or “the Paderewskis” he must  
- in the original example:  merge his ‘PaderewskiI1’-register with his 
‘PaderewskiI2’-register. 
- in the inverse case:  split his one ‘Paderewski’-register into two separate registers.   
If not, he opts out of successfully communicating with others via the word that the utterance 
“Paderewski” stands for.  It is the link between Peter’s and the public registers that allows us to 
convey to Peter in the actual world:  “Paderewski, the pianist, is Paderewski, the politician” 357 
and to Peter in the counterfactual world:  “PaderewskiP3, the pianist, is not PaderewskiP4, the 
politician.” 
The register analogy is a useful tool in explaining why some identity statements seem trivial 
to us, such as “Hesperus is Hesperus”, while others have informational content such as 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus”.  All the content within a register represents itself to us as “blatantly”, 
that is, without reflection, about one and the same topic.  In the long run we should structure our 
representative system such that co-referential terms become alternative labels for one and the 
                                                
357 Due to the Gricean maxim of relevance telling Peter:  “Paderewski is Paderewski” is probably 
sufficient to convey the identity we intend to.  Peter will assume that we didn’t mean to inform him of 
something trivial such as:  ‘Paderewski1 is Paderewski1’ or ‘Paderewski2 is Paderewski2’. 
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same register.  We then wouldn’t even have to reflect on transferring beliefs from the Hesperus 
to the Phosphorus register, as well as the Venus register.  It all depends on how well-engrained 
the identity between Venus, Phosphorus and Hesperus is within an individual’s cognitive system 
to lead to unified record-keeping.  Depending on how long we were engaged in Venus 
discussions and Hesperus conversations, prior to discovering the related identity, we may keep 
two registers:  one for Venus and one for Hesperus.  As a result, considerations such as ‘if Venus 
is a planet, then Hesperus must be a planet also’ may take some reflective effort.  Whereas ‘if 
Venus is a planet, then Venus is a planet’ is implicit in our record keeping.  Given that 
representative systems may vary across individuals, identities that are trivial to some may be 
informative to others.   
If we were to communicate to Peter:  “Paderewski, the pianist is the same individual as 
Paderewski, the politician” – it is correct that this utterance is just as trivial and uninformative to 
us as “Hesperus is Hesperus”.  Assuming that we are enlightened and know that Paderewski, the 
pianist is the same person as Paderewski the politician, we only have one Paderewski register 
and only one name associated with that register.  To Peter, however, this statement is 
informative.  It tells him that his two Paderewski-registers have the same topic – they “pick out” 
the same person.  If he wants to effectively communicate with us he should eventually “melt” the 
two distinct Paderewski registers into one.  As a result, all the modes of presentation associated 
with ‘PaderewskiI1’ ought to transfer to ‘PaderewskiI2’ and vice versa.  In the end having two 
distinct but homophonic and homographic names ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’ for one and 
the same individual will become redundant and only one public name will remain – thereby 
rendering the statement ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ also uninformative to Peter.  Once Peter 
realizes that PaderewskiI1 is the same individual as PaderewskiI2 there is no more reason to keep 
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the two registers separate – without the registers there is no more reason for the distinct names, 
which in turn necessitates one and the same sign for ‘Paderewski’ in the formalization of his 
inferences.  I thus view Fiengo and May’s principle of Singularity as appropriate.  I furthermore 
agree with Fiengo and May’s bald bi-conditional: 
We will find that the beliefs of individuals will be critical in the statement of those identity 
conditions on words: two occurrences of words are occurrences of the same word for an 
individual if and only if that individual believes they are the same.358   
In other words, individuals cannot be wrong about the individuation of their own words – even 
though they may be mistaken about the individuation of pubic words.   
Imagine you have been reading some impressive papers by a philosopher named ‘Sarah 
Connor’.  Over the past year, her publications ceased and another author captures your attention:  
Sarah Jameson.  One day you mention to a colleague that the most promising work you have 
been reading in your field lately was published by two women:  Sarah Connor and Sarah 
Jameson.  Your friend then informs you that Sarah Connor has recently gotten married and 
changed her name to ‘Sarah Jameson’.  Knowing that those two names belong to one and the 
same person should have you ascribe whatever you believed of Sarah Connor to Sarah Jameson 
and vice versa (resolving all conflicting beliefs) and thereby rendering the identity statement 
uninformative to you over time.  It takes a while for these identities to become automatic 
assumptions within your cognitive apparatus, because, until they are engrained in our cognitive 
apparatus, such changes take some reflective effort. 
Identity statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ – involving distinct public names – may 
in some circumstances be uninformative to a person.  I have in mind cases where one name is 
introduced in terms of the other.  Suppose Peter knows that Hesperus is the bright celestial object 
visible in the evening sky.  He is introduced to the name ‘Phosphorus’ thus:  “Hesperus is 
                                                
358 Fiengo & May (2006):  p. 53. 
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Phosphorus.”  It seems to me that Peter would simply add the newly acquired name ‘Phosphorus’ 
as an alternative label to his Hesperus register, since he doesn’t really know anything else about 
Phosphorus.  A third person then (not having heard the first identity statement) says:  “Hesperus 
is Phosphorus.”  This last statement should have no informational content for Peter (unless he 
didn’t trust the first source on the matter).  He lacks the resources to pick out the referent of 
‘Philosophorus’ independently of his conceptions regarding the referent of ‘Hesperus’.   
In most cases, if names are distinct in form such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ we will 
acquire information about what they denote independently (regardless of their co-reference).  
This probably explains why we have distinct registers for ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ even 
when we know that they co-refer.  For some it may require reflection to see that they are 
identical – which then explains why usually ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ does not have the same 
cognitive significance as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’.359   
The distinction between informative and uninformative identity statements can be made 
without mention of modes of presentation.  I do, however, admit of a correlation between 
registers and modes of presentation.  If a person associates distinct modes of presentation with 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ this indicates distinct registers for those words – thereby rendering 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ informative.  As discussed earlier, distinct registers or names don’t 
necessitate distinct modes of presentation (recall Putnam’s reflections on ‘elm’ and ‘beech’).  
                                                
359 The register analogy allows us to account for why for some individuals identity statements such as 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ have the same cognitive significance as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’.  This happens 
when ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are simply alternative labels for the same register.  My account also 
allows for gradations in informativeness.  Identity statements are more ore less informative, depending on 
the strength of cognitive links between the two registers in question (i.e. the Hesperus-register and the 
Phosphorus-register).  Fiengo and May’s account does not allow for such gradations and I don’t see how 
they could explain why for some speaker’s identity statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ are 
trivial.  ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are expressions that contain different expression-forms (I would say 
name-forms) and will thus by default lead to different Assignments – thereby rendering the identity 
statement informative (Fiengo & May (2006):  chapter 3).  
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The correct belief that ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ denote different kinds in the public language may 
suffice to keep the respective registers separate.  If, however, the speaker believes that ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’ behave like ‘hedgehog’ and ‘urchin’, such that those names are alternative labels for one 
and the same register, we may face a similar situation as in the inverse Paderewski puzzle – such 
that the speaker’s ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ cannot be taken to be the same as our identically spelled 
words (even though they are linguistically linked to one another).  This shows that the speaker’s 
own (usually implicit) linguistic beliefs cannot be ignored in individuating her words.360   
My proposal clearly is not a novel one.  Kripke himself envisaged such a response in the 
original paper introducing the Paderewski puzzle: 
One might argue that Peter and we do speak different dialects, since in Peter’s idiolect 
‘Paderewski’ is used ambiguously361 as a name for a musician and a statesman (even though these 
are, in fact, the same), while in our language it is used unambiguously for a musician-statesman.  
The problem then would be whether Peter’s dialect can be translated homophonically into our 
own.362 
Kripke entertains the possibility that Peter speaks a different dialect from ours, but ultimately 
rejects it.  I believe that his preference for a homophonic translation stems from his epistemic 
commitments.  I offered a translation manual for Peter’s words that still allows for 
communicative success in situations where we are trying to pass on information about the world.  
But the passage goes on: 
Before he hears of ‘Paderewski-the-statesman’, it would appear that the answer is affirmative for 
his (then unambiguous) use of ‘Paderewski’, since he did not differ from anyone who happens to 
                                                
360 I hope that this approach may also lead to new insights into to the question of what implications anti-
individualism has on self-knowledge – the knowledge an individual has about the content of her own 
thoughts.   
361 Kripke opted for a different notion for name than I.  Where Kripke describes Peter’s word 
‘Paderewski’ as ambiguous (either referring to Paderewski as musician or statesman, but not both), I 
simply say that there are two distinct names.  In the present context this difference is purely verbal and 
can be set aside.   
362 Krike (1979):  footnote 37, p. 279. 
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have heard of Paderewki’s musical achievements but not of his statesmanship.  Similarly for his 
later use of ‘Paderewski’, if we ignore his earlier use.363  
Kripke’s reflections illuminate a potential threat to my view.  Prior to Peter reading the 
biography, he only has one Paderewski-register.  At this point Peter is conceptually on par with 
the speaker who only knows of Paderewski as a musician.  This lack of information would not 
prevent us from translating this speaker’s name ‘PaderewskiI’ as the public name ‘PaderewskiP’ 
– thereby taking it at face value.  Why should Peter’s case then be any different, prior to his 
reading the biography that leads him to develop a second Paderewski2-register and acquire a new 
name.  So far, I assumed that none of Peter’s names ‘PaderewskiI1’ or ‘PaderewskiI2’ ought to be 
translated as the public ‘PaderewskiP’.  If ‘PaderewskiI1-at time t1’ is the same name as 
‘PaderewskiP’, while ‘PaderewskiP1-at time t2’ is not the same name as ‘PaderewskiP’ it follows that 
unbeknownst to Peter ‘PaderewskiI1-at time t1’ is not the same name as ‘PaderewskiI1-at time t2’.  This 
creates new potential for Peter to make invalid inferences or believe contradictions, since Peter 
will be inclined to schematize two distinct names as one and the same – thereby being willing to 
infer conjunctions that do not logically follow (remember the reverse Paderewski puzzle).  As a 
result our entire efforts would have been in vain!   
I am not convinced that our initial intuitions for either taking both names ‘PaderewskiI1’ and 
‘PaderewskiI2’ at face-value or none is well-founded.  I wonder whether this doesn’t stem from 
the consideration that the corresponding modes of presentations entertained by Peter “overlap” 
equally with the fully informed user’s modes of presentation associated with ‘PaderewskiP’.  I 
have advertised against a notion of names in which modes of presentation individuate names as a 
solution to the Paderewski puzzle.  I see no risk in proposing to translate the name that Peter 
                                                
363 Kripke (1979):  footnote 37, p.279. 
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acquires first at face-value, which would avoid Kripke’s objection, but not do so for the name or 
register he acquires later.   
5.6 Conclusion 
I wanted to do justice to the following intuitions:  (A) Peter doesn’t violate his rationality by 
asserting (i) and (ii), although only one of the two assertions can be true; (B) we understand what 
Peter wants to express with the utterances in question and Peter understands our public word 
‘Paderewski’.  I propose a special normative connection between our public name ‘Paderewski’ 
and Peter’s names ‘PaderewskiI1’ and ‘PaderewskiI2’.  Peter is obliged to merge his split concept 
into one, when he finds out that they both denote the same individual.  My anti-individualist 
version of the register analogy led me to conclude that speakers are always right about the 
individuation of their own proper names.  It remains to be shown whether this conclusion also 
applies to natural kind and artifact terms.  If this hypothesis holds for words generally, we may 
have a new solution to the prima facie conflict between anti-individualism and self-knowledge – 
the knowledge an individual has about the content of her own thoughts.  I will analyze this 
solution in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 6 
ARE INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS RELIABLE WHEN IT COMES TO INDIVIDUATING 
THEIR OWN WORDS?  TEST-CASE:  SLOW SWITCHING 
6.0  Introduction 
Oscar, an individual, ignorant of the chemical composition of water, is unknowingly switched 
from Earth to Twin Earth.364  We are to assume the two planets physically (and historically) 
identical with one exception:  we substitute Earth’s water, a collection of H2O molecules with 
twin-water, the chemical formula of which is entirely different and will be symbolized by 
‘XYZ’.365  It is generally agreed that the Earth English word ‘waterE’ denotes all and only water 
(H2O) and that the Twin Earth English word ‘waterTE’ denotes all and only twin water (XYZ). 
With few exceptions366, anti-individualists agree that while on Earth Oscar’s utterance u1 
“water1 quenches thirst” expresses that water quenches thirst, after some adequate amount of 
time spent on Twin Earth, Oscar’s utterance u2 “water2 quenches thirst” expresses that twin 
water quenches thirst.  Burge argues that judgments of our own (present) thoughts are self-
verifying367 - regardless of empirical knowledge of our social and physical environment.  Oscar 
can reason as follows:  “I know that I am (right now) thinking that water quenches thirst.”  If 
                                                
364 In order for there to be consistency in Oscar’s phenomenal experiences (non-intentionally described) 
he must find on Twin Earth a “replica” of all his family and other social bonds.  Oscar is to find a twin 
wife, twin children, twin friends, twin colleagues and twin acquaintances, who all have a history 
mimicking the one Oscar had with his actual wife, children, friends, colleagues and acquaintances.  We 
will thus assume that Twin Oscar has been simultaneously switched from Twin Earth to Earth.   
365 We are to ignore complications such as the physical compositions of humans on Twin Earth.  If there 
is no water on Twin Earth, then Twin Earthians couldn’t possibly be physically identical to Earthians.  It 
is also hard to see how the developmental histories of Earth and Twin Earth could have been even 
remotely similar.  Such scientific concerns are to be set aside.    
366 Falvey (2003) argues that on Twin Earth Oscar’s word ‘water’ denotes zwater (a merged concept of 
the concepts water and twin water).  My own view is similar to Falvey’s.  The difference is that I claim 
Oscar’s ‘waterO’-register denotes zwater on both planets.   
367 Burge (1988)  
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Oscar is on Earth, then his first-order thought, as well as his second-order thought will be about 
water.  On Twin Earth Oscar will, in contrast, be thinking that twin-water quenches thirst and 
also interpret his thought as pertaining to twin-water.  The content of both thoughts are 
determined by the same environment and are thus guaranteed to be about the same kind of 
stuff368 – thereby rendering such judgments authoritative.  There is disagreement about whether 
Oscar should have the ability to recall his earlier utterance u1 and thereby be in a position to 
compare what u1 asserts with his present utterance u2.  Oscar will assess the two utterances to 
express the same state of affairs, even though they express distinct thoughts.369   
Boghossian has argued that the inability to recognize that some past thought τ1 and some 
present thought τ2 have different contents, threatens the individual’s ability to draw valid 
inferences from τ1 and τ2370 without first investigating her environment accordingly.371   
Social anti-individualism attempts to explain the transfer of knowledge across speakers.  Taschek 
explains how 
there is no making sense of persons, in the relevant sense, without the possibility of assessing 
their rationality.  This means at the very least, being able to assess their beliefs for logical 
consistency, to evaluate their inferences for validity, and to identify intersubjective agreements 
and disagreements between their beliefs and those of others.372 
If Boghossian’s objection is justified, then social anti-individualism fails to be able to explain 
how inter-subjective communication is possible in cases where the speaker uses a word that is 
intended as a repetition of nodes that belong to distinct repetition trees.   
                                                
368 It is generally agreed that it takes some time for Oscar to adapt to the new linguistic community and 
physical environment.   
369 I am taking for granted that there is no distortion of content between the content of thought and what 
(content) the corresponding utterance Oscar uses to convey his respective thought expresses.  Presumably 
Oscar doesn’t need language to access his own thoughts.  Utterances are simply my means to talk about 
Oscar’s thoughts as well as Oscar’s means to convey his (more complex) beliefs to others.   
370 Any argument containing both thoughts are premises would threaten the individual’s ability to reason 
discursively.   
371 Boghossian (1992).  
372 Taschek (1998):  pp. 323-353.   
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Burge describes the main motivation for individualism as follows: 
[A]n individual’s representational content depends (partly) on a web of inferential connections 
with other representational contents.  The idea is that the constitutive conditions for 
understanding a concept cannot outrun the network of inferences that the individual can draw.373  
Given that (social) anti-individualist’s believe that a speaker can be partly under- or mis-
informed about what her words denote374, it follows that the content of the individual’s concept 
can outrun the network of inferences that the individual can draw.  What needs to be explained is 
how – in the face of switching scenarios – this doesn’t threaten the a priority of her logical 
reasoning abilities.   
Suppose that while water and twin-water dissolve salt, vitamin A is only soluble in twin-
water.375  Oscar is being told on Twin Earth:  “Vitamin A is soluble in water”376, which leads 
him to recall an utterance he heard on Earth:  “Water dissolves salt.”377  He then reasons as 
follows: 
(i) Water1 dissolves salt.378 
(ii) Water2 dissolves vitamin A.  
(iii) Thus, water3 dissolves vitamin A and salt.379  
Oscar’s ability to draw a valid inference from (i) and (ii) pre-supposes that he is able to keep 
track of his word ‘waterO’ throughout his reasoning process.  It would suffice if some external 
                                                
373 Burge (2007):  p. 176.   
374 Burge (1989, 2007):  p. 261.   
375 On Earth vitamin A stands out for not being soluble in water, but oil.   
376 Oscar has not been exposed to utterances suggesting the contrary to Oscar on Earth.   
377 It is assumed that Oscar at the time of the original acquisition of τ1 and τ2 respectively was justified in 
trusting the corresponding testimonies.   
378 Let’s assume that twin-water also dissolves salt.  Nevertheless, what (ii) expresses doesn’t follow from 
the original testimony, which only pertained to water and not twin water.   
379 Oscar will detect contradictions where there aren’t any.  If he were (unlike I assumed in the above 
example) to remember that he was once told “Vitamin A cannot be dissolved in water” when he is being 
told on Twin Earth “Vitamin A can be dissolved in water”, then Oscar will falsely conclude that he has to 
choose between which of the two statements he believes to be true.      
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mechanism ensured that Oscar uses the same word ‘water’ in (i) through (iii).  Gibbons, on the 
contrary, argues that the content of memory is preserved throughout the switch such that Oscar 
retains the ability to generate the concept water in addition to having acquired the new concept 
twin water380 – henceforth referred to as ‘the dual concept theory’ (DC).  Ludlow, Tye and 
Falvey contend that Oscar looses the ability to generate the concept water (after having spent an 
adequate amount of time) on Twin Earth381 – which I name ‘the replaced concept theory’ (RC).  
While DC ascribes invalid inference reasoning to Oscar, RC avoids such a charge, since Oscar’s 
word ‘water’ is assumed to denote the same substance from (i) to (iii).  RC allows for Oscar to 
keep track of his own words throughout the argument, but we are left puzzling over how he 
would simply forget such an ordinary word as ‘waterE’ (without any corresponding change in 
Oscar’s cognitive apparatus).   
Another strategy, pursued by Schiffer and Burge, combines the best of DC and RC.  After he 
encounters twin water, Oscar is assumed generally capable of generating both concepts:  water 
and twin water.  At the same time throughout his argument (i) through (iii) it is also assumed that 
his word ‘water’ anaphorically382 preserves reference (AR).383  If Oscar’s word ‘water’ can 
denote water in one context, but twin water in another, then Oscar fails to keep track of his word 
                                                
380 Gibbons (1996); Boghossian (1992) merely demonstrates some implications of this view; he doesn’t 
endorse DC; Burge assumes that Oscar has the ability to generate the concepts water and twin water, but 
he denies that this means Oscar therefore draws invalid inferences (such as in (i) through (iii)).   
381 Ludlow (1995); Tye  (1998); Falvey (2003). 
382 Usually the word applies to pronouns.  Schiffer (1992) doesn’t use the word ‘anaphoric’ to describe his 
proposal.  Goldberg describes Schiffer’s proposal as one involving “anaphoric reference preserving” 
(Goldberg (2007b):  p.185).  Schiffer imagines that an instructor believes two students with the generic 
name ‘Yolanda’ to be one and the same.  One always attends his classes on Tuesday, the other on 
Thursday.  “Ralph is thinking of the Thursday Yolanda under some vivid memory mode of presentation 
and, because he confuses her with the Tuesday Yolanda, thinks that she asked a very good question on 
Tuesday. To express this belief, he says:  ‘On Tuesday, Yolanda asked a very good question’ […We] may 
say that the spoken token of ‘Yolanda’ refers unambiguously to the Thursday Yolanda” (Schiffer (1992):  
p.33).  It is this process of reference transfer that I described as ‘anaphoric’.   
383 Burge (1998); Schiffer (1992). 
  
 
 
  183 
‘water’.  I have assumed that the reference of a given word w remains the same across time (and 
across individuals). 
Goldberg explains how DC and AR (the same goes for RC) all threaten an individual’s ability 
to reason discursively – either (a) the justificatory relation between premises and conclusion is 
broken, or (b) the epistemic relation between at least one premise and the experience through 
which it originally acquired justification is broken (i.e. a first-person perceptual experience or 
testimony).   
I observe that the root of the epistemic implications is that DC, RC and AR all violate Oscar’s 
ability to correctly individuate his own words across time and varying contexts, which also 
entails that speakers don’t forget words altogether384 – especially when it comes to such common 
words such as ‘water’.   
I will propose a solution that allows for Oscar to reliably keep track of his word ‘waterO’ 
across time and varying contexts – from now on referred to as ‘the rigid385 register theory’ (RR).  
Even though RR is compatible with the a priority of logical abilities, RR comes with its own 
negative epistemic implications.  I conclude that we should favor RR over DC, RC and AR.   
6.1 Unwarranted inferences 
It is not sufficient for the content of Oscar’s memories regarding (Earth) water to have been 
preserved throughout the switch to Twin Earth (and after), he also must be able to access them as 
memories pertaining to water.  Some assume that the content of the second-order thought is 
                                                
384 Unless neurological conditions caused the loss of memory (i.e. Alzheimer’s disease or amnesia).   
385 I am using the word ‘rigid’ to stress my very strong claim that words of a particular individual cannot 
under any circumstances change in meaning across time or contexts.  I am not saying that the individual’s 
word w has the same reference in all metaphysically possible worlds – since she may keep track of the 
various tokens in question (the ones that look like tokens of w) differently.   
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automatically the same as the first-order thought.  When Oscar thus recalls his memory “water 
dissolves salt”, he correctly remembers it as a memory about water (not twin-water).   
[We] can surely count on there being syntactic mechanisms which ensure that if a token of 
sentence S enters the belief box, then ceteris paribus, so does a token of the sentence ‘I believe 
that S’.  And so, provided that the embedded and unembedded tokens of S may always be counted 
upon to express the same content, the second order belief will always report correctly on the 
content of the first-order belief […].386 
As a result, Oscar’s utterances “water1” and “water2” will constitute performances of different 
words (at least if you assume, like I do, that in order for two non-indexical words w and w’ to be 
one and the same, they must at least have the same reference).  The token in premise (i) and the 
token in premise (ii) will not denote the same kind of stuff.  In premise (i) Oscar recalls a 
memory from Earth that pertains to water.  Since according to DC the content of memories is 
preserved (unless there is an accompanying cognitive change within the individual’s mental 
apparatus), (i) is correctly remembered as a thought about water.  Premise (ii), however, is a new 
belief the content of which is determined by Oscar’s new environment and therefore pertains to 
twin water.  Assuming that Oscar can adequately express his own thoughts, (i) is a claim about 
water, while (ii) is a claim about twin water.  Oscar, however, is incapable of recognizing the 
difference between water and twin water thoughts.  As a result, he judges utterances “water1”, 
“water2” and “water3” to constitute performances of the same word ‘waterO’.  If we were to ask 
Oscar to formalize his argument387 he would present us with something equivalent to the 
following:  
Let ‘Wx’ stand for ‘x is water’, ‘Ax’ stand for ‘x is vitamin A’, ‘Sx’ stand for ‘x is salt’ and 
‘xDy’ stand for ‘x dissolves y’: 
                                                
386 Boghossian (1992):  p.15.  Boghossian merely demonstrates the implications of this view, but does not 
endorse it himself; Gibbons (1996).  
387 We will assume Oscar competent in symbolic logic (I believe this assumption won’t distort the 
outcome of this analysis). 
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(i') (∀x) (∀y) ((Wx ∧ Ay) ⊃ xDy) 
(ii') (∀x) (∀y) ((Wx ∧ Sy) ⊃ xDy) 
(iii') (∀x) (∀y) (∀z) ((Wx ∧ Ay ∧ Sz) ⊃ (xDy ∧ xDz)) 
(iii’) states that all the stuff that Oscar calls ‘water’ dissolves vitamin A and salt.  If (i') through 
(iii') is one of the correct ways of schematizing Oscar’s argument in question, then he draws a 
valid inference.  
When Oscar utters:  (i) “water dissolves salt”, he thereby meant to repeat the testimony Τ 
(heard on Earth) through which he acquired the corresponding belief τ.  It was not one of Oscar’s 
own observations of water (i.e. upon dropping a spoon of water and watching the crystals 
dissolve) that gave rise to τ.  This means that the content of (i) is stipulated as not epistemically 
connected to Twin Earth experiences.  Oscar never deliberates about how his current experiences 
may confirm his belief in (i) – such as when he drops salt into boiling water in preparation for 
cooking pasta.  Oscar simply doesn’t spend much time in the kitchen or wondering about food 
science.  In addition, Oscar never learned on Earth that vitamin A doesn’t dissolve in water.  
Hence, when he hears the testimony Τ’ through which he forms the corresponding belief τ 
expressed by (ii), he doesn’t have to negate any of his beliefs previously held true.  He simply 
adds a new conception or attitude to his ‘waterO’-register (“dissolves vitamin A”).   
If DC is correct in arguing that Oscar’s memories of water are preserved and that he can 
access them as thoughts about water, then he commits the fallacy of equivocation.  “True 
premises”, Boghossian explain, “conspire, through a fallacy of equivocation that Peter is in 
principle not in a position to notice, to produce a false conclusion.”388  
                                                
388 Boghossian (1992):  p.22.   
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Ascribing characteristic A to entity a and characteristic B to entity b, does not imply that there 
is some entity c that displays characteristics A and B.  This would only follow, if we knew 
entities a and b to be one and the same individual, or if they were groups with all the same 
individuals as members.389  It is stipulated that this is not the case for water and twin water.  If 
any amount of liquid is water, then it is not twin water and vice versa.   
According to DC Oscar should have instead reasoned as follows:  
Let ‘W1x’ stand for ‘x is water’390, ‘W2x’ stand for ‘x is twin water’, ‘Ax’ stand for ‘x is 
vitamin A’, ‘Sx’ stand for ‘x is salt’ and ‘xDy’ stand for ‘x dissolves y’: 
(i'') (∀x) (∀y) ((W1x ∧ Ay) ⊃ xDy) 
(ii'') (∀x) (∀y) ((W2x ∧ Sy) ⊃ xDy) 
(iii'') (∀w) (∀x) (∀y) (∀z) ((W1w ∧ W2x ∧ Ay ∧ Sz) ⊃ (wDy ∧ xDz)) 
From (iiiʹ′ʹ′) it does not follow that there is some substance that dissolves vitamin A and water, 
even though there may be such a substance (i.e. some oils or twin water).   
If we interpret Oscar’s word ‘water1’ to denote water and Oscar’s word ‘water2’ to denote 
twin water, then (iʹ′ʹ′) and (iiʹ′ʹ′) are apt schemata for Oscar’s premises (i) and (ii) respectively.  His 
argument thus looks like the following: 
(i'') (∀x) (∀y) ((W1x ∧ Ay) ⊃ xDy) 
(ii'') (∀x) (∀y) ((W2x ∧ Sy) ⊃ xDy) 
(iii*) (∀x) (∀y) (∀z) (((W1x ∨ W2x) ∧ Ay ∧ Sz) ⊃ (xDy ∧ xDz)) 
                                                
389 Since I have assumed that twin-water dissolves salt and vitamin A, Oscar’s conclusion may be true (if 
it indeed were to pertain to twin water).  The question is of course not whether Oscar’s conclusion 
happens to be true, but rather whether his premises (i) and (ii) jointly imply (iii).   
390 Oscar’s second premise is assumed epistemically linked to a testimony he heard on Earth.  As I will 
discuss in a moment, some philosophers argue that Oscar’s epistemic link has been broken (even though 
it was “intact” while he lived on Earth).  According to DC, Oscar’s knowledge that water dissolves salt 
appropriately relies on the original testimony and this epistemic link is not broken by his change in 
location.   
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(iii*) doesn’t follow from (iʹ′ʹ′) and (iiʹ′ʹ′).  Oscar equivocates “apples with oranges”, or water with 
twin water and thus infers a conclusion that reaches beyond the information provided by the 
premises.  Sometimes we reason hastily, but this doesn’t explain Oscar’s mistake.  No amount of 
careful reflection and reconsidering each step of the argument is going to put him in a position to 
see that he should have reasoned differently.  Furthermore, the argument in question is not 
terribly complex to begin with – quite the contrary! 
If we were to present Oscar with the alternative schemata (iʹ′ʹ′) to (iiiʹ′ʹ′), he would tell us that 
we can formalize his sentences as proposed, but this hides the information that ‘(∀x) (W1x ↔ 
W2x)’; consequently, the distinction between the two symbols ‘W1x’ and ‘W2x’ is unnecessary.  
Short of telling Oscar about his having been switched from Earth to Twin Earth, Oscar is 
unlikely to be convinced of the need for the above distinction.  He never learned on Earth that 
water doesn’t dissolve vitamin A.  Hence, he has no experiences that would lead him to suspect 
that there are two types of water.     
Unless somebody informs him of the switch in location, Oscar is simply not going to 
challenge his beliefs about the words ‘waterE’ and ‘waterTE’, due to the considerable similarities 
between water and twin water.  He is going to continue to believe that the two words are one and 
the same and are correctly to be translated as his word ‘waterO’.  If Oscar is unable to even 
minimally assert the distinction between what ‘water1’ and ‘water2’ denote respectively, can we 
interpret (i) and (ii) as schemata (iʹ′ʹ′) and (iiʹ′ʹ′)?  Recall Putnam’s self-proclaimed ignorance as to 
what characteristics distinguish an elm from a beech tree.  Putnam was not able to specify how 
elms are different from beeches, but he was, nevertheless, minimally aware of a distinction 
between those two types of trees.  I argued that the content of his ‘elm’-register and the content 
of his ‘beech’-register are identical – in the sense that he ascribes the same characteristics to each 
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type of tree.  Putnam nonetheless keeps information about what these words denote separate.  
This warrants interpreting his words ‘elmP’ and ‘beechP’ as distinct words.  Oscar, on the other 
hand, keeps only one ‘waterO’ register stored in his cognitive apparatus.   
DC may simply insist that sometimes speakers are wrong about how they store information 
pertaining to the entities they talk about.  They may further point out that this whole reference to 
registers is merely an explanatory tool anyways.  It is quite unlikely that we would ever be able 
to scientifically prove that they exist.  We are able to demonstrate that some activities 
consistently activate one part of the brain (or several specific areas of the brain), while other 
activities consistently activate different parts of the brain.  It is doubtful that we could fine-tune 
this method to apply it to word-registers.  Perhaps such a spatial correlation with registers 
doesn’t even exist.  That said, I stipulated the existence of registers on the basis of the speaker’s 
intra-subjective word individuations – these intra-subjective judgments DC violates regardless of 
whether registers exist in the cognitive apparatus of the individual.  Unless Oscar is generally 
correct about how he keeps track of his own words, we can’t get word types off the ground.  
Recall my observations in chapter one, as well as Kaplan’s claims that the graphic and phonetic 
features of utterances aren’t enough to group word utterances into word-types.  Our investigation 
of how we communicate inter-subjectively pre-supposes the existence of word-types.  We thus 
concluded that we have to rely on the speaker’s own intra-subjective judgments about how she 
keeps track of her words by grouping utterances.  This means that we cannot suddenly question 
this ability at a later stage without offering reasons why those particular judgments of Oscar’s are 
false without having this skepticism permeate all his intra-subjective word individuations – 
thereby undermining our entire project.  Does the fact that Putnam’s thought-example is far-
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fetched to begin with contain this skepticism?  According to Ebbs such skepticism about self-
knowledge undermines our ability to even describe such Putnam style thought examples.391   
Either way, mistakes in formal reasoning should not be explained by reference to false beliefs 
regarding the empirical world.   
6.2 Monist proposals 
By arguing that Oscar cannot generate thoughts about both entities at any given time, RC 
blocks the attribution of invalid reasoning to Oscar.  The ability to produce thoughts about water 
is lost when he becomes competent in the concept twin water392 – throughout Oscar’s conceptual 
apparatus the concept twin water replaces the concept water.  RC entails that Oscar’s ‘waterO’-
register changes topic and either abruptly or somehow suddenly switches its reference from 
water to twin water.   
When Oscar is being told on Earth “water dissolves salt” he forms the belief that water 
dissolves salt through what was asserted by the original testimony Τ.  After several years of 
immersion in the Twin Earth English linguistic community, Oscar hears “water dissolves vitamin 
A.”  RC agrees with DC that Oscar is linguistically competent in the Twin English word 
‘waterTE’ denoting twin water and thereby comes to store the belief that twin water dissolves 
vitamin A.  The content of his memory which he expresses with “water dissolves salt” switches, 
once Oscar acquires the concept twin water, his “memory” pertains to twin water.393 
                                                
391 Ebbs (2003).   
392 Ludlow (1995); Tye  (1998). 
393 It is puzzling how two thoughts with significantly different contents are supposed to represent the 
same memory.   
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RC avoids ascribing bad inference reasoning to Oscar, since his utterance ‘water’ is only 
linked to one public word repetition tree at any given time, thereby rendering the schematizing of 
his argument apt.  According to RC Oscar correctly schematizes his reasoning as presented by 
(i') through (iii').  Furthermore, Oscar doesn’t make false comparative judgments of his words 
‘waterE’ and ‘waterTE’, since once he is able to perform an instance of the word ‘waterTE’ he 
thereby looses the ability to utter “waterE”.  Without the ability to bring to mind both words, he 
is unable to make a false comparative judgment as to whether they constitute the same or 
different words.   
Heal points out how Oscar will have many referential intentions that conflict with twin water 
being the referent for his word ‘waterO’.394  Oscar may say things such as “water is the stuff I 
swam in as a child” (and twin water is not the stuff Oscar swam in as a child).  However, I have 
pointed out in chapter three, how such conflicting referential intentions cannot always break the 
link to the public repetition tree (here, the public repetition tree being ‘waterTE’), or else we risk 
to undermine anti-individualism (à la Burge) altogether.  An important ingredient to anti-
individualism is that speakers can be wrong about some of the characteristics of the things their 
words denote.  Consequently, Oscar may simply be wrong about having swum in twin water as a 
child.  Still, Heal’s concerns give rise to the question as to why we should prioritize the 
referential intentions that would select twin water as the referent for Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ over 
those that would select water as the correct referent.  Should we value referential intentions less 
because they were formed further back in time?  Perhaps.  But what if the individual recalls those 
characteristics she learned first about what she interprets to be one topic more vividly?   
                                                
394 Heal (1998).   
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RC comes with significant costs.  It is unclear whether we can ever make sense of some of 
RC’s implications.  Even though, according to RC, Oscar doesn’t make a false judgment as to 
whether two of his words are one and the same, something even more puzzling happens:  Oscar 
completely forgets a rather ordinary word, such as ‘waterE’.  There are many words that we 
haven’t used for years, but they don’t thereby entirely slip our cognitive apparatus.  Certainly, if 
we were presented with a relevantly similar word-form, it would lead us to recall the word in 
question.  When I argued that speakers reliably keep track of their own words (unless some 
neurological damage has occurred), this also entails that speakers do not randomly forget words.  
In order for individuals to keep track of their own words, they must be able to keep track of the 
corresponding registers.  Words are labels for registers.   
The topic of Oscar’s register ‘waterO’ changes independently of any cognitive alterations of 
the register (non-intentionally described).  Registers change over time because we refine and 
enrich them by adding, removing and ideally correcting our conceptions of the respective entities 
they are about.  With the exception of adding the belief that “water can dissolve vitamin A” he 
didn’t change his beliefs about waterO.395  The corresponding register changes what it pertains to 
– it changes the topic.  If registers change what they pertain to over time, that is, switch whatever 
stuff they were denoting from reference group A to reference group B (the two reference groups 
being distinct), then w1 and w2 could constitute performances of the same word, even though w1 
denotes a different reference class than w2.  Non-indexical words ought to be interchangeable in 
a sentence without changing the truth-value of the sentence as a whole.  Dropping such a 
fundamental assumption will have far-reaching consequences, which we ought to avoid.   
                                                
395 This of course means we ignore his extended experiences with new particulars that he identifies as 
water:  such as ‘this glass is filled with water’.  Oscar doesn’t think that this much extends his knowledge 
of “water”, since he already keeps identifying the same kind of stuff as water over and over again – which 
of course is false.  Oscar is identifying glasses filled with twin water as “water”.   
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When Oscar looses the ability to generate the concept water, he thereby also forgets all his 
thoughts that pertained to water.  At the same time Oscar is unaware of having forgotten 
anything, since component parts of these memories were substituted with twin water.  As a 
result, Oscar’s memories turn into “mis-memories”.  When Oscar utters:  “I used to swim in 
water as a child” he is now stating that he used to swim in twin-water as a child – which is false 
(he used to swim in water).  The same goes for all his thoughts that constitute “memories” about 
particulars of that physical world on Earth.  He somehow cannot entertain any thoughts that 
pertain to individual objects (including sentient and rational “objects”) of his past habitat on 
Earth.  The truth-value of a large portion of his thoughts (that were at some time about life on 
Earth) changed from true to false.  Only memories that don’t pertain to particulars (including the 
particular planet) or to the natural kind water still remain unaffected by the switch.  It is very 
hard to come to terms with how a change in location – one Oscar is unaware of – can have such 
drastic effects on Oscar’s mental life.  How can we explain Oscar’s collective forgetting of all 
thoughts that pertain to the concept water and the respective individuals from Earth? 
Since RC agrees that Oscar used to know that water dissolves salt, how can he cease to have 
this knowledge without having made any changes in his corresponding ‘water’-register?396  
Nevertheless, it is agreed that if we could point at Oscar having acquired new relevant beliefs, 
then he may have changed his mind about a previously held belief.  Falvey suggests: 
[N]ew information can lead one to question a previous judgment that was in fact warranted.397   
                                                
396 Boghossian (1992).   
However, it is unclear whether Oscar forgets anything – his memory’s content switches without him 
noticing the change.  I agree with Boghossian that something puzzling is happening with Oscar’s 
cognitive apparatus.  I am not sure whether we can argue that Oscar doesn’t forget anything, if he indeed 
ceases to be capable to generate the concept water and thus looses a good deal of knowledge.   
397 Falvey (2003):  p. 223.   
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 As Falvey himself notes, this observation doesn’t seem to help us much with the puzzle at hand, 
since Oscar certainly doesn’t identify his new experiences with twin water as new information.  It 
brings us closer to the key question:  does Oscar’s change in location have any significant effects 
on Oscar’s cognitive apparatus?  What supposedly happens is not that he adds new conceptions 
to his ‘water’-register, it is that the topic of his register changes altogether.  This would of course 
explain the loss of knowledge – if Oscar cannot generate thoughts about water, then he also 
couldn’t possibly have knowledge of the corresponding substance.  I explained above how this 
approach is conceptually dangerous.   
Goldberg demonstrates how approaches like RC that allow for Oscar to keep track of his word 
‘waterO’ in (i) through (iii) threaten Oscar’s ability to reason on the basis of discursive 
justification – “the kind of justification that accrues to a belief acquired via inference.”  RC 
entirely focuses on whether Oscar’s reasoning is valid, but thereby overlooks dangerous 
epistemic implications.   
If I [= Oscar] am not presently [= at tr] suffering from a relevant cognitive malfunction and have 
not acquired any relevant new evidence regarding any of my premise-beliefs since the time I 
acquired them, the degree of justification of my belief in the conjunction of the premises at tr is 
exclusively determined by the degrees of justification enjoyed by each of my premise-beliefs, 
individually, at the time each was acquired.398, 399 
In Oscar’s case, however, the epistemic link between premise (i) and the experience that gave 
rise to premise (i) is interrupted.  At some point, Oscar’s belief τ expressed by “water dissolves 
salt” has adequate epistemic justification through testimony Τ.  This epistemic link is 
mysteriously broken, without any corresponding change in Oscar’s cognitive apparatus (nothing 
changes “inside” his mind).   
                                                
398 Goldberg (2007b):  p. 189. 
399 Goldberg seems to take for granted that the belief in question cannot change its epistemic warrant over 
time.  I may, for instance, believe that the birth-rate in Germany is 0.8 per person (and that this is not 
going to change for several years).  This is the kind of belief that may cease to be true over time.  
Germany’s government could adopt drastic measures to increase the birth-rate of its citizens. 
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[I]nsofar as the hearer aims to acquire knowledge of how the world is through that testimony, he 
(the hearer) must recover how that testimony has represented the world to be.  And this, of 
course, is another way of saying that the hearer must have understood the testimony.400 
According to RC, when Oscar first is exposed to the testimony Τ:  “water dissolves salt” (on 
Earth) he understands the claim Τ makes about the world and about water specifically.  From the 
time Oscar acquires competence in our word ‘waterE’ he remains competent in ‘waterE’ 
throughout his stay on Earth.401  Upon hearing Τ Oscar forms the adequate belief that water 
dissolves salt (τ).  Τ thus transfers its epistemic warrant onto τ – since Oscar understands how Τ 
has presented the world to be and adequately stores Τ’s content as τ.402  Premise (i) is meant to 
simply restate τ.  Here we are facing an identity question:  should we say that (i) mis-represents 
τ, or instead claim that (i) correctly states τ’s content (but the content of τ changed)?  Either way 
the epistemic link to the original testimony Τ is interrupted, since Oscar is unable to recall its 
content (without the ability to generate thoughts about water, he cannot recall the content of Τ).   
Goldberg seems to assume that τ and what (i) states are one and the same thought (but that the 
thought changed its content over time).  Of course, if we cannot keep track of the content of our 
own thoughts in this manner, such that at t1 τ claims the word to display state of affairs s1, but 
that at t2 τ claims the world to display state of affairs s2 (and s1 is a different state of affairs from 
s2), then it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the degree of justification of τ would quite likely 
have changed from t1 to t2 (without the individual having acquired relevant new evidence).  To 
me the core of the problem is whether we accept the possibility that an individual’s mental 
                                                
400 Goldberg (2007a):  p. 42.  
401 It is not entirely clear when Oscar is supposed to loose his competence in ‘waterE’.  We do know it 
supposedly happens some time between his leaving Earth and his acquiring competence in the word 
‘waterTE’.   
402 Oscar doesn’t possess knowledge that would increase the degree of justification of what Τ expresses.   
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register can change the topic from water to twin water403,404 as assumed by RC.  I maintain that a 
mental register doesn’t change in content (over time or across contexts).   
Of course, one could take the converse approach to RC and argue that Oscar instead never 
acquires the concept twin water and only ever stores beliefs about water in his ‘waterO’ register.  
The advantage of attributing such adaptation failure to Oscar (AF) is that we don’t have to 
explain Oscar’s excessive loss of knowledge and the undetected substitution of the effected 
beliefs by false beliefs.  According to AF Oscar’s reasoning from (i) to (iii) is valid.   
As anti-individualists we would have a hard time explaining why Oscar never picks up the 
public concept twin water no matter how much time he spends on Twin Earth.  How can Oscar 
directly perceive twin water and appear to engage successfully in substantial conversations about 
twin water, without having picked up the corresponding public concept?  Again, this reference 
failure would pertain to all names for particulars (i.e. the name of Oscar’s twin wife405) in his 
environment that constitute twins to particulars Oscar had already been acquainted with on Earth.  
Oscar’s success in deferring to his Earth (English) community is in accordance with anti-
individualism; his later (partial) failure to defer to his Twin Earth linguistic community seems 
puzzling.  In chapter four I offered an example where my prior membership in the German 
linguistic community interfered with acquiring competence in the ordinary English word 
‘angina’.  What makes my own case different from Oscar’s – even though we both intended to 
defer to the respective linguistic community in question and still failed – is that I had significant 
beliefs about the characteristics of what my word ‘angina’ denotes that are incompatible with my 
                                                
403 Or as later discussed change content from water to zwater.   
404 I suppose it would also be possible for the water-register to cease to exist altogether and be replaced 
simultaneously by a twin-water register.  It seems to me that in such a case there would be no epistemic 
continuity between the original testimony Τ and what premise (i) states.  Oscar would simply forget τ and 
form a new belief τ*. 
405 The twin wife is really Twin Oscar’s wife.  Oscar and the twin wife never exchanged marriage vows.   
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having spoken about angina.  I was furthermore aware of my interacting with distinct linguistic 
communities:  the German and the English ones.  Oscar isn’t even aware of the possibility of 
distinct words being in use because he believes he is engaging with the same linguistic 
community throughout the time span of the thought example.  He furthermore doesn’t seem to 
have false referential beliefs about twin water.  Since AF doesn’t seem a viable proposal for anti-
individualists, I consider it a dead end.   
Falvey offers a clever version of RC406, where Oscar’s water concept doesn’t get replaced by 
the concept twin water, but instead by a disjunctive concept (RC’) zwater.407  He proposes that 
Oscar’s “judgment purports only to be about a kind of stuff, and there are disjunctive kinds of 
stuff, even if they are not natural kinds (jade is a frequently cited example).”408  Oscar’s 
utterance “this is water” is true if and only if what he points at is either water or twin water.  We 
cannot attribute to him a disjunctive claim such as “this is water or twin water” since this would 
entail that Oscar is minimally aware of the two kinds – this is why I prefer to attribute to Oscar a 
merged “concept”.  Oscar is not even minimally aware of a distinction between the two kinds of 
water.  
Just like RC, RC’ allows us to interpret Oscar’s argument as valid, since all utterances of 
‘water’ therein are instances of the same word ‘waterO’ denoting zwater.  This, however, implies 
that somehow Oscar lost track of his own word ‘waterO’, in the sense that at some point in the 
past (on Earth) it denoted water and at present (on Twin Earth) it means zwater – while Oscar is 
unaware of any change of reference.  Since he lost the ability to produce an instance of his 
                                                
406 Falvey (2003) and I disagree on Oscar’s memories from Earth such as “water quenches thirst” 
pertaining only to water.  I will argue that if Oscar’s ‘waterO’-register matures as one that pertains to 
water and twin-water, then we have to apply this to all of Oscar’s past utterances.  
407 I suppose ‘zwater’ stands for ‘zwitterwater’, where ‘Zwitter’ is a German word to be translated as 
‘hybrid’ into English.   
408 Falvey (2003):  p.229 
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original word ‘waterO’ denoting water, I can’t argue that he incorrectly judges instances of the 
two words to be performances of the same word.  Without the ability to produce instances of 
both words, Oscar is not in a position to make such comparative judgments.   
Falvey takes our word ‘jade’ to be evidence for the possibility of such disjunctive concepts.409  
Many people may be under the false impression that ‘jade’ denotes one natural kind whereas it 
denotes two different natural kinds:  jadeite and nephrite (distinct chemical substances).  Jade is 
nevertheless a homogenous kind of a sort:  it is (typically) a green gemstone often carved into 
small to medium artifacts.  Without instruments enhancing the human senses, jadeite is 
indistinguishable from nephrite.  Suppose Patrick, a person who is oblivious to the two types of 
jade, were to observe a sample of jadeite and come to conclude:  “jade has about the same 
hardness as quartz” (Patrick assumes that jade is a natural kind).  As it happens, this property is 
not shared by nephrite (which is slightly softer than jadeite).  Patrick’s sample was biased.  In 
anticipation of concerns that Patrick’s word ‘jade’ only denotes jadeite (and not nephrite), let’s 
also stipulate that Patrick also interacted with samples of nephrite.  Suppose his wife has a 
necklace made out of nephrite beads and Patrick has not dared to test those for their hardness 
properties.  Patrick would describe the piece of jewelry as a “jade necklace”.   
Patrick reasons as follows:   
(iv) Jade has about the same hardness as quartz.   
(v) Jade is a metamorphic rock. 
                                                
409 I concur.   
  
 
 
  198 
(vi) Thus, jade is a metamorphic rock with about the same hardness as 
quartz.410  
I think most of us would agree that Patrick simply has the false belief that all jade has about the 
same hardness as quartz, but that his inferences are valid.  This is merely supposed to show that 
it is quite possible for a person to store information about two distinct natural kinds in one 
register – even though it is not stored as information about two distinct kinds.  That is, from the 
perspective of Patrick’s registers, there is only one kind of jade.   
The same goes for Oscar’s argument.  The conclusion follows from the premises, but it is 
false that all zwater dissolves salt and vitamin A (since the latter is not soluble in water).  Of 
course, Oscar’s situation is more complicated than Patrick’s.  The public word ‘jade’ (in English) 
also expresses such a disjunctive concept and thus when Patrick uses his word ‘jadeP’ we don’t 
have to explain failure to defer to competent speakers of the public word ‘jade’.   
Even though RC’ allows for some continuity between the ‘waterO’-register Oscar has on Earth 
with the one he has on Twin Earth (once he has spent an adequate amount of time on this planet), 
there is still a change in topic from water to zwater.  At least RC’ allows for an overlap between 
what the register pertains to on Twin Earth and what it pertains to on Earth, I discussed how 
problematic it is to allow for a mental register to change its topic.  According to my own theory 
such a radical change – a change in topic, rather than in the conceptions stored in the register – 
causes for a new register to be formed, while the respective “muddled” register gets retired.   
 
                                                
410 If we were to teach Patrick first order logic, this is how Patrick would formalize his belief:  Let’s 
assume ‘Jx’ stands for the predicate ‘x is jade’; ‘Qx’ stands for the predicate ‘x is quartz’; ‘Rx’ stands for 
the predicate ‘x is a metamorphic rock’; ‘xHy’ stands for the relation that ‘x has the same hardness as y’.  
(v) (∀x) (∀y) (Jx ∧ Qy ⊃ xHy) 
(vi) (∀x) (Jx ⊃ Rx) 
(vii) (∀x) (∀y) (Jx ∧ Qy ⊃ xHy ∧ Rx) 
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The resulting break in continuity of Oscar’s memories pertaining to water still remains puzzling.  
At some point Oscar had the experience of swimming in water.  This event brings about the later 
memory:  I used to swim in water as a child.  While Oscar resides on Earth (and doesn’t forget 
the event in question non-intentionally described), he knows that he used to swim in water as a 
child.  Once the substitution of the concepts in question occurs in Oscar’s cognitive apparatus, 
his utterance:  “I used to swim in water as a child,” expresses that Oscar used to swim in zwater 
as a child.  Falvey admits that 
[it] is not correct to say that [Oscar] remembers that [he swam in] zwater [as a child], since he did 
not know this at the time.  Partly for this reason, and the fact that the change in concept is 
undetectable [to Oscar], we may not want to say that [his] present judgment represent knowledge 
of [the bathing event].411 
RC’ like RC implies that Oscar suffers from a puzzling loss of knowledge, which we can’t find a 
satisfying explanation for.  Falvey moderates this objection by observing how Oscar’s “error is 
mitigated by the fact that zwater is a broadening of the concept that did figure in [his original] 
thought.”412  
It is not very believable, however, that a change in location would bring about such selective 
amnesia.  This psychological condition is usually caused by some traumatic experience or the 
result of physical injury.  The switch couldn’t have been traumatic for Oscar, since he wasn’t 
even aware of it.  It also doesn’t seem part of the story that Oscar is injured during the process.  
It remains puzzling why Oscar would loose such large amounts of knowledge.   
While in RC the epistemic link to the original testimony about water “water dissolves salt” is 
entirely broken, since Oscar fails to generate thoughts about water on Twin Earth altogether, 
according to RC’ the link remains partly intact, since Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ on Twin Earth 
means zwater.  Oscar is not able to generate thoughts about water specifically, but he is still able 
                                                
411 Falvey (2003):  p.240. 
412 Ibid.   
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to generate thoughts that are partially about water – he can generate thoughts that are about water 
or twin water without awareness of the latter two being distinct entities.  This seems to be an 
advantage RC’ has over RC.   
Even though RC’ improves the epistemic link between the testimony Τ and what premise (i) 
states, there is still a loss in degree of justification between the belief formed at the time when 
Oscar first hears Τ and the time he reasons through the argument in question (even though he 
doesn’t acquire new relevant information).  When Oscar thinks τ for the first time, τ is justified 
through testimony Τ.  On Twin Earth Oscar ceases to understand Τ – τ somehow switched 
content and turned into a “mis-memory” (it now pertains to zwater, whereas it pertained to water 
at some earlier time).  Even though it happens to be true that water and twin water both dissolve 
salt, premise (i) is not formed on the basis of an observation Oscar made while interacting with 
twin water; it’s justificatory status epistemically depends on a testimony heard on Earth.  
According to RC’ Oscar can still generate the concept water413, he just can’t generate it in 
isolation from twin water.  Even though RC’ has the same problematic implications as RC in 
kind they are somewhat more palatable in their severity.  There is somewhat less of a memory 
loss and there is at least a partial epistemic link to the original testimony that premise (i) links to.   
We cannot, however, overlook a newly introduced challenge by RC’.  Since Oscar’s word 
‘waterO’ on Twin Earth denotes zwater, while his interlocutors’ words ‘water’ denote twin 
water414, Oscar is constantly talking past his interlocutors – at least in part.  Premise (ii) is 
actually false and was never justified.  Oscar meant to repeat a testimony Τ’ he heard on Twin 
                                                
413 The concept water that picks out H2O. 
414 We assume that Oscar is the only one that underwent the switch from Earth to Twin Earth.  Since we 
assumed that Twin Oscar simultaneously was switched from Twin Earth to Earth and thus presumably, 
according to RC’, would also acquire the concept zwater, Twin Oscar would be the only one who could 
understand Oscar.  Of course, they are stipulated to never meet…   
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Earth.  Oscar, however, never understood that Τ’ asserted twin water to dissolve vitamin A.  
Oscar interprets Τ’ to make the claim that zwater dissolves vitamin A – which is false (since not 
all zwater dissolves vitamin A). 
Schiffer and Burge propose an anti-individualist solution that avoids some of the problems RC 
and RC’ introduce, without accusing Oscar of an invalid inference (AR).415  It is argued that 
Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ denotes the same throughout his reasoning (i) to (iii), due to an anaphoric 
reference preservation within a given context.  According to Schiffer, “[w]hatever mode of 
presentation is operative for [Oscar] in the first utterance will also be operative with him in the 
second:  for his intention is to be speaking about the same [stuff].”416   
As per to AR Oscar can generally generate both concepts water and twin water (even though 
he is not aware of their distinctness).  We thus don’t have to explain a general loss of knowledge 
of thoughts pertaining to water or individuals from Earth.  Oscar still has the memory “I swam in 
water as a child” and it states correctly that Oscar swam in water as a child.  It is only when 
Oscar thinks of twin water within the same context that he gets his “memories” mixed up.  This 
means that Oscar’s ‘waterO’-register is ambiguous:  depending on context it either pertains to 
water or twin water.   
Schiffer has us imagine a person, Ralph, being unable to keep two students separate.  Ralph 
has beliefs about them stored in the same mental register labeled ‘Yolanda’.  Since proper names 
can only have one referent (at a time), we are supposed to conclude that when Ralph utters 
‘Yolanda’ he only refers to one student (not both).  For the puzzle in question, it doesn’t matter 
which individual Ralph’s name ‘Yolanda’ refers to, since all Schiffer needs to show is that 
Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ denotes the same stuff throughout his reasoning process.   
                                                
415 Schiffer (1992); Burge (1998). 
416 Schiffer (1992):  p.33.   
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 An odd result of this proposal is that what premises (i) and (ii), as well as the conclusion 
(iii) express depends on the order within which the premises are presented.  Surely, this order is 
arbitrary and shouldn’t settle how we ought to interpret what the argument as a whole pertains to. 
AR still implies a loss of epistemic connection to the experience that originally lent 
justification to one of the premises.417  This time the culprit is premise (ii), since the occurrence 
of ‘waterO’ anaphorically receives its reference from premise (i).  Premise (ii) lost its epistemic 
link to testimony Τ’, the content of which gave rise to the belief τ that (ii) expresses.   
AR is furthermore incompatible with my assertion that speakers can reliably individuate their 
own words (across time and varying contexts).  The reference of Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ changes 
across contexts sometimes denoting water, at others twin water.  Perhaps Schiffer would reply 
that Oscar still keeps track of the same word – but it happens to be an ambiguous word.  If that is 
so, Oscar should be aware of using an ambiguous word, since his word ‘waterO’ will not be 
substitutable across contexts without changing the truth-value of the statement that ‘waterO’ is a 
component part of.   
6.3 Merged registers 
Unless the individual suffers from some cognitive malfunctioning, the degree of justification 
of a conclusion-belief is derived from the degree of justification of the conjunction of the 
respective premise-beliefs.  The degree of justification of each premise-belief goes back to some 
event of acquisition – some event that caused the individual to assert the premise-belief.  In the 
case where the premise-belief was acquired as a result of another person’s testimony, the premise 
belief τ is justified to the degree the original testimony Τ was justified assuming that the 
                                                
417 Goldberg (2007b).   
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individual understood Τ (and assuming that the individual has not and does not acquire any 
additional relevant evidence that bestows greater epistemic warrant on the premise belief).  
According to Goldberg, the degree of justification of τ ought to remain constant across time 
(unless the individual acquires new relevant evidence).418  If the content of τ is allowed to 
change over time, without the individual’s notice (without some conscious change in the 
individual’s cognitive apparatus) – then it is quite likely that a belief’s justification is not 
preserved through memory.  In other words, the epistemic link of the belief to its justificatory 
experience is broken.  If we want to argue for the a priority of logical abilities, we must not only 
take into account the validity of an argument, but also consider that the premises are warranted 
due to some original experience.  If the epistemic link to that experience is interrupted (i.e. Oscar 
ceases to understand the testimony), then the respective premise ceases to be justified.   
I will offer a new solution that will neither ascribe invalid reasoning to Oscar, nor argue that 
his premise-beliefs fail to preserve their justification through the switch from Earth to Twin 
Earth.  I will achieve this by arguing that Oscar keeps track of his own word ‘waterO’ – that is, 
Oscar does not forget his word ‘waterO’ which he acquired on Earth and he is able to individuate 
his own utterances “water” correctly across time (and across varying contexts).  At the same 
time, Oscar doesn’t fail to link his ‘waterO’-register to the ‘waterTE’-repetition tree (the word 
‘waterTE’ on Twin Earth).  Finally, Oscar’s ‘waterO’-register doesn’t change reference (over time 
and across contexts) – it claims registers to be rigid (RR).  However, the only reason why the 
degree of justification of Oscar’s premise-beliefs remains constant over time is that, since Oscar 
never really understood the respective premises, the justificatory link between testimony Τ and 
                                                
418 Goldberg (2007b).   
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Oscar’s resulting belief τ was always defective – τ was never adequately justified to begin with 
(this is true for both premise-beliefs (i) and (ii)).   
You may wonder whether this means that Oscar was never able to communicate with his 
fellow Earthlings about water and whether he ever effectively communicates with his fellow 
Twin Earthlings about twin water – using the various performances of his word ‘waterO’ (which 
are all linked to the same register).  It is Oscar’s commitment to repeat our word ‘water’ and his 
willingness to make the adequate changes to his ‘water’-register – if he finds out about the 
switch and the two kinds of water – that establish a semantic link between ‘waterE’ and ‘waterO’.  
Again, I must stress that this semantic link is weaker than identity – this does not make Oscar’s 
performance ‘waterO’ a successful repetition of our word ‘waterE’, precisely because the same 
commitment exists with regard to the Twin English word ‘waterTE’ (denoting twin water).  I 
assume that Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ cannot constitute a repetition of nodes stemming from distinct 
repetition trees.  At the same time Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ is a merged concept of two public 
repetition trees – he is not free to use it however he wants.  
Once Oscar finds out about the two distinct liquids water and twin water and the 
corresponding public words ‘waterE’ and ‘waterTE’ Oscar must split his ‘water’-register into two 
separate registers, such as to avoid drawing invalid inferences.  This re-organizing of his 
registers is what allows Oscar to unlock the original testimonies (that gave rise to his beliefs (i) 
and (ii)).  His later split concepts ‘waterO1’ and ‘waterO2’ are each respectively repetitions of the 
public words ‘waterE’ and ‘waterTE’.  There is semantic continuity between ‘waterO’ and 
‘waterO1’ (as well as ‘waterO2’).  Some of the conceptions previously associated with ‘waterO’ 
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were transferred to ‘waterO1’ (the same ones or others get transferred to ‘waterO2’).419  
Nevertheless, until Oscar performs this splitting of his ‘waterO’ register, he is talking past his 
interlocutors when uttering “water”.  While testimonies acquired through his informants’ use of 
the word ‘waterE’ or ‘waterTE’ are defective – the information contained in those testimonies can 
be unlocked as described above.   
I thus agree with DC and RC’ that at the time he reasons through his argument in question 
Oscar indeed is linked to both public repetition trees ‘waterE’, as well as ‘waterTE’ – but I clearly 
identify it as a defective link.  RR furthermore concurs with RC’ that it is one and the same 
‘waterO’ mental register that is linked to both repetition trees at the same time.  As a result, 
Oscar’s formal logical reasoning isn’t faulty.  Given that all of Oscar’s utterances “water” are 
linked to the same register420, Oscar draws a valid conclusion (iii).  His word ‘water’ denotes 
water as well as twin water without distinguishing the two entities as distinct kinds.   
What distinguishes RR from RC’ is that RR doesn’t allow for Oscar’s memories to switch in 
content – even those that contain the word ‘waterO’.  So, Oscar’s register ‘waterO’ doesn’t 
undergo a change in what it denotes.  Since I also want Oscar to be (at least) “partially 
successful” at communicating with his Twin Earth community when it comes to conversations 
about twin water, I will have to argue that Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ means zwater throughout – on 
Earth, as well as Twin Earth.  From that it follows that Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ already denotes 
twin water (as well as water) prior to his encountering twin water.  Admittedly, RR appears 
prima facie unbelievable – perhaps even crazy.  Please bear with me; I will address those 
concerns in a moment.   
                                                
419 This transferring of conceptions is tricky to do correctly.  Oscar may not know which conceptions 
correctly belong to which register.  Peter didn’t have this problem when merging his ‘Paderewski1’ and 
‘Paderewski2’ registers.   
420 At least up to the point when he finds out that his word ‘waterO’ is really linked to words denoting 
distinct natural kinds.   
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Oscar’s mistake is not to be located in his inference reasoning; he simply comes to a false 
conclusion because he assumes a false premise.  What Oscar predicates in (ii) of the set of things 
his word ‘water’ denotes is only true of a subset thereof.  Even though the corresponding original 
testimony that Oscar meant to repeat in (ii) is true, (ii) is false.   
[I]nsofar as the hearer aims to acquire knowledge of how the world is through that testimony, he 
(the hearer) must recover how that testimony has represented the world to be.  And this, of 
course, is another way of saying that the hearer must have understood the testimony.421 
Since Oscar fails to distinguish between water and twin water and the original testimony claimed 
that vitamin A is soluble in twin water, Oscar has misunderstood what the original testimony 
meant to convey.  The same goes for premise (i) – even though (i) happens to be true, it is based 
on a testimony Oscar failed to understand.   
The downside of RR is that Oscar never manages to successfully communicate with his 
linguistic community about water or twin water (at least not until he finds out about the switch in 
location); this is true on Earth as well as Twin Earth.  When Oscar utters “water”, he is talking 
about zwater, while others are either talking about water or twin water.  Neither in Earth English 
nor in Twin Earth English does a word exist that expresses the disjunctive concept that Falvey 
and I intend to ascribe to Oscar.  My assumptions also commit me to this communication failure 
– but I argue that it can be rectified through Oscar’s re-organizing of his registers accordingly 
(that is, he must split his ‘waterO’-register).   
The upside is that since the topic of Oscar’s register ‘waterO’ doesn’t change, (a) Oscar’s 
reasoning is valid; (b) there is no loss of knowledge related to his respective memories (i.e. “I 
swam in water as a child”); (c) Oscar doesn’t forget the word ‘waterE’ (since he was never 
linguistically competent in its use); (d) Oscar reliably individuates his utterances “water” across 
                                                
421 Goldberg (2007a):  p. 42.  
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time and across contexts; and (e) the degree of justification of his premise-beliefs is preserved 
across time.  
It is difficult to make believable that Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ is “linked” to the ‘waterTE’ 
repetition tree, even before he interacts with people who have experienced twin water and before 
Oscar directly perceives twin water.  Keep in mind that from first exposure to full-fledged 
competence, the register is one and the same.  While the register’s content is growing it remains 
the same register and it pertains to the same content throughout its development.   
In chapter four I explained how a speaker, who encounters a word for the first time will create 
a mental register with an accompanying label.  Let’s first analyze the non-problematic case, 
where the individual is not unknowingly switched to a twin-environment.  Let’s call this 
individual ‘Kevin’.  When Kevin first encounters the word ‘waterE’ at t0, he creates a register 
with the label ‘waterK’.  Kevin may have picked up the word, without having any idea what it 
denotes (except for inferring from its grammatical role that it is a kind word – perhaps even a 
mass noun).  I want to allow for Kevin to be using the same word ‘waterK’ from first exposure to 
the public word ‘waterE’ to the point (tn) where he has filled the register with substantial 
information such that his register has matured.  Even though at t0 Kevin’s register doesn’t 
contain any information that would single out water as the correct referent and we cannot 
consider him yet a competent participant of the ‘waterE’-speaking practice, we interpret his word 
as denoting water.  It is his future commitment to that practice that retroactively bestows 
reference onto Kevin’s word ‘waterK’ at t0422.  I want us to recognize that even in normal cases, 
we already allow for the future to partly individuate an individual’s words.   
                                                
422 Kevin’s word ‘waterK’ does not undergo a change in reference from first exposure to ‘waterE’ which 
leads him to create a ‘waterK’-register to performances of ‘waterK’ when his register has matured.  The 
difference between the early and the later performances is that Kevin acquires competence in the word 
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Oscar’s case, even though it strikes us prima facie as puzzling, is not really extraordinary.  I 
am not violating anti-individualism, since Oscar’s word ‘waterO’ is linked to some public 
repetition tree – what is unusual, is that his word is connected to more than one repetition tree.  
Oscar “owes” commitment to both linguistic communities, which partially explains why he is not 
entirely failing in his communicative attempts – he successfully coordinates his behavior with his 
fellow speaker through his word ‘waterO’ and interpreting their words ‘waterE’ and ‘waterTE’ to 
constitute the same word as his word ‘waterO’.  As stated above, my account implies that Oscar 
is (from an epistemic point of view) not successfully communicating about a single topic with 
his interlocutors.  When Oscar talks about zwater, others talk to him about water (or twin water).  
Once Oscar finds out about the different kinds of water and the switch in location, he will split 
his merged register into separate registers.  This commitment is what makes him a member of 
both public practices – Oscar would regard himself as a member of both linguistic communities, 
if he were to be informed about there being two linguistic communities linked to his word 
‘waterO’.   
Some may find it unconvincing that in the two parallel worlds – one where Oscar is never 
switched to Twin Earth W1 and another, where Oscar does get switched to Twin Earth W2 – the 
two Oscars will have had identical experiences up to a certain time t (prior to the switch), they 
even live in the same environment, but the Oscar in W1 denotes water with his word ‘waterO’, 
while Oscar in W2 denotes zwater with ‘waterO’.  As an anti-individualist, I would question 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘waterK’ gradually.  That is, only once his register is matured is he entitled to make substantial claims 
about water using ‘waterK’.  Since in the normal case, Kevin is assumed to develop competence in the 
public word ‘waterE’, his performances of the word ‘waterK’ also constitute performances of the word 
‘waterE’.   
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whether the appropriate individuation of words is determined by mental states plus the 
individual’s physical and social environment.423 
 
RR still has some unpalatable implications, but it seems to fare better than any existing 
alternative (as shown by the following table): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4  Conclusion 
My analysis lends further evidence in support of Goldberg’s observation that anti-
individualism introduces serious epistemic costs that need to be considered.  Assuming anti-
individualism, there is no straightforward solution that keeps Oscar’s discursive reasoning intact 
without introducing other significant costs to his way of acquiring knowledge of his 
environment.  My own view is that we cannot even begin to make sense of how we acquire 
                                                
423 Ebbs (2009) goes so far as to argue that nothing makes our word-individuations true apart from our 
actual interpretations of words (PJSSs).   
 DC RC RC’ AR RR* 
Valid reasoning – + + + + 
No puzzling loss of knowledge + – – + + 
No puzzling loss of words + – – + + 
Reliable word-individuations – + + – + 
Degree of justification constant + – – – + 
Intact epistemic link to testimonies + – – – – 
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knowledge of the external world without first taking for granted that we can keep track of our 
own words (across time and contexts).  RR is the only solution to the problems posed to anti-
individualism by switching scenarios that takes seriously Oscar’s ability to individuate and not 
inexplicably forget his own words.   
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